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THE EFFECTIVENESS AND FAIRNESS OF SUPERFUND'S
JUDICIAL REVIEW PRECLUSION PROVISION
Michael P. Healy*

I.

INTRODUCTION

This article examines the effectiveness and fairness1 of section
113(h) 2 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA or Superfund). 3 That broadlyworded provision forecloses judicial review of Superfund cleanups
prior to enforcement or cleanup completion by requiring that any
review action fall within several narrowly-defined exceptions.
After providing an overview of the statute, its enforcement
mechanisms, and a context for considering section 113(h), the article summarizes how courts have applied CERCLA's timing of
* Associate Professor, University of Kentucky College of Law; J.D., University of Pennsylvania, 1984; B.A., Williams College, 1978. From 1987 until July 1990, Michael Healy was
an attorney in the Appellate Section of the Environment and Natural Resources Division.
United States Department of Justice. This article is based on a Report entitled, "'An Evaluation of the Fairness and Effectiveness of the Judicial Review Preclusion Provision in the
Superfund Statute," which Mr. Healy prepared for the Administrative Conference of tht
United States. Congress failed to continue funding for the Administrative Conference, so
the Conference did not have an opportunity to consider recommendations based on the
Report. The University of Kentucky College of Law also assisted in preparing this article
through a summer research grant. Mr. Healy wishes to acknowledge the help of an anonymous official who encouraged him to compare the review of response actions to the review
of corrective actions. Thanks to Debbie Mains, Class of 1996, for her work as a research
assistant.
I In Michael P. Healy, Judicial Review and CERCLA Response Actions: Interpretive

Strategies in the Face of Plain Meaning, 17 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (1993), the author

analyzes the problems of statutory construction that are posed by CERCLA's review preclusion provision. In this article, the author will discuss the various judicial interpretations
of § 113(h) only briefly, except where there have been important developments in the law
since the earlier article.
2 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) (1988). This provision states that, unless the action is one of five
proceedings identified in the statute:
No Federal court shall have jurisdiction under Federal law other than under
section 1332 of Title 28 (relating to diversity of citizenship jurisdiction) or
under State law ... to review any challenges to removal or remedial action
selected under section 9604 of this title, or to review any order issued under
section 9606(a) of this title ....

Id.
3 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA) amended CERCLA. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat.
1613 (1986).
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review provision,4 focusing principally on recent interpretations of
the provision. Finally, the article evaluates the effectiveness and
fairness of CERCLA review preclusion and concludes by offering
recommendations about how the provision should be interpreted
and amended.
Given the terms and intent of section 113(h), courts uniformly
hold that a district court lacks jurisdiction when, prior to a government action to recover response costs, a potentially responsible
party (PRP) seeks judicial review to determine its liability under
section 107 of CERCLA.6 By foreclosing review of such claims,
the provision has been quite effective in ensuring that cleanups are
not slowed as a result of litigation concerning CERCLA liability.
However, because section 113(h) postpones litigation of the liability issue, the review preclusion provision intensifies PRP concerns
about the fairness of CERCLA's liability scheme.
Section 113(h) has been less effective in foreclosing immediate
judicial review of CERCLA claims that are unrelated to liability,
with a minority of courts deciding that immediate review is available because delayed review would be inadequate.7 A particularly
troublesome claim of this type is present when a plaintiff contends
that the implementation of the challenged response action will
itself do irreparable harm to public health and the environment. If
section 113(h) forecloses review of this type of claim until after
implementation of the response action, the provision operates to
bar adequate review of the claim because the health-based concerns arise out of the planned cleanup measures themselves.
Courts must also decide whether section 113(h) bars federal
court jurisdiction when claimants rely on other federal statutes or
the Constitution to gain review of a CERCLA response action.
Courts have come to a variety of inconsistent conclusions about
whether the provision forecloses review in these cases. When
courts have decided that section 113(h) does not bar judicial
review, they have typically allowed review because of fairness con4 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h).
5 The author includes a much more detailed discussion of the cases interpreting § 113'(h)
in Healy, supra note 1. For an alternative summary of how courts have interpreted

§ 113(h), see Elizabeth Williams, Annotation, What Claims Fall Within Limitation Imposed
by § 113(h) of Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA) (42 USCS § 9613(h)) on Judicial Review of Cases Arising Under CERCLA,

116 A.L.R. FED. 69 (1993).
6 42 U.S.C. § 9607.
7 See infra parts III.B., IV.B.
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cerns. 8 That is, notwithstanding the broad and categorical terms of
section 113(h), concern for the preservation of statutory and constitutional rights through timely judicial review has motivated such
grants of early review.
II.

OVERVIEW

OF CERCLA,

SECTION

113(H),

AND THE

PROBLEM OF PRE-ENFORCEMENT REVIEW

A.

CERCLA and the Cleanup of Hazardous Substances

In 1980, Congress enacted CERCLA so that the federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) would have "the tools necessary for a prompt and effective response to problems of national
magnitude resulting from hazardous waste disposal."9 CERCLA
provided federal funds to ensure cleanup of hazardous substances
and federal authority to recover cleanup costs from those responsible for contamination. 10 CERCLA included substantial federal
funding, increased by subsequent statutes, to allow the federal government to begin cleanups of the "most significant releases of hazardous substances."' 1 The enforcement provisions and
8 See id.

9 United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1112 (D. Minn. 1982).
The concerns about hazardous waste that gave rise to CERCLA's enactment may be
traced to "[sleveral well-publicized incidents of improper disposal of large amounts of hazardous substances which caused serious public health problems." Michael P. Healy, Direct
Liability for Hazardous Substance Cleanups Under CERCLA: A Comprehensive
Approach, 42 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 65, 68 (1992). Congress recognized that a new environmental statute was necessary in order to address adequately the very significant problem that it believed was confronting the nation. See id. at 69 n.10.
Since Congress enacted CERCLA in 1980, clean-up costs have risen significantly. At
the time of CERCLA's enactment, the EPA estimated that spending between $13.1 and
$22.1 billion would permit the cleanup of the 1200 to 2000 most dangerous sites. See
United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1338 n.11 (E.D. Pa. 1983). More recently, a 1991
"University of Tennessee study calculates that the eventual costs of cleaning up all hazardous waste sites could reach $752 billion." HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS AND
OVERSIGHT OF THE COMM. ON PUBLIC WORKS AND TRANSPORTATION, ADMINISTRATION

OF THE FEDERAL SUPERFUND PROGRAM, H.R. Doc. No. 35, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6
(1993) [hereinafter REPORT ON SUPERFUND ADMINISTRATION].
10

See

KATHERINE N. PROBST ET AL., FOOTING THE BILL FOR SUPERFUND CLEANUPS:

WHO PAYS AND How? 30-31 (1995).
11 S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 17-18 (1980), reprintedin 1 SENATE COMM. ON
ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS, 97TH CONG., 2D SESS., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION, AND LIABILITY ACT

OF 1980 (SUPERFUND)

PUBLIC LAW 96-510, at 324-25 (Comm. Print 1983) [hereinafter

CERCLA HISTORY]. Three statutes have authorized a total of approximately $15 billion
for the Hazardous Substance Superfund (Superfund). See Healy, supra note 9, at 74 n.31.
26 U.S.C. § 9507 (1994) establishes the Superfund.
Congress intended Superfund to provide seed money for cleanups and replenish that
money by recovering the costs of cleanup from parties identified as liable for those costs
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mechanisms included in CERCLA are based on a "polluter pays"
principle and seek to impose cleanup costs on those responsible for

the release of hazardous substances into the environment. 12 A
basic understanding of CERCLA and the relationship between

cleanup and enforcement is important before one can evaluate the
effect of and concerns related to the review preclusion provision.
As the article discusses, CERCLA is structured so that the cleanup

function may be pursued independently of enforcing or imposing
liability under the Act.
1.

The Structure of CERCLA Cleanups
CERCLA grants the federal government and other parties the

authority to pursue response actions (cleanups). 13 When there is a

release or the threat of a release of a hazardous substance 14 from a
facility, 15 the EPA,'16 states, 17 tribes, 18 or other persons '9 may take
response actions that fall into either of two categories.
A first response option is a removal action, a short-term
response to a release intended "to abate, prevent, minimize, stabi2°
lize, mitigate, or eliminate the release or the threat of release.

Examples of removal actions include the use of fences, warning
signs, and other forms of site control; the installation of drainage
controls; the removal of leaking drums; and the construction of
caps over contaminated soil to reduce migration of hazardous subunder the Act. See Healy, supra note 9, at 75 n.34; see also infra notes 69-80 and accompanying text (discussing cost recovery actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 9607).
12 See Healy, supra note 9, at 82-83.
13 See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25) (defining the terms "respond" or "response").
14 Id. § 9601(22) defines a "release" as any discharge of hazardous substances into the
environment, subject to several exceptions.
IS Id. § 9601(9) defines "facility" quite broadly to include both the container of the hazardous substance and the area in which the substance has been deposited.
16 CERCLA § 104 gives the President the authority to respond to a release or a threat
of a release of hazardous substances by taking any "response measure consistent with the
national contingency plan which the President deems necessary to protect the public health
or welfare or the environment." Id. § 9604(a)(1). The National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (National Contingency Plan or NCP) presents the
EPA's plans for administering and implementing response actions. Section 105 of CERCLA requires that the EPA prepare the NCP, which is codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300 (1995).
17 See 40 C.F.R. § 300.500 (1995).
18 The NCP prescribes conditions under which Indian tribes are "afforded substantially
the same treatment as states under § 104 of CERCLA." Id. § 300.515(b).
19 See id. § 300.700(a) ("Any person may undertake a response'action to reduce or eliminate a release of a hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant.").
20 Id. § 300.415(b)(1); see also 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23) (defining the terms "remove" or
"removal").

1995-96]

Judicial Review Preclusion

275

stances. 21 Because these removal actions allow for immediate
abatement and are usually limited in terms of the money and time
the
that may be expended for them,22 they may be pursued without
23
process.
administrative
substantial
a
of
prior completion
Between CERCLA's enactment in 1980 and May 1992, the
"EPA calculated that 3,269 cleanup [remoVal] projects had been
started at 2,602 waste sites with 2,757 projects at 2,238 sites completed. ' 24 A recent study of CERCLA observed that "[t]he
removal program is generally believed to be the unsung success
story of the Superfund program. '2 5 Indeed, the EPA has indicated
that one of CERCLA's most valuable contributions to human
health and the environment has been the authorization for and
completion of these removal actions.26
A remedial action, 7 the other type of response action, refers to a
cleanup designed to achieve a permanent remedy at the site.28
Examples of remedial actions include several of the actions that
may be part of a removal action, 29 as well as mechanisms to collect
leachate and runoff, the treatment or incineration of hazardous
substances at the site, and reasonable monitoring to ensure the
adequacy of the remediation- effort.3° The 1986 Amendments to
CERCLA establish a preference for permanent, treatment-based
40 C.F.R. § 300.415(e) (1995).
Subject to narrow exceptions, CERCLA limits Superfund response action expenditures to $2 million and duration to 12 months, unless the action involves investigation and
monitoring permitted under 42 U.S.C. § 9604(b). Id. § 300.415(b)(5).
23 A pre-removal planning process is required only when "a planning period of at least
six months exists before on-site activities must be initiated." Id. § 300.415(b)(4).
24 REPORT ON SUPERFUND ADMINISTRATION, supra note 9, at 42.
25 PROBST ET AL., supra note 10, at 15.
26 See Review of the Hazardous Substance Superfund: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 223 (1993) (statement of Don R. Clay, Assistant Adm'r, Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response,
U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency) [hereinafter Ways and Means Review Hearings]. "[T]he
2,800 separate emergency removal actions we have taken have been very successful. We
believe these actions prevented fires, explosions, and other catastrophic events from occurring at unstable sites. I think this area has been a big success for the program, and we often
do not talk about them." Id.
27 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24).
28 A remedial action is taken "to prevent or minimize the release of hazardous substances so that they do not migrate to cause substantial danger to present or future public
health or welfare or the environment." Id.
29 For example, the statute states that a remedial action may involve "confinement...
clay cover ... cleanup of released hazardous substances ... . [and] repair or replacement of
leaking containers." Id. These actions are the same as those discussed in connection with
removal actions. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
30 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24). The EPA has identified seven basic "expectations [for use] in
developing appropriate remedial alternatives." 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(a)(1)(iii) (1995).
21
22
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remedies. 31 The cost of these preferred remedies is higher than the
cost of a removal that merely contains the hazardous substance and
remediates the effects of any prior releases into the environment.32
Because of the significant public health concerns related to
ensuring permanent remedies 33 and substantial average costs
(between $25 and $30 million per site) of remedial actions, the
process of funding, selecting, and implementing remedial actions is
very complex and time consuming.35 Only a small number of
remedial actions have been completed since CERCLA's enactment. 36 The EPA has vowed, however, that the number of completed remedial actions will increase significantly through the end
of this century.37 Additionally, the EPA has suggested that CERCLA's success should not be judged solely upon the number of
31 42 U.S.C. § 9621(b)(1).
32 See Ways and Means Review Hearings, supra note 26, at 19 (statement of Jan Paul
Acton, Assistant Director, Natural Resources and Commerce Division, Congressional
Budget Office).
33When it added § 121 to CERCLA in 1986, Congress stated its intent that "remedial
actions must assure protection of human health and the environment." H.R. CONF. REP.
No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 245 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3276, 3338. Congress' fundamental concern with the protection of human health is also apparent in the
Conference Committee's explanation of the requirement of cost-effectiveness, which was
included in § 121:
The term "cost-effective" means that in determining the appropriate level of
cleanup the President first determines the appropriate level of environmental
and health protection to be achieved and then selects a cost-efficient means of
achieving that goal. Only after the President determines ... that adequate
protection of human health and the environment will be achieved, is it appropriate to consider cost effectiveness.
Id.
34 REPORT ON SUPERFUND ADMINISTRATION, supra note 9, at 5 ("The cost of cleaning
up hazardous waste sites is enormous. [The] EPA estimates that the average cost for a
Superfund cleanup is between $25 and $30 million per site ..... "); see PROBST ET AL., supra
note 10, at 20 (estimating a cost of $29.1 million for a site cleanup).
35 The time period needed to plan for and complete a remedy is quite long. See REPORT
ON SUPERFUND ADMINISTRATION, supra note 9, at 6 ("The Congressional Budget Office
estimates that 15 years or more is needed from discovery to the completion of cleanup
construction for the average Superfund site.").
36 See id. at I (In the thirteen years since CERCLA was enacted, "only 49 sites have
been cleaned up and taken off the NPL. Cleanup construction has been completed at
another 112 sites, and it-is estimated that about half of all NPL sites have had some waste
removal completed."); National Priorities List for Uncontrolled Hazardous Waste Sites, 59
Fed. Reg. 65,206, 65,207 (1994) (reporting that, as of December 1994, 67 sites have been
deleted from the NPL following cleanup).
37 See Ways and Means Review Hearings, supra note 26, at 229 (statement of Don R.
Clay, Assistant Adm'r, Office *of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency) ("[Tihe number [of sites at which the construction of a remedy has been
completed] is now growing at a pace of approximately one completion per week; [the] EPA
is targeting 650 construction completions by the year 2000.").
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completed remedial actions, but upon the effectiveness of response
actions in reducing or eliminating risks to public health and the
environment. 38 To encourage this new measure of effectiveness,
the EPA developed the Superfund Accelerated Cleanup Model
(SACM), which "is an attempt to measure the effectiveness of the
Superfund program by risk reduction, rather than solely by how
many sites are deleted from the NPL."3 9 Regulated parties appear
to support this change in focus because the new standard for effectiveness should ensure that the EPA's remedial priorities are not
based merely on the ease of completing the action.40
CERCLA financed remedial actions are limited to the approximately 1,300 sites on the National Priorities List (NPL). The NPL
consists of sites the EPA has identified as posing the greatest risk
to human health and the environment.4 ' This limitation reflects
Congress' understanding that priorities had to be established CERCLA funding was simply
inadequate to respond to all releases
42
of hazardous substances.
The cost and effectiveness of a remedial action depend on its
design and selection, including the preparation of the Remedial
Investigation and Feasibility Study (alternatively referred to as the
38 See id. at 25 (statement of Jan Paul Acton, Assistant Director, Natural Resources and
Commerce Division, Congressional Budget Office). "[B]y eliminating the distinction
between removal sites and remedial sites, the agency hopes to change the yardstick by
which Superfund is measured, shifting the emphasis from NPL completions to risk reductions." Id.
39 REPORT ON SUPERFUND ADMINISTRATION, supra note 9, at 56.
40 See Ways and Means Review Hearings,supra note 26, at 360 (statement of Bill Mulligan, manager of Environmental Affairs, Chevron Corp., on behalf of the American Petroleum Institute). "Pressures to get the greatest number of sites cleaned up within a certain
time frame have caused [the] EPA to expend its limited resources on less complex sites
that generally pose lesser risks. API believes this inefficient practice should be reviewed
and attention focused on those sites presenting higher public health and environmental
risks." Id.
4f"The NPL is the list of priority releases for long-term remedial evaluation and
response." 40 C.F.R. § 300.425(b) (1995). The NPL list identifies sites that pose the greatest threat to human health and the environment, according to a hazard ranking system or a
prior determination by a state or the EPA. Id. § 300.425(c). See generally Eagle-Picher
Indus. v. United States EPA, 822 F.2d 132 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (describing and clarifying the
process by which sites are placed on the NPL). As of December 1994, there were 1,288
final and proposed sites on the NPL. See National Priorities List for Uncontrolled Hazardous Waste Sites, 59 Fed. Reg. 65,206, 65,206 (1994). The number of sites on the NPL is
expected to increase significantly for the foreseeable future. See REPORT ON SUPERFUND
ADMINISTRATION, supra note 9, at 1-2. "[The] EPA estimates that more than 100 [sites]
will be added annually to the NPL through the year 2000, producing an NPL more than
five times its originally anticipated size." Id.
42 See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
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RI/FS).4 3 This critical stage of the remedial action, 4 which typically requires three to four years to complete,45 is subject to strict
procedural and rather uncertain substantive constraints. Procedurally, the 1986 CERCLA Amendments added section 117, which
ensures substantial public participation in the selection and design
of the remediation plan. 6
Two elements are critical to the substance of the remedial action,
but the statute subjects neither to uniform and predictable controls. The first element involves the standards to determine
whether the remedial action is complete; that is, whether the site is
clean enough following the remedial action. In general, a remedy
is required to protect human health and the environment adequately. 47 To reach this goal, a site must comply with standards
identified in other environmental statutes that are "legally applicable ... or ...relevant and appropriate under the circumstances"
(ARARs)." Because CERCLA grants a state "substantial and
43 See 40 C.F.R. § 300.430 (1994) (discussing the RI/ES). The National Contingency
Plan states that "[t]he purpose of the [RUFS] is to assess site conditions and evaluate alternatives to the extent necessary to select a remedy." Id. § 300.430(a)(2).
44See REPORT ON SUPERFUND ADMINISTRATION, supra note 9, at 83 ("The selection of
a remedy is a major part of the cleanup process. Mr. Grumbly [President of Clean Sites,
Inc.,] said that the selection of remedy is 'the linchpin of any cleanup program ... .
45See id. at 53.
46 42 U.S.C. § 9617. This section requires that, before any remedial action may be pursued, notice and a brief analysis of the proposed remediation plan must be published and
made available to the public. The public must then be provided with "a reasonable opportunity for submission of written and oral comments." Id. § 9617(a). CERCLA also
requires public notice of the final remedial action plan, which must be available for review
by the public. Id. § 9617(b). The final plan must be accompanied by discussion of significant changes from the proposed plan and responses to any significant public comments on
the proposed plan. Id. Consistent with these formal procedural requirements, CERCLA
also requires the.EPA to keep an administrative record regarding the selection of a remedial action. Id. § 9613(k). Finally, the EPA must publish an explanation of any "significant
differences" between the final remediation plan and any action "taken" or the terms of any
final settlement. Id. § 9617(c).
Congress intended the 1986 Amendments to encourage support for cleanups within the
community. See, e.g., H.R. No. 253, 99th Cong., 1st. Sess., pt. 5, at 65 (1985) ("[Ijncreased
public participation will in the short term add procedural steps to the decision-making
process, but in the long term will expedite cleanup progress and increase public understanding of and support for remedial actions undertaken at Superfund sites."), reprinted in
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3124, 3188. CERCLA also provides funding for technical assistance
grants so that public participation is well-informed and productive. 42 U.S.C. § 9617(e).
4742 U.S.C. § 9621(d)(1). This provision was added to CERCLA in 1986 to codify Congress' intent that "remedial actions must assure protection of human health and the environment." See H. R. CONF. REP. No. 962, supra note 33, at 245.
48 42 U.S.C. § 9621(d)(2)(A)(i). In cases where an ARAR does not define a "protective
level" for a hazardous substance, the final remediation goal for carcinogens is to reduce the
risk to one incidence of cancer in one million. See Ways and Means Review Hearings,supra
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meaningful involvement" in the promulgation of cleanliness standards,49 they may vary among the states, particularly when states
have adopted pollution control standards that are more stringent
than federal standards. This process must be repeated for each
remediation site,50 producing new ARARs and thus uncertainty
about the final cleanup standards that will apply. Ultimately, this
process makes the cost of the cleanup less certain, reduces the willingness of private parties to agree upon remedial actions, and
increases the likelihood of litigation. 1
The second critical substantive element is the actual technical
plan for remediation. Although CERCLA prefers permanent
treatment-based remedies,5 2 there are often many alternative
methods for treating or otherwise remediating a site and the costs
associated with each method may vary greatly. Generally, the EPA
has undertaken the time-consuming process of identifying the.
appropriate cleanup methodology on a site-by-site basis. This process tends to slow cleanups and increase transaction costs for two
53
reasons: choosing a proper cleanup methodology is itself difficult,
and section 10754 PRPs are often unwilling to settle before the

note 26, at 303 (written response of the EPA to inquiries from Rep. Pickle). For noncarcinogens, the protective level is "a Hazard Index of less than or equal to 1." Id.
49 42 U.S.C. § 9621(f)(1). See also United States v. Akzo Coatings of Am., Inc., 949 F.2d
1409, 1418 (6th Cir. 1991) ("CERCLA ... provides a substantial and meaningful role for
the individual states in the selection and development of remedial actions to be taken
within their jurisdictions."). CERCLA also provides the states with a limited right to judicial review of an EPA decision and allows substitution of alternative remedies for EPA
proposals, including environmental standards viewed as relevant and appropriate by the
state. See 42 U.S.C. § 9621(f)(2)-(3); 40 C.F.R. § 300.515(f)(2) (1995).
50 See REPORT ON SUPERFUND ADMINISTRATION, supra note 9, at 79 ("In the absence of
specific statutory cleanup goals and levels, [the] EPA must determine 'how clean is clean'
at each Superfund site, a process requiring lengthy investigation and decisionmaking.").
51 See id. at 110 ("The ARARs requirement does lend uncertainty and inconsistency to
the remedy selection process, making responsible party litigation over the remedy and
delays in the cleanup process likely. Further, the uncertainty over which standards and
remedies will be applied is a disincentive for responsible parties to initiate cleanups.").
52 See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
53 See Ways and Means Review Hearings,supra note 26, at 234 (statement of Don R.
Clay, Assistant Adm'r, Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, stating that the EPA is seeking to change the ad hoc nature of remedy
selection and move to "[t]he use of presumptive remedies [which] will streamline removal
actions, site studies, and remedial actions, thereby improving consistency, reducing costs,
and increasing the speed with which hazardous waste sites are cleaned up").
54 42 U.S.C. § 9607.
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cleanup methodology is determined because the amount of their
liability will vary according to the chosen methodology. 55 Moreover, PRPs have raised concerns that the EPA selects the method
56

of remediation without regard to the related costs.

In sum, because there are few predictable and consistent sub-

stantive standards established for remedial actions, transaction
costs increase, settlement with PRPs becomes less likely, and con57
cerns that the cleanup program is unfair increase.
2.

The Structure of CERCLA Enforcement
CERCLA provides two formal enforcement methods, as well as
an informal method available only to the EPA. Any party authorized to undertake a response action 58 may initiate the first method,
a section 107 cost-recovery action. After an authorized party has
expended response costs, section 107(a) 59 allows an action to
recover such costs from parties defined as responsible under the

55 See Ways and Means Review Hearings, supra note 26, at 81 (statement of Jan Paul
Acton, Assistant Director, Natural Resources and Commerce Division, Congressional
Budget Office). Regarding cleanup negotiations, PRPs commented that "being forced to
sign up for a share of a cost of unknown magnitude too early causes PRPs to put up a lot of
resistance. That is often true at the stage of the [RI/FS]." Id.
56 See id. at 352 (statement of Bernard J. Reilly, Corporate Counsel, Du Pont Company). "[T]he liability scheme is wrong because it places the remedy selection decision in
the hands of regulators with absolutely no incentive to control costs, since the law allows
recovery of every penny from the parties. This is an unhealthy dynamic." Id.
57 See REPORT ON SUPERFUND ADMINISTRATION, supra note 9, at 91. According to this
report, when the EPA is deciding upon a remedy:
[the] EPA tends to focus on the highest potential health risks and chooses
protective remedies, while responsible parties would rather focus on an estimate of the most likely risks which results in less conservative cleanup levels
and less expensive remedies to meet those levels. The pace of cleanup can be

delayed significantly by responsible parties litigating over the risk assessment
upon which [the] EPA bases its remedy selection.
Id.
See Healy, supra note 1, at 9-10.
59 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
58
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Act. 60 Section 107(a) also defines the four classes of "person[s]"' 1
or responsible parties who are liable for bearing CERCLA cleanup
CoStS. 62 Responsible parties include present owners and operators
of the facility or site,63 some past owners or operators, 64 generators,65 and transporters.66 This section has been uniformly interpreted as imposing retroactive, strict, and joint and several liability
on responsible parties.67 This strict liability scheme is based on
"the 'polluter pays' principle, which has allowed the federal government and taxpayers to limit the cleanup costs they must
incur."' Since CERCLA's enactment, the EPA has significantly
increased the amount of money sought from PRPs in cost-recovery
actions. 69 Even after taking this into account, these recovered costs
60 40 C.F.R. § 300.700(c) (1995) outlines a § 107(a) cost-recovery action. When the

United States, a state, or a tribe incurs response costs, all costs "not inconsistent with the
NCP" may be recovered from responsible parties. Id. § 300.700(c)(1). When other parties
incur response costs, all "necessary costs ... consistent with the NCP" may be recovered.
Id. § 300.700(c)(2). Courts have construed the distinction between recoverable costs to
create a presumption in favor of recovery of costs incurred by the United States, a state, or
a tribe; such response costs will be disallowed only when a responsible party demonstrates
that they were not consistent with the NCP. See County Line Investment Co. v. Tinney,
933 F.2d 1508, 1512 n.8 (10th Cir. 1991) (explaining that "claims to recover government
response costs [are] subject to a lessened standard of proof"); United States v. Kramer, 757
F. Supp. 397, 436 (D.N.J. 1991) (stating that in cost-recovery actions brought by the government, "[d]efendants have the burden to prove that response costs are inconsistent with
the NCP" (citation omitted)). When a private party brings an action to recover CERCLA
response costs, the party must prove that the response costs incurred were consistent with
the NCP. Tinney, 933 F.2d at 1512.
61 CERCLA defines "person" broadly to include corporations and business entities as
well as individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21).
62 Id. § 9607(a). See generally Healy, supra note 9 (analyzing the difficulties that arise in
determining whether particular parties are liable for response costs under § 107 of CERCLA). Some courts have recently held that a PRP may not bring a § 107 cost recovery
action and may instead bring only a contribution action under § 113(f). See Hydro-Mfg. v.
Kayser-Roth Corp., 903 F. Supp. 273 (D.R.I. 1995).
63 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1).
64 Id. § 9607(a)(2).
65 Id. § 9607(a)(3) (responsible parties include those who arranged for the disposal or
treatment of the hazardous substances).
66 Id. § 9607(a)(4) (responsible parties include those who have transported the hazardous substances and selected the disposal facility).
67 See Healy, supra note 9, at 81-84 (discussing retroactive liability), 86-87 (discussing
strict liability), 102-03 (discussing joint and several liability).
68 REPORT ON SUPERFUND ADMINISTRATION, supra note 9, at 12. In part, when it
defined the groups of responsible parties, Congress intended to improve the level of care
with which hazardous substances are handled and disposed. See Healy, supra note 9, at 7286 (discussing the intent of the liability scheme).
69 See Healy, supra note 9, at 32-33 ("[The] EPA has increased its emphasis on cost
recovery of federal fund expenditures at Superfund sites. In 1987, the Agency sought to
recover $81 million from responsible parties. By 1992, the Agency was seeking to recover
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will continue to amount to only a small fraction of the total
Superfund.7 °
CERCLA does not require that the cost-recovery action be

brought immediately after response costs are incurred. The Act
merely establishes a statute of limitations, which in the case of
remedial actions forecloses a cost recovery action brought more
than "6years after initiation of physical on-site construction of the
remedial action."' 71 Because construction at a Superfund site may

not begin until ten or more years after it has been listed on the

NPL, 72 the average $30 million claim 73 for the remedial action will
not typically have to be brought until approximately 15 years after
74
a PRP has some notice that it may be liable for those costs.
The second formal enforcement option is available only to the
EPA. In addition to imposing liability under section 107 and
authorizing actions to recover the costs of cleanup, CERCLA provides the EPA with greater flexibility to respond to releases or

threatened releases that pose "an imminent and substantial endangerment to the public health or welfare or the environment."7 . In
that situation, section 106 authorizes the EPA to issue administrative orders compelling private cleanup of the facility. 76 These

administrative orders may be issued, for example, to instigate a
$280.3 million. Actual monies recovered by the Agency increased from $18.9 million in
1987 to $183.7 million in 1992.").
70 See PROBST ET AL., supra note 10, at 14 ("By the end of the 1993 fiscal year, $728[ ]
million in costs had been recovered by the government since the program's inception.
Such recoveries are likely to continue to provide a relatively small portion of the total trust
fund revenues.").
71 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(2)(B). For removal actions, the cost recovery action must be'
brought within three years after the removal is completed. See id. § 9613(g)(2)(A).
72 See REPORT ON SUPERFUND ADMINISTRATION, supra note 9, at 52-53. According to
the report:
The entire process from site identification to construction cleanup may last 15
years. The time required to progress from waste site identification to listing
on the NPL averages between seven and eight years. The RI/FS, cleanup
design, and construction stages average a total of approximately eight years,
with the RI/FS alone averaging from three to four years.
Id.
73 See supra note 34 (discussing the average cost of a remedial action).
74 See infra note 90 (discussing the EPA's views on when a cost-recovery action should
be brought).
75 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a).
76 See id. ("The President may ... after notice to the affected State, take other action ...
including ... issuing such orders as may be necessary to protect public health and welfare
and the environment."). See generally ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, GuIDANCE ON CERCLA SEC. 106(A) UNILATERAL ADMINISTRATIVE ORDERS FOR REMEDIAL
DESIGNS AND REMEDIAL ORDERS (1990), reprinted in 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
35,253 (1990). Section 106(a) also authorizes the United States to sue in federal district
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removal action or to force implementation of a remedial action
that has been selected by the EPA.77
If an ordered party fails to take the required actions, the EPA
may bring an action to enforce the order78 or it may itself proceed
with the response action. Wheni the EPA sues to recover the
response costs, it may also seek fines and damages for the party's
violation of the section 106 administrative order.79 Section 106
administrative orders are thus a powerful enforcement tool
because, if the subject of the order improperly fails to perform the
actions that are ordered, the government may recover fines 80 and
punitive damages of up to triple the Superfund expenditures.81
CERCLA does not specifically define the final enforcement
option available to the EPA. This informal option involves an
agreement between the EPA and one or more of the PRPs - ultimately formalized as a consent decree that is filed with a federal
district court - pursuant to which the settling PRPs agree to a
private response action at a Superfund site. Because the
Superfund program can support only a limited number of cleanups,
this third enforcement option has become "critical" to the EPA's
administration of CERCLA. 82 The $8.3 billion total value of these
so-called "PRP-lead" cleanups8 3 and their $1.3 billion yearly value,
compared to $1.6 billion annual expenditures out of Superfund,
demonstrate their significance to CERCLA.84
Indeed, in 1989 when the EPA was faced with growing congressional concern about the tardiness of CERCLA cleanups, the
agency decided to pursue an "enforcement-first" policy in administering CERCLA.85 This policy sought to increase the number of
court and "to secure such relief as may be necessary to abate such danger or threat." 42
U.S.C. § 9606(a).
77 See United States v. Akzo Coatings of Am., 949 F.2d 1409, 1417-18 (6th Cir. 1991).
78 See 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b)(1).
79 See id. § 9607(c)(3).
80 Id. § 9606(b)(1) (authorizing award of fines of up to $25,000 per day against "[any
person who, without sufficient cause, willfully violates, or fails or refuses to comply with" a
I
§ 106 order).
81 Id. § 9607(c)(3) (authorizing recovery of punitive damages from a party liable for
response costs under § 107 who, "without sufficient cause," fails to comply with a § 106
order).
82 PROBST ET AL., supra note 10, at 24 ("As long as the trust fund remains at current
funding levels, getting responsible parties to take the lead in site studies and remedial
actions is critical to achieving cleanups at all NPL sites.").
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 See REPORT ON SUPERFUND ADMINISTRATION, supra note 9, at 29.
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PRP-lead cleanups.86 As a result of this policy, the EPA now
devotes more resources to identifying PRPs once a site is listed on
the NPL.87 After PRPs have been identified, the EPA negotiates
in an effort to encourage one or more PRPs to pursue a remedial
action.88
There are three important and related impacts of the EPA's pursuit of the enforcement-first policy. First, the EPA has substantially increased the number of PRP-financed remedial actions so
that more than three-quarters of them are now funded by responsible parties. 89 This success makes the formal cost-recovery action a
less important enforcement option for the EPA.9"
86 See Ways and Means Review Hearings, supra note 26, at 235 (statement of Don R.
Clay, Assistant Adm'r, Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency) ("The first component of the enforcement process involves maximizing
the number of sites where [PRPs] are conducting the response.").
87 See REPORT ON SUPERFUND ADMINISTRATION, supra note 9, at 29 ("Under the
agency's 'enforcement first' approach, a responsible party search is undertaken after a site
is listed on the NPL.").
88 See id. at 30 ("[The] EPA will negotiate with the identified responsible parties to pay
for cleanup; the final terms and conditions of the response settlement are entered into a
judicial consent decree.").
89 See PROBST ET AL., supra note 10, at 17 ("In fiscal year 1987, responsible parties took
the lead in only 39 percent of remedial actions; by fiscal year 1993, they had taken the lead
in 79 percent of these cleanups." (footnote omitted)); see also REPORT ON SUPERFUND
ADMINISTRATION, supra note 9, at 30 ("[The] EPA's enforcement-first strategy has, since
1989, increased the amount of cleanups being paid for by responsible parties. [The] EPA
calculates that more than 60 percent of Superfund cleanups are now being paid for by
responsible parties, up from approximately 30 percent during the program's first eight
years." (footnote omitted)); Benefits and Drawbacks of the Superfund Statute's Liability
Provisions: Hearing Before the Environment, Energy, and Natural Resources Subcomm. of
the House Comm. on Government Operations, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 118 (1994) (statement
of Katherine N. Probst, fellow, Resources for the Future, noting that slightly more than 70
percent of cleanups are PRP financed) [hereinafter House Liability Hearing].
90 An EPA official recently explained how the cost-recovery action fits within the EPA
enforcement-first policy. He stated that:
The final component of the enforcement process is recovery of trust fund
expenditures. Cost recovery actions are essential both to replenish the fund
and, along with treble damage provisions, to deter other PRPs from trying to
avoid responsibility for performing response actions themselves. Cost recovery actions may take place at several points during the enforcement process
and are integral throughout. As a rule, [the] EPA attempts to negotiate
recovery of its oversight costs and all of its past site costs simultaneously with
negotiations for site response actions. Where there are non-settling PRPs,
[the] EPA may chose [sic] to waive the recovery of past costs from settling
parties and pursue non-settling parties for those past costs. If [the] EPA uses
its unilateral order authority under Section 106 of CERCLA to obtain PRP
response, we will first pursue non-settling/non-complying parties for these
costs. If no such parties exist, [the] EPA will pursue the complying PRPs
through a subsequent cost recovery action. Finally, where a response action is
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Second, the EPA's success in dramatically increasing the number
of PRP-financed cleanups demonstrates that settlement between
the EPA and PRPs is quite likely. PRPs often agree to pursue private cleanups because the EPA's cleanup costs are about 20%
higher - a cost the PRPs will ultimately have to bear.91 The EPA
also has incentives to settle with PRPs: shifting the cost of cleanup
away from the Superfund; reducing transaction costs and the burden that those costs pose for the fund. Litigation rarely follows an
agreement to pursue a PRP-lead cleanup, and thus the agency has
very low litigation-related transaction costs for that site. 2
Finally, the enforcement-first policy has increased the EPA's reliance on section 106 unilateral administrative orders (UAOs) to
compel cleanups by identified responsible parties. 93 However,
PRPs have criticized the EPA's use of UAOs as unfair, arguing that
the policy allows the EPA to target certain PRPs and to force those
deep-pocket parties to bear the very significant costs of cleaning up
a site. 94
In addition to these formal and informal EPA enforcement
actions, CERCLA contains a citizens' suit provision. 95 This provision authorizes private parties to bring actions in federal district
court alleging that the United States or any other person is violating CERCLA, or that an officer of the United States has failed to
perform a nondiscretionary duty under CERCLA.
fund financed, [the] EPA will pursue PRPs for cost recovery following the
completion of one or more of the major phases.of the cleanup.
Ways and Means Review Hearings, supra note 26, at 235-36 (statement of Don R. Clay,
Assistant Adm'r, Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, EPA).
91 See PRoasT ET AL., supra note 10, at 17 ("Compared to the federal government.
responsible parties are believed to achieve cost savings on the order of 15 to 20 percent
when they implement site cleanup. These savings, it is argued, reflect the inherent inefficiencies of large bureaucracies and government contract requirements." (footnotes omitted)); see also House Liability Hearing, supra note 89, at 98 (statement of Katherine N.
Probst, Fellow, Resources for the Future) ("If there is one element of Superfund on which
almost everyone agrees, it is that the private sector can more effectively manage site cleanups than the Federal Government.").
92 PROBST ET AL., supra note 10, at 17.
93 See id. at 30-31 ("The number of [unilateral administrative orders] issued under if 106
increased as well, from 13 in 1988 to 110 in 1992." (footnote omitted)); Ways and Means
Review Hearings,supra note 26, at 236 (statement of Don R. Clay, Assistant Adm'r, Office
of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency) ("Since 1980,
[the] EPA has issued 780 UAOs for response actions. Of that number, more than 50%
have been issued since 'Enforcement-First.' More than 80% of the 175 UAOs issued for
cleanup design and implementation have been issued since 'Enforcement First."').
94 See infra notes 355-57 and accompanying text.
95 42 U.S.C. § 9659(a).
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CERCLA's Review Preclusion Provision

All litigation, including a citizens' suit under section 310,96 that
requires a federal court "to review any challenges to removal or
remedial action selected under section 9604 of this title, or to
review any [Section 106 administrative] order" is subject to CERCLA's judicial review preclusion provision, which imposes critical
limits on the timing of review. 97 This "unusual provision," 98 which
was added to CERCLA by SARA in 1986, 99 bars federal court
jurisdiction "under Federal law other than under section 1332 of
Title 28 (relating to diversity of citizenship jurisdiction)" to review
the aforementioned challenges, 10 0 unless the challenge is brought
in one of the five specific CERCLA proceedings identified by the
statute. 101
These five actions fall into three categories. The first. is a costrecovery action (or contribution action) that will assign liability for
section 107 response costs. 102 The second category includes
actions brought by the United States in exercise of its authority
under section 106103 or by a party seeking reimbursement for costs
incurred in a section 106 ordered cleanup. 10 4 The final category
includes certain defined citizens' suits. 10 5 The general effect of
these provisions is that judicial review is delayed until an enforcement action is pursued under sections 106 or 107, or until the
response action (or a defined portion of the response action) is
completed.
The meaning of "pre-enforcement review" varies somewhat
depending on the administrative law context. 10 6 In the CERCLA
96 See id. (noting that a citizens' suit may be brought "[ejxcept as provided in ...
section
9613(h) of this title (relating to timing of judicial review)").
97 Id. § 9613(h).
98 North Shore Gas Co. v. United States EPA, 930 F.2d 1239, 1245 (7th Cir. 1991) ("We
can leave for another day the exploration of the outer bounds of this unusual provision.").
Although this type of provision may be unusual, it is certainly not unique. See, e.g.,
Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-121, § 318(b)(6)(A), 103 Stat. 745 (1989).
99 Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499,
§ 113(h), 100 Stat. 1613 (1986).
100 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h). The exception for diversity cases has not been the subject of
significant controversy and is not discussed in this article.
101 Id. § 9613(h)(1)-(5); see infra notes 102-105 and accompanying text.
102 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h)(1).
103 Id. § 9613(h)(2) & (5).
104 Id. § 9613(h)(3).
105 Id. § 9613(h)(4).
106 For example, the Administrative Conference of the United States stated that preenforcement review is review gained "by instituting a direct review proceeding against the
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context, a citizens' suit under section 310 and public or private
enforcement actions may challenge agency action as unlawful. The
meaning of pre-enforcement review under CERCLA must therefore be rather broad, including actions brought prior to (1) a section 107 cost-recovery action,1 °7 (2) a government section 106
enforcement action, 10 8 or (3) completion of a cleanup at the site (or
at least completion of a discrete portion of a remedial action). 10 9
Section 113(h), by its terms, bars such pre-enforcement review of
CERCLA response actions." 0 This section discusses the terms of
section 113(h) and Congress' intent in enacting the provision.
1.

The Broad Terms of the Review Preclusion Provision

The terms of the review preclusion provision bar pre-enforcement review of two categories of claims. First, section 113(h) limits
judicial review of "any challenges to removal or remedial action
selected under section 9604 of this title"'' thus foreclosing immediate review of removal or remedial actions. Section 101 of the
Act' 12 defines these terms broadly, including specifically "enforce3
ment activities related to" the removal or iemedial action.1
agency in an appropriate court." ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES,
RECOMMENDATION 82-7, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF RULES IN ENFORCEMENT PROCEEDINGS 15
(1982). The Conference contrasted this type of review with "enforcement review," which
is gained "by asserting the invalidity of the rule as a defense in a civil or criminal proceeding to apply or enforce the rule." Id.
107 See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h)(1).
108Id. § 9613(h)(2), (5).
109 Id. § 9613(h)(3)-(4).
110 Id. § 9613(h).
1I1 Id.
112 See id. § 9601(23) (defining the terms "remove" and "removal"); id. § 9601(24)
(defining the terms "remedy" and "remedial action").
113 Id. § 9601(25) provides that, "[tihe terms 'respond' or 'response' means [sic] remove,
removal, remedy, and remedial action;, [sic] all such terms (including the terms 'removal'
and 'remedial action') include enforcement activities related thereto."
The 1986 Amendments added this provision to CERCLA. See Superfund Amendments
and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, § 101(e)-(f), 100 Stat. 1613 (1986). In
Reardon v. United States, 947 F.2d 1509, 1514 (1st Cir. 1991) (en banc), the court stated
that, to the extent § 101(25) expanded the scope of review preclusion under § 113(h), this
result was an "inadvertent[] rather than purposeful[ ]" action by Congress. The court
believed the expanded definition included in § 101(25) was intended to ensure that the
government would recover the costs of enforcement actions brought against responsible
parties. Id. at 1514 (citing relevant legislative history). However, the court held that, even
if Congress had no specific intent to expand the scope of review preclusion in § 113(h), the
court was bound to apply the statute's definition uniformly in applying CERCLA. Id. at
1514; see Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 479 (1992) (identifying
"the basic canon of statutory construction that identical terms within an Act bear the same
meaning" (citations omitted)). The dissent in Reardon disagreed strongly with the court's
reliance on this legislative history in deciding that a lien was an enforcement activity
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In Reardon v. United States, the First Circuit provided the most
detailed judicial analysis of the meaning of removal and remedial
action.' 14 In that case, the plaintiffs challenged the EPA's placement of a CERCLA lien on their property. 115 To determine
whether section 113(h) barred this claim, the court relied upon the
plain and ordinary meaning of the terms used in section 113(h) and
concluded that "the activity of filing liens is, in ordinary language,
an 'enforcement activity."" 16 Accordingly, the court decided that
the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider whether the government's lien was permissible under CERCLA.
In addition to foreclosing review of immediate challenges to
"removal or remedial actions," the review preclusion provision
forecloses review of a second category of cases: challenges to "any
order issued under section 9606(a) of this title."'1 17 In deciding
whether this provision forecloses immediate review, a court must
determine whether the claimant's action challenges the issuance of
an order under section 106.118 This second part of the review preclusion provision has not been the subject of significant litigation,
and the meaning of its terms does not appear to be controversial. 1 9
related to the response action and therefore could not be challenged prior to EPA enforcement. See 947 F.2d at 1525 n.6 (Cyr, J., dissenting).
114 947 F.2d 1509 (1st Cir. 1991) (en banc).
115 The CERCLA lien was imposed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 9607(l)(1), which states that:
All costs and damages for which a person is liable to the United States
under [42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) - the CERCLA liability provision] ... shall constitute a lien in favor of the United States upon all real property and rights to
such property which (A) belong to such person; and
(B) are subject to or affected by a removal or remedial action.
The lien arises as a matter of law under 42 U.S.C. § 9607(l)(2) and "continue[s] until the
liability for the costs (or a judgment against the person arising out of such liability) is
satisfied or becomes unenforceable" as a result of the statute of limitations provided in 42
U.S.C. § 9613(f).
The claimants in Reardon argued that the EPA had violated CERCLA in imposing a lien
because they were innocent purchasers of property and therefore not liable for response
costs under § 107. Reardon, 947 F.2d at 1511. The claimants also contended that the lien
imposed by the EPA covered too much property and therefore violated the terms of the
lien provision. Id.
116 947 F.2d at 1513. The court also stated that "[w]hen the government files a lien on
property to secure payment of that [CERCLA] liability, it can reasonably be described as
seeking to enforce the liability provision." Id. at 1512.
117 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h).
118 Id.
119 Pollution Control Indus. of Am. v. Reilly, 715 F. Supp. 219 (N.D. Ill. 1989), is one
action that involved this second portion of the review preclusion provision. In that case,
the EPA had issued a § 106 order requiring the plaintiff to perform an emergency removal
action at a site the plaintiff owned. Id. at 220. After the plaintiff notified the EPA of a
contractor it wanted to use for the response action, the EPA disqualified the contractor
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The Legislative History and Purpose of Section 113(h):
Ensuring the Effectiveness of Cleanups by Foreclosing
Pre-enforcement Review of CERCLA Liability
Issues

2.

Congress enacted section 113(h) to "confirm and build upon
existing case law, ' 120 foreclosing judicial review prior to government enforcement actions. This line of pre-SARA appellate cases
began with J.V. Peters & Co. v. Administrator,EnvironmentalProtection Agency. 12 1 In that case, the plaintiffs sought to enjoin a
response action pursued by the EPA. They asserted first that they
would become liable for response costs once the EPA had undertaken the cleanup and second, that they needed an 1immediate
22
hearing or they would be without an adequate remedy.

The Sixth Circuit held that CERCLA barred pre-enforcement
review, even in the absence of an express provision. The court con-

cluded that, "[b]ecause the Act's primary purpose is the prompt
cleanup of hazardous waste sites," allowing the immediate review

sought by the plaintiffs "would debilitate the central function of the
Act.

'123

The court also concluded that the section 107 cost recov-

ery action, during which the existence and scope of the plaintiffs'
CERCLA liability would be adjudicated, was an adequate legal
remedy for the plaintiffs. 124 . In short, the court held that prebecause of a prior case of fraud. Id. The plaintiff then sought a preliminary injunction to
bar the EPA from enforcing the disqualification order. Id. The court held that § 113(h)
barred the action, because the EPA issued the disqualification order pursuant to its
"broad[ I" authority under § 106. Id. at 220-21.
120 132 CONG. REC. S28,441 (1986) (statement of Sen. Thurmond, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee); see Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc. v. Reilly, 889 F.2d 1380,
1387-88 (5th Cir. 1989) ("Section 113(h) ... codified earlier case law limitations on 'preenforcement' review of remedial and removal actions."); Reardon v. United States, 731 F.
Supp. 558, 564 (D. Mass. 1990), rev'd in part, 947 F.2d 1509 (1st Cir. 1991) (en banc) ("Section 113(h), enacted as part of the SARA Amendments, codified this prior case law
prohibiting the pre-enforcement review of EPA cleanup actions.").
121 767 F.2d 263 (6th Cir. 1985).
122 Id.
123 Id. (citations and internal quotations omitted). The court was unwilling to find that
CERCLA implied a cause of action permitting review of an EPA response action, prior to
an EPA enforcement action. The court therefore held that judicial review would be available only if permitted under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701706. J.V. Peters, 767 F.2d at 264.
124 Because the "agency determination to take a response action" under 42 U.S.C.
§ 9604(a) was not a "final agency action for which there is no adequate remedy in a court,"
review was unavailable under the APA. J. V. Peters, 767 F.2d at 265. The court supported
this decision in part by identifying a requirement in the NCP to conduct EPA response
actions in a cost-effective manner. See supranote 16. The plaintiffs would therefore not be
liable for any response costs that were inconsistent with the NCP. 767 F.2d at 265.
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enforcement review was barred because it would slow cleanups and
was unnecessary to ensure adequate judicial review.
Other courts soon followed the Sixth Circuit, uniformly holding
that CERCLA's strong prompt cleanup policy implicitly foreclosed
early review of the liability issue. Courts reached this conclusion
when a party sought immediate review of a long-term EPA remeEP de
dial action, 125 an EPA
decision prohibiting a PRP from preparing a
1
26
RI/FS,
and an EPA decision to issue an administrative order
under section 106.127 In short, when Congress enacted section
113(h) in 1986 and essentially ratified these decisions, it intended
to enact a uniform rule barring pre-enforcement review of CERCLA liability issues so that cleanups of hazardous substances could
be pursued promptly and without externally-imposed delays.12 8
Several courts have reviewed the legislative history and concluded that Congress intended section 113(h) to serve two important purposes: prevent delays in cleanups 129 and foreclose
125 Lone Pine Steering Comm. v. United States EPA, 777 F.2d 882, 887 (3d Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1115 (1986).
126Wheaton Indus. v. United States EPA, 781 F.2d 354 (3d Cir. 1986).
127 Wagner Seed Co. v. Daggett, 800 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1986).
128 In addition to expressing support for the results reached by these courts, the legislative history of SARA includes several explicit statements that PRPs should not be permitted to litigate the issue of CERCLA liability prior to an enforcement action. See 132
CONG. REC. S28,441 (1986) (statement of Sen. Thurmond) ("Citizens, including potentially
responsible parties, cannot seek review of the response action or their potential liability for
a response action - other than in an action for contribution - unless the suit falls within
one of the categories provided in this section."); 132 CONG. REC. H29,755 (1986) (statement of Rep. Roe) ("[W]hen the essence of a lawsuit involves contesting the liability of the
plaintiff for cleanup costs, the courts should apply the other provisions of section 113(h),
which require such plaintiff to wait until the Government has filed a suit under sections 106
or 107 to seek review of the liability issue."); see also H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess., pt.1, at 266-67 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2941-42 (separate and dissenting views of Rep. Florio and nine other Representatives). This Report states that:
The purpose of the [committee amendment foreclosing review except under
limited circumstances] is to prevent private responsible parties from filing dilatory, interim lawsuits which have the effect of slowing down or preventing
[the] EPA's cleanup activities. By limiting court challenges to the point in
time when the agency"has decided to enforce the liability of such private
responsible parties, the amendment will ensure both that effective cleanup is
not derailed and that private responsible parties get their full day in court to
challenge the agency's determination that they are liable for cleanup costs.
Id.
129 See, e.g., North Shore Gas Co. v. EPA, 930 F.2d 1239, 1244 (7th Cir. 1991) ("[T]he
purpose of section 113(h) is to prevent litigation from delaying remediation."); Schalk v.
Reilly, 900 F.2d 1091, 1097 (7th Cir. 1990); Apache Powder Co. v. United States, 738 F.
Supp. 1291, 1292 (D. Ariz. 1990).
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piecemeal review of CERCLA cleanups. 130 Relying upon the legislative history and these two purposes, these courts have identified
whether immediate review of
several functional tests to decide
3
plaintiff's challenge is barred.1 1
In sum, the legislative history of SARA shows Congress' intent
to speed cleanups by delaying litigation of CERCLA liability issues
until a government enforcement action is brought. When deciding
whether judicial review is barred by section 113(h), courts must
usually decide whether the claim involves a challenge to a removal
or remedial action. Courts have construed these terms broadly,
applying a functional test grounded on the language and intent of
the review preclusion provision.
C. Preclusion of Pre-Enforcement Review in Administrative Law
and in an Alternative Hazardous Waste Cleanup Context
In order to broaden the context for evaluating the effectiveness
and the fairness of the review preclusion provision in CERCLA, it
is valuable to consider the extent to which other statutes foreclose
pre-enforcement review of administrative actions.' 32 Additionally,
the availability of administrative and judicial review of corrective
actions under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA) can enhance one's understanding of CERCLA review
preclusion. 133 These corrective actions have a great deal in common with CERCLA response actions. Indeed, one text states that
the RCRA "corrective action program [is] strikingly similar to the
CERCLA cleanup process. 1 34 Notwithstanding this similarity,
RCRA permits pre-cleanup review, an important type of preenforcement review,'135 under its corrective action provisions.

130 Senator Thurmond identified this purpose, explaining that the review preclusion provision included in SARA "is designed to preclude piecemeal review." 132 CONG. REC.
S28,441 (1986). See Reardon v. United States, 947 F.2d 1509, 1513 (1st Cir. 1991); Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc. v. Reilly, 889 F.2d 1380, 1390 (5th Cir. 1989).
131 See Healy, supra note 1, at 21-23 (describing functional tests).

132

For a general discussion of the availability of pre-enforcement review under the prin-

cipal environmental statutes, see David M. Moore, Comment, Pre-enforcement Review of
Administrative Orders to Abate Environmental Hazards, 9 PACE ENVmL. L. REV. 675
(1992).
13342 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
134 ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND

POLICY 373 (1992).
135 See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
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Pre-EnforcementReview in Administrative Law

When Congress grants an agency the authority to administer and
enforce federal law, courts must often decide whether pre-enforcement judicial review sought by an aggrieved party is available. In
most cases, the organic statutes are silent on the question of review
availability. This was true when a claimant sought pre-enforcement review of CERCLA claims prior to the enactment of SARA
and section 113(h) in 1986.136 Indeed, the current judicial review
provisions of CERCLA atypically include specific language that is
intended to define the extent to which the statute forecloses review
of certain claims.
In the context of a silent statute, courts evaluate challenges to an
agency's enforcement decision with a general presumption that.
meaningful judicial review is available to determine the lawfulness
of an agency action. 1 37 A court may, however, infer from the structure of the statute's judicial
review provisions that immediate
13 8
review is unavailable.
If a statute's review provisions suggest exclusivity of the defined
avenues for relief, the court will tend to hold that immediate
review is unavailable. For example, in Thunder Basin Coal Co. v.
Reich,3 9 the Supreme Court decided whether a mining company
was permitted to bring a pre-enforcement claim in federal court
challenging a requirement of the Federal Mine Safety and Health
'Amendments Act of 1977 (Mine Act). 140 Notwithstanding the fact
that the statute did not expressly bar such review, the Court held
that there was no federal court jurisdiction over the claim because
the Mine Act "establishes a detailed structure for reviewing violations"'141 and this "comprehensive review process' 1 42 does not provide for pre-enforcement claims in district court by regulated
136 See supra notes 121-27 and accompanying text (discussing cases prior to the enactment of § 113(h) that foreclose pre-enforcement review of response actions).
137 Thus, before a coirt will construe a statute to foreclose entirely judicial review, the
agency proposing such a construction "bears the heavy burden of overcoming the strong
presumption that Congress did not mean to prohibit all judicial review of [its] decisions."
Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 567 (1975); see Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family
Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 670-73 (1986). This presumption is less weighty when a court is
asked only to delay review until a time when meaningful review is available under the
statute. See Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 114 S.Ct. 771, 776 n.8 (1994).
138 114 S.Ct. at 776.
139Id. at 771.
14030 U.S.C. §§ 801-962 (1994).
141 114 S.Ct. at 776.
142 Id. at 777.
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parties. Similarly, in Rueth v. United States EPA, 143 a lower court
held that the recipient of a Clean Water Act'" compliance order
could not bring an action in district court challenging that order
because the Act defined the only two circumstances in which compliance orders could be challenged.145
A court is also more likely to infer review foreclosure if the statute provides for administrative review with an implied exhaustion
requirement 146 or requires a final agency action for review.' 47 In
short, a court may infer that pre-enforcement review is foreclosed
because the statute makes no provision for such review, and/or
requires exhaustion of administrative remedies.
In addition to focusing on the statute's structure, a court also
considers the effectiveness and the fairness of permitting immediate review. Regarding effectiveness, a court typically considers
whether permitting pre-enforcement review will impede the effective implementation of the federal statute in either of two different
ways. First, a court considers whether granting or denying jurisdiction will promote the substantive goals of the underlying federal
statute. 48 Second, a court considers whether pre-enforcement
review undermines the effective operation of the administrative
49
agency.
143 13 F.3d 227 (7th Cir. 1993).
144 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994).
145 See Rueth, 13 F.3d at 230 ("[C]ongress

intended judicial review of challenges to
agency administrative actions only after the agency seeks judicial enforcement of a compliance order or the agency seeks to enforce administrative penalties.").
146 See Southern Ohio Coal Co. v. Office of Surface Mining, Reclamation and Enforcement, 20 F.3d 1418, 1422-23 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that pre-enforcement review of a
cessation order was unavailable because the statute requires that administrative remedies
be exhausted).
147 See Asbestec Const. Serv., Inc. v. United States EPA, 849 F.2d 765, 768-69 (2d Cir.
1988) (holding that review of a Clean Air Act compliance order is not available prior to
court of appeals enforcement because it is not the kind of final agency action required by
the statute).
148 In a number of cases, courts have held that a statute foreclosed pre-enforcement
review where review would delay movement toward environmental goals established by
Congress. As discussed earlier, prior to the 1986 Amendments, courts construed CERCLA to bar pre-enforcement review because such review would slow cleanups and thereby
undermine the key purpose of the statute. See supra notes 121-27 and accompanying text;
see also Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 593 F.2d 299, 304-05 (8th Cir. 1979) (permitting preenforcement review of notice of violation Acts would undermine enforcement provisions
of the Clean Air Act intended to obtain expeditious compliance).
149 A court will be wary of permitting pre-enforcement review when the agency will
thereby forfeit its enforcement discretion. See Southern Ohio Coal Co., 20 F.3d at 1427
(holding pre-enforcement review is not available because such review would "interfere
with the EPA's ability to quickly respond to environmental problems"); see also Lloyd A.
Fry Roofing Co. v. EPA, 554 F.2d 885, 890-91 (8th Cir. 1977) (permitting pre-enforcement
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Regarding fairness, a court is far less willing to hold that preenforcement review is unavailable if it concludes that delayed
review will be inadequate for the party asserting the pre-enforce-

ment claim. 150 Moreover, even if a court infers a bar of preenforcement review, courts often recognize, either implicitly or
explicitly, three safety valves that temper the effect of review

preclusion.
First, courts will decide constitutional due process claims arising
from delayed review. 151 Second, courts will review a colorable
claim that the agency has taken an action that is plainly unauthor-

ized by Congress. 152 Third, courts find pre-enforcement review
available where an agency's action would place too great an actual
1 53

burden on the affected party prior to final resolution.

review of compliance order would undermine Clean Air Act enforcement procedures
designed to promote abatement without judicial involvement). Moreover, courts infer that
judicial review is unavailable where the proffered claim turns on expert fact-finding or
technical review. See Rueth, 13 F.3d at 230 n.2 (pre-enforcement review is not available
under Clean Water Act because the agency must still make a final, fact-based decision
about whether the statute appiies). Courts of appeals, in particular, are not well-placed to
make findings of fact, or to otherwise develop a factual record for decision making. See
Asbestec Constr. Serv., Inc., 849 F.2d at 769 (noting that agency action is not final and is
thus unreviewable because the dispute between the parties is fact-based and the courts of
appeals "are not designed and are ill-equipped to serve as fact-finding forums").
150 See supra note 149 (illustrating that a court is more likely to find lack of jurisdiction if
review is merely being delayed). Interpreting an ambiguous statute to permit review if
delayed review would be inadequate may prevent a due process claim and thus conform to
the canon that statutes be construed to avoid constitutional questions. See Edward J.
DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. and Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575
(1988) (noting that a court "will construe [a] statute to avoid [constitutional] problems
unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress").
151 After deciding that the Mining Act barred pre-enforcement review of the claim being
asserted by the plaintiff in Thunder Basin Coal, 114 S. Ct. at 780-81, the Supreme Court
considered the merits of the plaintiff's claim and decided that its due process rights would
be violated if it could not seek immediate review of the order of the Mine Safety and
Health Administration. See id. at 781-82 (rejecting claim of due process violation where
the statute did not subject the claimant "to a serious prehearing deprivation"); see also
Asbestec Constr. Serv., 849 F.2d at 769-70 (concluding that the Clean Air Act bars preenforcement review of a plaintiff's claim and considering the underlying due process
claim).
152 See Rueth, 13 F.3d at 231 (specifying that the court "will not hesitate to intervene in
pre-enforcement activity" of an agency if the court finds that the agency has "completely
overextend[ed its] authority"); accord Southern Ohio Coal Co., 20 F.3d at 1427. This
exception seems to follow from the Court's decision in Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184, 188
(1958), that a court may intervene when an agency makes a final action "in excess of its
delegated powers and contrary to a specific [statutory] prohibition." Id.
153 See Thunder Basin Coal, 114 S. Ct. at 779 (holding that a district court may exercise
pre-enforcement jurisdiction over claims that are collateral to the enforcement action when
precluding review would make meaningful review unlikely); see also Southern Ohio Coal
Co., 20 F.3d at 1424 (holding that immediate review of agency action may be available if
irreparable injury would result in the absence of such review).
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Clearly, the issue of pre-enforcement review is one that arises.
quite often in administrative law. Courts will foreclose preenforcement review, even in the absence of statutory language dictating that result, where they conclude that barring review is necessary to secure the statute's goals. Generally however, immediate
review will be available in the event that the court believes such
review is necessary to prevent serious unfairness to the claimant
seeking review.
2. RCRA Corrective Actions and Their Review
Having reviewed the extent to which pre-enforcement review is
generally available in administrative law, we turn next to preenforcement review of corrective actions under RCRA. Congress
enacted RCRA in order to provide for the prospective, "cradle-tograve" management of hazardous waste disposal. 154 RCRA is
intended to prevent prospectively the conditions that will result in
the release of hazardous substances into the environment, while
CERCLA generally provides for the cleanup of hazardous substances that are released into the environment as a result of past
disposal practices. 5 5 RCRA's corrective action requirement illus56
trates an important area of overlap between the two statutes.1
Congress included this requirement in the 1984 amendments to
RCRA to relieve the Superfund program of some of the burden of
cleaning up releases of hazardous substances into the
environment.

157

The RCRA corrective action program has been described as

"quite 'CERCLA-like' in scope and effect,'

158

and the program

may apply to about 3700 RCRA facilities across the country containing about 64,000 units needing corrective action. 159 The corrective action requirement basically mandates that facilities subject to
regulation under RCRA (treatment, storage, or disposal of hazardous waste facilities (TSDs)) conduct cleanups (i.e., corrective
actions) when they release hazardous waste or its constituents from
any active or inactive solid waste management unit at the facility,
supra note 134, at 215.
See id. at 214; Healy, supra note 9, at 81-82.
See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 134, at 214-15.
See JACKSON B. BATTLE & MAXINE I. LIPELES,

154 PERCIVAL ET AL.,
155
156
157

HAZARDOUS WASTE

103 (2d ed.

1993).
158 Richard G. Stoll, The New RCRA Cleanup Regime: Comparisons and Contrasts with
CERCLA, 44 Sw. L.J. 1299, 1299 (1991).
159 See WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW §7.7, at 637 (2d ed. 1994).
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regardless of when the waste was placed in the unit. 160 The corrective action requirement applies somewhat differently depending on
the type of RCRA TSD facility involved.
Under RCRA, TSD facilities that are to be used for the current
treatment, storage, or disposal of hazardous wastes must obtain a
permit. 161 To receive a permit, the TSD facility must complete a
"corrective action for all releases of hazardous waste or constituents from any solid waste management unit at [the facility], regard1 62
If
less of the time at which waste was placed in such unit."'
completion of the corrective action at the TSD facility is not possible prior to the issuance of the permit, then the permit itself "shall
contain schedules of compliance for such corrective action ...and
assurances of financial responsibility for completing such corrective
action."' 63 RCRA thus ties permits to permittee cleanups of
releases of hazardous wastes and substances at their TSD facility,
with facility defined broadly to include "all contiguous property
under the owner or operator's control."'"
Interim status facilities compose a second group of TSD facilities
subject to RCRA regulation, although TSD operating permits have
not been sought. 165 For these facilities, Congress has provided in
section 3008(h) of RCRA that when "there is or has been a release
of hazardous waste into the environment from a[n interim status]
facility ... the Administrator may issue an order requiring corrective action," or may bring an action in district court seeking appro166
priate relief.
It is difficult to summarize the process for identifying the
required corrective action and the standards that apply to assess
160
See 42 U.S.C. § 6924(u); see also id. § 6928(h).
161See id. § 6925(a). This permit requirement also applies to a TSD facility receiving
hazardous wastes after November 19, 1980 (the effective date of RCRA's TSD permitting
requirement), that failed to apply formally for an interim status permit, and that has not
been clean closed. Such facilities are subject to RCRA's closure and post-closure permit
requirements. See In re Consolidated Land Disposal Regulation Litig., 938 F.2d 1386
(D.C. Cir. 1991).
162 42 U.S.C. § 6924(u). Corrective action requirements may be imposed when a facility
first applies for a RCRA operating permit or when it seeks a permit renewal. See 1 SUSAN
M. COOKE, THE LAW OF HAZARDOUS WASTE: MANAGEMENT, CLEANUP, LIABILITY, AND

LITIGATION § 5.0416][e], at 5-156.6 (1995).

163 42 U.S.C. § 6924(u).

164 Hazardous Waste Management System; Final Codification Rule, 50 Fed. Reg. 28,702,

28,712 (1985). The court in United Technologies Corp. v. EPA, 821 F.2d 714 (D.C. Cir.
1987), upheld this broad EPA interpretation.
165 Interim status facilities are the TSD facilities authorized to operate under 42 U.S.C.
§ 6925(e).
166 Id. § 6928(h)(1).
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whether a corrective action has been successful. 167 Furthermore,
the standards differ somewhat depending on whether the corrective action is a permit condition or an order to an interim status
facility, for which less formal procedures apply. 168 The process
does, however, resemble in many respects the RI/FS process for
CERCLA remedial actions. First, a RCRA Facility Assessment
(RFA) defines the nature of the releases and potential releases at
the site. Next, a RCRA Facility Investigation (RFI) fully characterizes those releases. These two steps are somewhat analogous to
the CERCLA Remedial Investigation (RI). The third step
involves an analysis of the appropriateness of particular corrective
measures. Based on this Corrective Measures Study (CMS), which
is analogous to the CERCLA Feasibility Study (FS), the necessary
corrective actions are identified for the facility. The
final step is
69
the Corrective Measures Implementation (CMI).1
Although this RCRA process resembles the CERCLA process,
performs similar functions, and controls many of the same risks as
CERCLA response actions, review of a corrective action required
by the EPA is available at a much earlier time than review of a
CERCLA response action. As discussed, a corrective action may
be compelled as a condition for a RCRA operating permit.17
After drafting a proposed permit and subjecting it to public comment and, in many cases, a public hearing, the terms and conditions
of a RCRA permit are written. Once the permit is issued in final
form, "any person who filed comments on th[e] draft permit or
participated in the public hearing may petition the Environmental
Appeals Board [EAB] to review any condition of the permit decision.' 1 71 This petitioner must file within thirty days of the issuance
of the final permit.172 The EAB also has authority to "decide on its
73
own initiative to review any condition of any RCRA ... permit.'
167 For more detailed discussions, see, e.g., COOKE, supra note 162, § 5.04[6][e], at 5156.5 to 156.17; Stoll, supra note 158, at 1309-12.
168 See RODGERS, supra note 159, § 7.7, at 636-37.
169 See supra notes 43-56 and accompanying text. The summary of RCRA corrective
action processes in the text is based on the summary in RODGERS, supra note 159, § 7.7, at
638.
170 See supra notes 161-64 and accompanying text.
171 40 C.F.R. § 124.19(a) (1995). The EAB, composed of three judges appointed by the

EPA Administrator, "acts as the final [EPA] agency decisionmaker for appeals on various
permit and civil penalty decisions under all the major environmental statutes that [the]
EPA administers." Edward E. Reich, EPA's New Environmental Appeals Board, 8 NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV'T 39, 39 (1994).
172 40 C.F.R. § 124.19(a) (1995).
173 Id. § 124.19(b).
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The EAB may deny review of the petition, issue a decision resolving the merits of the petition, or remand the matter for further proceedings on the permit. 174 A party aggrieved by a decision of the
EAB may then seek review of that decision in the federal court of
appeals for the judicial district in which the party resides or does
175
business.
Administrative review is also available when the EPA orders an
interim status facility to perform a corrective action. When acting
unilaterally under section 3008(h), the EPA issues an initial administrative order requiring the corrective action and giving notice to
the recipient of the "right to request a hearing with respect to any
issue of material fact or the appropriateness of the proposed corrective action.' 1 76 Unless the recipient responds within thirty days
to that order and requests a hearing, the initial order becomes a
1 77
final order.
Although the precise hearing procedures differ depending upon
the directions included in the initial order,17 8 the hearing is held
before the regional judicial officer or another EPA lawyer, and that
presiding officer prepares a recommended decision for the regional
administrator.1 79 The presiding officer's recommendation must
state whether the regional administrator should modify the corrective action order, withdraw the order, or issue the order without
modification.'1 0 The regional administrator then takes final agency
action on the order by either signing or modifying the recommended decision presented by the presiding officer. 8 This decision may not be appealed to the administrator. 182 RCRA does not
provide expressly for a right to judicial review of the regional
administrator's decision (which is not a permitting decision), and it
is unclear whether judicial review of that final agency action is
available under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 83
See id. § 124.19(f).
See 42 U.S.C. § 6976(b). In its regulations, the EPA requires a party to petition the
Environmental Appeals Board for review before it may bring such an action in federal
court. This is meant to ensure that the party exhausts its administrative remedies. See 40
C.F.R. § 124.19(e) (1995).
176 40 C.F.R. § 24.02(c)(3) (1995).
177 See id. § 24.05(a).
178 See id. § 24.08.
179 See id. §§ 24.09, 24.17.
180 Id. §§ 24.12(b), 24.17(a).
181 Id. §§ 24.18-.19.
182 Id. § 24.20.
174

175

1835 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (1994).
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In sum, unlike CERCLA, RCRA provides for immediate administrative review and the potential for judicial review of RCRA corrective actions. The availability of this review under RCRA begs
the question why such immediate review is not also available under
CERCLA. As we consider the effectiveness and fairness of CERCLA review preclusion, we must therefore consider how cleanups
under the two statutes compare and contrast with each other: Do
the programs differ in ways that make immediate review of CERCLA cleanups or particular CERCLA claims inappropriate?. Does
the availability of immediate review under RCRA show that CERCLA's broad bar against early review is unwarranted?
III.

THE Six LITIGATION CONTEXTS IN WHICH THE ISSUE OF

CERCLA REVIEW PRECLUSION TYPICALLY ARISES
Litigation of CERCLA's review preclusion provision typically
occurs in one of six different contexts, and the willingness of courts
to foreclose judicial review is often dependent on the particular
litigation context. The first litigation context is likely the most
common and certainly the one that primarily concerned Congress
when section 113(h) was added in 1986. Cases in this category
include those in which a PRP seeks review to determine its liability
solely under section 107 of CERCLA. 184 The fairness or effectiveness of barring immediate judicial review is more difficult to assess
in the next four litigation contexts - here, competing policies support both permitting and barring immediate review. Specifically,
even though permitting early review in the next four litigation contexts may slow the CERCLA cleanup, early review may also either
(1) serve another important policy of CERCLA, such as ensuring
the safety of individuals residing nearby the site; 185 or (2) ensure
that important policies identified in other statutes are not subverted by the cleanup. 186 When called upon to apply the review
preclusion provision in these other litigation contexts, courts may
allow review to proceed, notwithstanding the statute's express and
categorical preclusion of review.
The sixth and final litigation context involves immediate, judicial
review of a claim that the CERCLA cleanup offends constitutional
rights. 187 In this litigation context, courts concerned about the
fairness of sanctioning a violation of basic constitutional protec184 See infra part III.A.
185 See infra part III.B.
186 See infra part III.C-E.
187 See infra part III.F.
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tions have been most willing to hold that judicial review is available
immediately, notwithstanding the terms of section 113(h).
A.

Preclusion of Pre-Enforcement Review of CERCLA Liability
Claims

Given the terms of section 113(h) and the structure and purposes
of CERCLA, 188 courts uniformly decline review of either the existence or extent of liability for section 107189 response costs' 90 prior
to a government action to recover such costs. This result is consistent with both Congress' intent 91 and the provision's text, which
expressly states that issues related to liability may be litigated only
in an enforcement action. 192 Indeed, CERCLA's pre-enforcement
review preclusion is so strong that courts have rejected PRP efforts
to avoid the bar through a citizens' suit and its exemption from
section 113(h), 9 3 and have thus foreclosed district court jurisdicIn sum, courts have
tion of pre-enforcement liability claims.
consistently interpreted the plain terms of CERCLA and its legis188 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h). For an overview of CERCLA and its purposes, see supra parts
I.A-B.
189 42 U.S.C. § 9607.
190 Healy, supra note 1, at 12. In that article, the author cites cases that exemplify several of these settings: a PRP seeking a declaratory judgment that it is not liable for an
ongoing cleanup; a PRP action seeking to enjoin the EPA from proceeding with a response
action under § 104, because the PRP believes the response action is too costly; and a § 106
administrative order recipient challenging the order, claiming that it is not liable for
response costs under CERCLA.
191See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h)(1) (specifying that a federal court has jurisdiction to review a
response action challenge in "[a]n action under section 9607 of this title to recover
response costs or damages or for contribution"). Although the issue has rarely been litigated, one court of appeals held that, once the EPA brings a § 107 cost recovery action
against a PRP, the agency has "open[ed] the door" to challenges against the selected
response action. United States v. Princeton Gamma-Tech, Inc., 31 F.3d 138, 142 (3d Cir.
1994); see Ehrlich v. Reno, 1994 WL 613698, at *4 (E.D. Pa. 1994) ("[W]hen the EPA files
a cost recovery action, section 113 does not bar jurisdiction over an injunctive action alleging irreparable harm inconsistent with CERCLA."); cf Princeton Gamma-Tech, 31 F.3d at
150 n.1 (Nygaard, J., concurring) ("[Wihen the EPA opens the door by bringing a cost

recovery suit while a response action remains in progress, common sense and judicial economy require us to review both the completed work and those similar portions of the
response phase that are either planned or partially completed."). If other courts were to
follow the holding that an EPA cost-recovery action opens the door for challenges to a
response action, the rule would not pose a serious threat to the EPA's ability to administer
the program because the EPA may refrain from bringing the cost-recovery action.
192 See supra part II.B.2.
193-See Cabot Corp. v. EPA, 677 F. Supp. 823 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (holding that a PRP cannot rely on the exception in 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h)(4) to avoid the bar against pre-enforcement review).
194 Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc. (VPG) v. Reilly, 889 F.2d 1380 (5th Cir. 1989).
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lative history to
foreclose pre-enforcement review of CERCLA lia1 95
bility claims.
B.

Preclusion of Nonliability-Based CERCLA Claims Priorto
the Completion of the Cleanup

Application of section 113(h)'s broad language to a CERCLA
claim unrelated to the existence or scope of liability is the next
issue. CERCLA's policies may be read to support immediate jurisdiction in this context.
These CERCLA claims arise most commonly when a private
party brings a citizens' suit claiming that a response action poses a
threat to public health or the environment while judicial review of
that claim would have the effect of slowing implementation of the
response action. 196 Health-based claims in the context of a CERCLA response action may be divided into two broad categories:
claims that, when completed, a remedial action will not sufficiently
protect human health and the environment because hazards will
remain at the site 197 and claims that the implementation of the proposed response action itself poses an undue threat to human health
and the environment. Some pre-enforcement claims are related
neither to liability nor the cleanup's health effects. These claims
cannot be categorized into any more specific or descriptive
classifications.
Claimants hoping to assert such health and nonliability-based
claims in challenging response actions have usually relied on the
express terms of section 113(h)(4), which provides that such challenges may be brought in:
195 Several judges on the First Circuit Court of Appeals voiced the only dissent to the
otherwise unanimous view that pre-enforcement review of CERCLA liability is barred. In
a withdrawn panel decision, Reardon v. United States, 922 F.2d 28, 32 (1st Cir. 1990), and a
dissent to an en banc decision, Reardon v. United States, 947 F.2d 1509, 1524 (1st Cir. 1991)
(Cyr, J., dissenting), these judges concluded that the statute was ambiguous in defining
when district court review of liability issues was foreclosed. Based on PRP claims that the
delayed review available in an enforcement action would be both too delayed and inadequate, these judges construed the statute's ambiguous terms narrowly in order to permit
immediate judicial review. Given these judges' underlying view that delayed review is
inadequate, these decisions follow the approach described earlier, which permits preenforcement review to avoid undue unfairness. See supra notes 150-53 and accompanying
text.
196 See infra part IV.B.
197 This category includes two related types of claims. The first type relates to the
appropriate standards for defining a sufficiently clean site following remediation. The second type of claim relates to whether the remedial action will actually result in compliance
with the applicable cleanliness standards. Both claims, however, relate to the threat to
human health posed by the site after the remedial action is complete.
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[a]n action under section 9659 of this title (relating to citizens' suits) alleging that the removal or remedial action

taken under section 9604 of this title or secured under section 9606 of this title was in violation of any requirement of
this chapter. Such an action may not be brought with regard
to a removal where a remedial action is to be undertaken at
the site.' 98
However, courts have generally denied these claims, deferring to
Congress' intention to foreclose early litigation of all CERCLA

claims to ensure that the pace of cleanups is not slowed. This
reluctance to review CERCLA claims has been particularly evident in the case of adverse health claims.
As more fully described in an earlier article, 199 the leading case

in this litigation context is Schalk v. Reilly.2 ° ° In that case, the.
court relied on the "plain language" of section 113(h)(4) in holding
that immediate review under the 113(h)(4) exception to review
preclusion is unavailable when the response action has not yet
been completed, notwithstanding a claim that the response action
itself poses unreasonable risks to human health and the environment and therefore violates CERCLA. 20 1 The Ninth Circuit
recently adopted the broad holding in Schalk.20 2
198 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h)(4). CERCLA's citizens' suit provision states that:
Except as provided in ... section 9613(h) of this title (relating to timing of
judicial review), any person may commence a civil action on his own behalf(1) against any person (including the United States.. .) who is alleged
to be in violation of any standard, regulation, condition, requirement,
or order which has become effective pursuant to this chapter ....
Id. § 9659(a).
199 See Healy, supra note 1, at 36-37.
200 900 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir. 1990).
201 Id. at 1095. For the scant support of this broad review preclusion rule in the legislative history, see H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 81 (1986), reprinted in
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2863 ("[Tjhere is no right of judicial review of the Administrator's
selection and implementation'of response actions until after the response action have [sic]
been completed.").
202 See McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v. Perry, 47 F.3d 325, 328 (9th Cir. 1995)
(noting that the exception to review preclusion applies to "citizen[s'] suits challenging past
cleanup actions"). In dicta, another court also suggested that CERCLA policies require a
broad preclusion rule that applies to all claims, regardless of whether they raise CERCLA
liability issues. See Boarhead Corp. v. Erickson, 923 F.2d 1011. 1019 (3d Cir. 1991). The
Boarhead court stated:
The limits sec. 113(h) imposes on a district court's jurisdiction are an integral
part of Congress's overall goal that CERCLA free the EPA to conduct forthwith clean-up related activities at a hazardous site ....
CERCLA's language
shows Congressconcluded that disputes about who is responsiblefor a hazardous site, what measures are actually necessary to clean-up the site and remove
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Other courts, however, have relied on the legislative history of
section 113(h) in holding that a party is not required to wait until
the cleanup's completion to bring its citizens' suit. 20 3 These courts
conclude that a citizens' suit may be brought to challenge a cleanup
phase after that phase has been completed. This interpretation is
based on the discussion of the scope of the citizens' suit exception
to review preclusion in SARA's Conference Committee Report.2 °4
The Conference Report states:
In new section 113(h)(4) ... the phrase "removal or remedial action taken" is not intended to preclude judicial review
until the total response action is finished if the response
action proceeds in distinct and separate stages. Rather, an
action under section 310 would lie following completion of
each distinct and separable phase of the cleanup ....

It

should be the practice of the President to set forth each separate and distinct phase of a response action in a separate
Record of Decision document. Any challenge under this
provision to a completed stage of a response action shall hot
interfere with those stages of the response action which have
not been completed.2 °5
the hazard or who is responsiblefor its cost should be dealt with after the site
has been cleaned up.
Id. (emphasis added); see also Environmental Waste Control, Inc. v. Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, 763 F. Supp. 1576 (N.D. Ga. 1991) (construing broadly the
scope of review preclusion provision in health-related claim).
203 Ehrlich v. Reno, 1994 WL 613698, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 2, 1994) ("[E]xception [to
review preclusion] exists for completed phases of a cleanup."); Neighborhood Toxic
Cleanup Emergency v. Reilly, 716 F. Supp. 828 (D. N.J. 1989); Schalk v. Thomas, 28 E.R.C.
1655 (S.D. Ind. 1988), affd, 900 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir. 1990).
In Neighborhood Toxic, an association of citizens residing near a NPL site brought a
citizens' suit to enjoin the EPA's scheduled remedial action, alleging that the cleanup
posed health hazards. 716 F. Supp. at 829-30. The site at issue covered sixty acres, ranked
twelfth on the NPL, and was located near large numbers of residences. See id. The facts
and decision in Schalk are discussed supra notes 200-01 and accompanying text.
204 The Neighborhood Toxic court viewed this Report as "the most authoritative legislative history." 716 F. Supp. at 833-34. See Commissioner v. Acker, 361 U.S. 87, 94 (1959)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("The most authoritative form of such [contemporaneous legislative] explanation is a congressional report defining the scope and meaning of proposed
legislation. The most authoritative report is a Conference Report acted upon by both
Houses and therefore unequivocally representing the will of both Houses as the joint legislative body.").
205 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 224 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3317; see also id. (noting that judicial review may proceed when "all the
activities set forth in the Record of Decision for the surface cleanup phase have been completed"); 132 CONG. REC. 28,429 (1986) (statement of Sen. Mitchell) ("A suit to compel
compliance with the CERCLA standards would be permitted under section 113(h) after
each stage of cleanup is complete. In this way, an entire. cleanup need not be complete
before a citizen can sue.").
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Based on this language, one court concluded that, although a citizens' suit could be brought before the entire cleanup was completed, "in no event is judicial review [available] to delay the start
of a cleanup remedy. ' 20 6 This interpretation of section 113(h)(4)
thus would permit a citizens' suit prior to completion of the entire
cleanup, even though it still effectively forecloses adequate review
of a claim that the implementation of a phase of the cleanup will
cause adverse health or environmental effects.
In contrast to the two foregoing interpretations of section
113(h), other courts have expressly or impliedly concluded that
review of nonliability-based CERCLA claims should be available
prior to implementation of the cleanup. In these cases, the plaintiffs have convinced the courts that policy considerations, such as
protection of public health and the environment, the speed of the
cleanup process, or the inadequacy of delayed review, weigh
strongly in favor of immediate review. These courts also appear to
decide that, because the citizens' suit claims are unrelated to CERCLA liability, there is no clear congressional intent to foreclose
pre-enforcement review. Indeed, some legislative history indicates
that, Congress intended to permit review of nonliability-based
CERCLA claims once a cleanup plan had been selected.20 7
Other parts of the legislative history indicate that Congress intended something more
than the selection of a plan for a cleanup is required before a citizens' suit can be brought.
See H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 23 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3046. According to that piece of legislative history, the citizens' suit exception to the bar on CERCLA review was
not intended to allow review of the selection of a response action prior to
completion of the action: the provision allows for review only of an "action
taken .. " Thus, after the RI/FS has been completed, the remedial action has
been selected and designed, and the construction of the selected action has
begun, persons will be able to maintain suit to ensure that a specific on-theground implementation of the response action is consistent with the requireThe Committee emphasizes that this paragraph is not
ments of the Act ....
intended to allow delay of the clean-up and that, in actions under this paragraph, courts should not entertain claims to re-evaluate the selection of remedial action.
See also 132 CONG. REC. 28,441 (1986) (statement of Sen. Thurmond) (stating that § 113(h)
is intended to preclude "premature challenges in court to remedy selection or liability").
206 Neighborhood Toxic Cleanup Emergency, 716 F. Supp. at 834. In addition to the
legislative history, the court supported its decision by relying on other decisions. See id. at
832.
207 Several legislators argued that the selection of a response action is an "action taken"
under § 310 of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9659, and that a citizens' suit may therefore be
brought once the remedial action is selected. See 132 CONG. REC. 29,754 (1986) (statement
of Rep. Roe) ("A final cleanup decision, or plan, constitutes the taking of action at a site,
and the legislative language makes it clear that citizens' suits under section 310 will lie
alleging violations of law and irreparable injury to health as soon as - and these words are
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In United States v. Princeton Gamma-Tech, Inc.,2°8 the court concluded that citizens' suit jurisdiction is available for a health-based
claim "even though the cleanup may not yet be completed.

' 20 9

The

Court of Appeals presented three arguments in support of its decision that review of health-based claims is not barred until at least a
particular phase of the cleanup has been completed. First, the text
of section 113(h)(4) "does not speak in clear terms "210 when it provides that a citizens' suit may be brought once there is an "action
taken." Second, an absurd result would arise if thetext of section
113(h)(4) were read to foreclose review until the cleanup has been
completed: "The citizens' suit provision is effectively nullified if
litigation must be delayed until after irreparable harm or damage
has been done. In such circumstances, a statutory interpretation
that calls for the full completion of the plan before review
is per211
mitted makes the citizens' suit provision an absurdity.

Finally, the court asserted that a construction of the statute permitting review of a health-based claim prior to implementation of
the cleanup is necessary given CERCLA's purposes: "In circumstances where irreparable environmental damage will result from a
planned response action, forcing parties to. wait until the project
has been fully completed before hearing objections to the action
would violate the purposes of CERCLA.1212

Although the

a direct quote - 'action is taken."'); see also 132 CONG. REC. 29,754 (1986) (statement of
Rep. Roe) ("The legislation allows citizens to bring a lawsuit under section [9659] as soon
as the agency announces its decision regarding how a cleanup will be structured."); 132
CONG. REC. S14,898 (1986) (statement of Rep. Glickman, quoting Sen. Stafford) ("It is
crucial, if it is at all possible, to maintain citizens' rights to challenge response actions, or
final cleanup plans before such plans are implemented even in part."). This narrow interpretation of the scope of review preclusion for health-based claims also receives inferential
support from a House Report, which ties Congress' concerns about litigation delays to its
concern that public health will be threatened. See H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.,
pt. 5,at 25 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3148. According to that house report:
The purpose of th[e review preclusion] provision is to ensure that there will
be no delays associated with a legal challenge of [sic] the particular removal
or remedial action selected under section 104 or secured through administrative order or judicial action under section 106. Without such a provision,
responses to releases or threatened releases of hazardous substances could be
unduly delayed, thereby exacerbating the threat of damage to human health
or the environment.
Id. In a case where delay in implementing the cleanup would likely result in public health
improvements, the applicability of the bar against early review is more doubtful.
208 31 F.3d 138 (3d Cir. 1994).
209 Id. at 148.
210 Id. at 145.
211 Id. at 146.
212 Id. at 144-45.
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Princeton Gamma-Tech court distinguished its case from earlier
circuit decisions by asserting that those courts had not been "confronted with bona fide assertions of irreparable environmental
damage resulting from violations of CERCLA's policies, ' 213 the
Princeton Gamma-Tech court is the only circuit court that has construed section 113(h) to permit citizens' suit jurisdiction prior to
cleanup implementation.
The result in Princeton Gamma-Tech, however, finds support in
dictum by the District Court in Cabot Corp. v. United States
EPA.214 In that case, the court stated that citizens' suit jurisdiction
should be available for a health-based claim immediately after a
cleanup plan is selected.215 The Cabot court came to this conclusion after first deciding that the citizens' suit exception made the
scope of review preclusion provision ambiguous.216 The court then
concluded that this ambiguity should be resolved in favor of permitting early review of health-based CERCLA claims both
because the legislative history 217 indicated that Congress intended
Id. at 144 (footnote omitted).
677 F. Supp. 823, 828-30 (E.D. Pa. 1988); see supra note 193 and accompanying text.
677 F. Supp. at 829. In one other case, Artesian Water Co. v. Government of New
Castle County, 659 F. Supp. 1269 (D. Del. 1987), the court stated, with little analysis and
without discussing the full terms of § 113(h), that "[w]ithout deciding the issue, it appears
that [the plaintiff] may ...challenge in a citizens' suit the adequacy of [the] EPA's selected
remedy, particularly its failure to provide [an alternative water supply.]" Id. at 1290 n.39.
216 677 F. Supp. at 828 ("[S]ubsection 9613(h)(4) appears to be the provision most hospitable to early judicial review .... Th[e] language arguably permits challenges to [the]
EPA's plans even before they have been implemented." (citations omitted)).
217 See id. at 828-29; see also supra notes 128, 205, 207 (summarizing the relevant legislative history). During the debate that preceded final enactment of SARA, Representative
Glickman sought to foreclose an interpretation of § 113(h) that would permit immediate
review of a claim because it was health-based. Representative Glickman instead compared
a citizen's health-based claim to a PRP's premature liability claim and argued that they are
substantially the same because they delay cleanups. See 132 CONG.. REC. 29,736 (1986).
Rep. Glickman states:
This is a valid argument and one which both neighbors of sites and potentially
responsible parties have asserted. Neither of these persons want[s] to see an
inadequate or inappropriate remedy built. If the remedy is not adequate the
neighbors may be injured and the potentially responsible parties may be liable
under State law for those injuries. Ifthe remedy has to be rebuilt, the potentially responsible parties may have to pay twice for the cleanup of one site.
Notwithstanding these arguments, the conferees decided to ensure expeditious cleanups by restricting such preimplementation review.
Id. Rep. Glickman went on to conclude:
[C]learly the conferees did not intend to allow any plaintiff, whether the
neighbor who is unhappy about the construction of a toxic waste incinerator
in the neighborhood, or the potentially responsible party who will have to pay
for its construction, to stop a cleanup by what would undoubtedly be a prolonged legal battle.
213
214
215
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this result2 18 and because only pre-cleanup review would ensure
adequate review of a claim of irreparable injury.2 1 9
Thus, the Cabot court - like the Princeton Gamma-Tech court
- found that it would be objectionable to permit judicial review
only after a stage of the cleanup has been completed in a healthbased citizens' suit. In such a case, the court will be unable to prevent the threatened harm if the harmful phase of the remedial plan

has already been implemented at the time of review. The Cabot
Corp. court premised its analysis in part on the expectation that
private citizens rather that PRPs would bring these citizens' suits.
However, the party ielying on citizens' suit jurisdiction in
22 0
Princeton Gamma-Tech was a PRP.
In sum, courts have reached different conclusions about the
extent to which section 113(h) forecloses immediate judicial review
of CERCLA claims that are not related to liability, with a minority
of courts deciding that immediate review is available because
delayed review would be inadequate.
C.

Preclusion of Bankruptcy Review Claims Priorto Completion
of the CERCLA Cleanup

The next litigation context is the first of three in which plaintiffs
assert claims under an alternative statutory scheme to secure
immediate review of CERCLA cleanup issues. The first context
involves a PRP seeking to extinguish a CERCLA claim in a bankruptcy proceeding, while the EPA contends that CERCLA bars
such a discharge until it has brought a cost recovery action.221
Id. at 29,737.
218 See 677 F. Supp. at 829 ("Health and environmental hazards must be addressed as
promptly as possible rather than awaiting the completion of an inadequately protective
response action." (emphasis added)).
219 See id. at 829 n.6. The court states that:
The compatibility with due process of deferring judicial review of claims of
compensable harm [(such as the issue of liability for response costs)], as distinguished from the need for prompt review of allegations of irreparable
injury, such as harm to public health or the environment, supports the distinction here drawn between PRPs' suits alleging essentially monetary harms and
bona fide citizens' suits alleging irreparable harm.
Id.
220 Other courts have als6 indicated a willingness to allow immediate judicial review of
CERCLA claims unrelated to liability. See Healy, supra note 1, at 51-56 (discussing Alabama v. United States EPA, 871 F.2d 1548 (11th Cir. 1989), and Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. United States EPA, 673 F. Supp. 1043 (D. Kan. 1987)).
221 This type of case is discussed infra notes 224-46 and accompanying text.
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As discussed, review preclusion is clearest when a PRP seeks to
litigate the existence or scope of its liability prior to an EPA
enforcement action. Such claims threaten delays in cleanup and
were specifically slated for litigation only after the United States
itself brings a section 107 cost recovery action.222 In an increasing
number of cases, however, the PRP does not assert a pre-cost
recovery claim against the EPA, but instead files for bankruptcy
and seeks to have any claim available to the EPA for CERCLA
response costs discharged in the bankruptcy proceeding.223
In the bankruptcy context, a plain "conflict ' '224 has developed
between the Bankruptcy Code, the purpose of which is to provide
debtors with a "fresh start, an objective made more feasible by
maximizing the scope of a discharge, "225 and CERCLA, one purpose of which is to expedite cleanups with "litigation about cleanup
costs [delayed] until after the cleanup. '226 In trying to reconcile
this conflict, courts have come to three different conclusions about
how these two statutory schemes interact, none of which adheres

See supra part III.A.
See David H. Topol, Hazardous Waste and Bankruptcy: Confronting the Unasked
Questions, 13 VA. ENVrL. L.J. 185, 191 (1994) ("[The] EPA has projected that thirty percent of all hazardous waste site owners will be forced to file for bankruptcy. Many other
companies that generate hazardous waste may also be forced into bankruptcy because of
the costs of hazardous waste cleanup." (footnotes omitted)).
224 In re Combustion Equip. Assocs., 838 F.2d 35, 37 (2d Cir. 1988); accord Sylvester
Bros. Dev. Co. v. Burlington N. R.R., 133 B.R. 648, 654 (D. Minn. 1991); see also In re
Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R. Co., 3 F.3d 200, 201 (7th Cir. 1993) ("The tension between these fundamental aspects of our national policy is profound."); In re Jensen,
995 F.2d 925, 928 (9th Cir. 1993) ("Conflict and confusion [between environmental and
bankruptcy policies] are almost inevitable." (citation omitted)); In re Chateaugay Corp.,
944 F.2d 997, 1002 (2d Cir. 1991) ("[T]he Bankruptcy Code and CERCLA point toward
competing objectives."); In re National Gypsum Co., 139 B.R. 397, 404 (N.D. Tex. 1992)
("CERCLA and the [Bankruptcy] Code are in tension in significant respects."); United
States v.Union Scrap Iron & Metal, 123 B.R. 831, 835 (D. Minn. 1990) ("The parties see a
fundamental conflict between the goals of the Bankruptcy Act and the CERCLA/
Superfund legislation."); In re Chateaugay Corp., 112 B.R. 513, 524-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1990),
aff'd, 944 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1991) (balancing "the debtor's right to reorganize its affairs in a
rational way" against the "administrative[ ] difficult[y]" for environmental agencies that
must present certain claims for response costs that will otherwise be discharged in bankruptcy). The conflict between CERCLA and the Code seems greater than any conflict
between other environmental laws and the Code because, unlike those other statutes,
CERCLA imposes liability for monetary environmental claims. See Denise M. Schuh,
Comment, The Cents of It: Dischargeabilityand Environmental Claims Under the Bankruptcy Code, 14 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 191, 217-18 (1993).
225 In re Chateaugay, 944 F.2d at 1002.
226 In re Combustion Equip., 838 F.2d at 37. That policy is, of course, the substance of
§ 113(h).
222

223
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fully to section 113(h)'s intended foreclose of pre-enforcement
review of the CERCLA liability issue.227
In re ChateaugayCorp. first addressed section 113(h)'s impact on
a bankruptcy court's ability to discharge claims related to a PRP's
CERCLA liability before the EPA has itself sought to recover
those costs under section 107.228 In Chateaugay, the Second Circuit
rejected the EPA's contention that section 113(h)'s "ban on preenforcement judicial review requires that it receive a declaratory
judgment upholding its contention that unincurred response costs'
are not dischargeable 'claims. '229
The court construed section 113(h) very narrowly and held that
"CERCLA's prohibition of pre-enforcement review is simply inapplicable. ' 230 Although the court clearly erred by asserting that section 113(h) was irrelevant to its decision, 231 the court had to
identify the scope of CERCLA claims that were subject to the discharge. Using Congress' broad definition of the term "claim" in
the Bankruptcy Code,2 32 the Second Circuit affirmed the district
court's holding that CERCLA claims are discharged in bankruptcy
for "releases that have occurred pre-petition, even though they
have not then been discovered by [the] EPA (or anyone else). 23 3
In short, the Second Circuit read the review preclusion provision
narrowly in order to further the fresh start policy of the Bankruptcy Code.234
The district court decision in In re National Gypsum Co.
presented an alternative interpretation of how CERCLA interacts
227 The interaction between CERCLA and bankruptcy has received extensive comment
in law reviews. See John R. Bevis, Case Note, In Re Jensen: Demonstratingthe Need for
Supreme Court Resolution of the Conflict Between CERCLA and the Bankruptcy Code, 9 J.
LAND UsE & ENvrrL. L. 179, 184-96 (1993) (summarizing in greater detail the current state
of the law); see also Healy, supra note 1, at 61-70 (examining bankruptcy cases in greater
detail).
228 944 F.2d. at 1006.
229 Id.
230 Id.
231 See Healy, supra note 1, at 64-65.
232 See 944 F.2d at 1005.
233 Id. at 1000.
234 In interpreting how the two statutes interact, however, it should be noted that the
Second Circuit rejected the debtor's argument that the discharge should also include claims
for all response costs "whenever based on LTV's pre-petition conduct, a position that
would have included LTV's pre-petition conduct of placing hazardous substances in sealed
containers, followed by release of the substances into the environment years after confirmation." Id.
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with the Bankruptcy Code. 35 Unlike the Second Circuit, this court
recognized that section 113(h) applies generally to questions of
PRP liability under CERCLA and that those liability issues are
implicated when claims are estimated and liquidated in bankruptcy.236 In attempting to harmonize the statutes, the court
decided that CERCLA review preclusion could not be viewed so
broadly that courts would be able to discharge claims in bankruptcy only after the EPA had brought a CERCLA cost recovery
action. Instead, the court decided that there was an important distinction "between costs associated with pre-petition conduct resulting in a release ... that could have been 'fairly' contemplated by
the parties; and those that could not have been 'fairly' contemplated by the parties. '237 Only claims related to the former costs
could be discharged in bankruptcy, but those could be discharged
regardless of whether the EPA had brought a cost recovery action.
The court stated in this regard that when a court considers whether
CERCLA costs are associated with claims within the "fair contemplation" of the parties, the court must consider several factors that
2 38
reflect CERCLA policy.
Following the district court decision and because CERCLA policy must be harmonized with the Bankruptcy Code's fresh start
policy, the EPA is no longer able to retain its full enforcement discretion when deciding whether to file a notice of CERCLA claims
once PRPs have filed for bankruptcy.2 39 Under the district court's
view,
235 139 B.R. 397 (N.D. Tex. 1992). National Gypsum had filed a voluntary petition for
bankruptcy under Chapter 11. Id. at 399. On behalf of the EPA and the Department of
the Interior, the United States thereafter filed a proof of claim asserting that National
Gypsum was liable for response costs and damages under CERCLA. Id.
236
'Id. at 411 ("Section 113(h) is applicable in these circumstances."). But cf. id. at 406
n.21 ("[T]he presentation of evidence and testimony for purposes of reaching an estimate
[of a claim in bankruptcy] is not tantamount to the litigation precluded by 42 U.S.C.
§ 9613(h).").
237 Id. at 407 (footnotes omitted). The court criticized Chateaugay because the Second
Circuit provided no basis for excluding from its broad definition of claims response costs
related to sites where the debtor had disposed of hazardous substances, but where a
release or a threat of a release had not occurred pre-petition: "[T]here exists no meaningful distinction between debtor's conduct and the release or threatened release resulting
from this conduct." Id. (footnote omitted); see id. at 407 n.24 ("[l]t is not clear to the Court
why the placing of hazardous substances in sealed containers pre-petition, followed by
release of the substances into the environment years after confirmation, is not a claim;
while the release of substances at locations unknown to the parties pre-petition is a
claim.").
238 See id. at 407 & n.24.
239 See id. at 411 n.36 (noting that in VPG, "[t]he Fifth Circuit was not faced with the
unique circumstances surrounding the interaction of the Code and CERCLA").
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[i]n order for the EPA to preserve its claims in regard to a
PRP in bankruptcy, its duties are triggered by the mere discovery of a site linked to the Debtors, and extends to such
activity that would allow a rough and speedy estimation of
CERCLA claims under the Code.24°
In short, the court recognized that its interpretation of section
113(h) curtailed the EPA's enforcement discretion and forced the
EPA to modify its enforcement priorities, to the extent that in
some cases the EPA was now required to make an earlier filing of
claims against PRPs in bankruptcy.24'
Two circuits have recently adopted the general approach of the
National Gypsum court in dbciding whether a CERCLA claim has
been discharged in bankruptcy. 242 Neither of these cases, however,
involved the discharge of an EPA claim, thus neither case involved
the strongest case for holding that the claim is not discharged.
Both courts held that a private party claim for CERCLA response
costs was discharged because the party had had adequate notice of
the claim prior to the discharge in bankruptcy and the claimant had
failed to assert the claim in the bankruptcy proceeding.243
Dictum in another district court decision suggests a third
approach to the discharge of CERCLA claims in bankruptcy - an
approach that is more favorable to the EPA than the National Gypsum approach. In United States v. Union Scrap Iron & Metal,244 the
court relied upon the terms of section 113(h) to reject a reorganized company's contention that in a bankruptcy proceeding "a
release or threatened release alone constitutes a dischargeable
claim. '245 Having disposed of the basic approach taken by the Second Circuit in Chateaugay, the court stated that a CERCLA claim
could be discharged in bankruptcy only for a claim as to which the
EPA had incurred response costs prior to the bankruptcy discharge
Id. at 409 (emphasis added).
241 See id. at 411 n.34.
242 See In re Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R., 3 F.3d 200, 202 (7th Cir. 1993);
In re Jensen, 995.F.2d 925, 930 (9th Cir. 1993).
243 In re Chicago, 3 F.3d at 206-07; In re Jensen, 995 F.2d at 931.
244 123 B.R. 831 (D. Minn. 1990).
245 Id. at 837. The court stated that such a rule would conflict directly with CERCLA's
policies:
Congress did not intend the EPA to be embroiled in litigation over the wisdom, scope, and costs of various possible remedies to clean up dangerous sites
before the EPA had spent any resources investigating, evaluating, and implementing a remedy for these sites. [The reorganized company's] position cannot be squared with the CERCLA legislative scheme.
Id. at 838.
240
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date.246 This approach will result in fewer CERCLA claims being
subject to discharge in bankruptcy and thus will impose the fewest
constraints on the EPA's administration of the Superfund program.
Notwithstanding this effect, the approach still does not bar entirely
the discharge of CERCLA claims in bankruptcy prior to an EPA
enforcement action and thus limits the effect of section 113(h).
In sum, the bankruptcy context is one in which two important
statutory goals conflict in ways that are quite apparent to courts
and litigants. When called upon to reconcile this conflict, courts
have taken various approaches, all of which modify to some extent
the effect of section 113(h) in foreclosing pre-enforcement review.
D. Preclusion of Substantive Federal Statutory Claims Prior to
CERCLA Enforcement
A claimant can also rely upon other federal statutes to establish
district court jurisdiction when seeking early review of a CERCLA
claim.247 Cases involving claims for statutory review under a federal statute other than CERCLA can be divided into two broad
categories for the purpose of summarizing the applicable law.
The first category consists of claims arising under another statute
where Congress has provided for the interaction of that statute
with CERCLA. Recently, this situation has arisen in two cases
where parties have sought indirect review of CERCLA response
actions by relying directly or indirectly on the right of review
249 the governgranted in RCRA.248 In United States v. Colorado,
ment sought a declaratory judgment to foreclose Colorado from
taking any action to enforce a compliance order that the state had
issued pursuant to its delegated authority to enforce RCRA.25 °
246 See id. at 838 (labelling the approach described in the text as a "sensible approach to
balancing environmental and bankruptcy policy goals"). However, the court's discussion
of this approach appears to be dictum for two reasons. First, the case did not involve any
of the types of fair contemplation claims that could be discharged according to the court in
National Gypsum. Second, the Union Scrap court appeared willing to discharge other
claims even when the PRP had not yet incurred actual response costs at the time of the
bankruptcy proceeding, because there may be "a contingent claim based on pre-confirmation contacts between the parties." Id. at 839.
247 The remainder of this section discusses these cases in detail.
248 See Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, Challenges to FederalFacility Cleanups and CERCLA Section 113(h), 8 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 353 (1995) (discussing the extent to which CERCLA's
§ 113(h) forecloses review of a RCRA citizens' suit); see also Nathan H. Stearns, Comment, Cleaning Up the Mess, or Messing Up the Cleanup: Does CERCLA's Jurisdictional
Bar (Section 113(h)) Prohibit Citizen Suits Brought Under RCRA, 22 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.
REV. 49 (1994).
249 990 F.2d 1565 (10th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 922 (1994).
250 Id. at 1573-74.
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The government argued that resolution of the RCRA compliance
order dispute would involve the court in the review of an ongoing
CERCLA response action that was barred by section 113(h).25 '
The Tenth Circuit considered the interaction of CERCLA and
RCRA by analyzing CERCLA's savings provisions2 52 and RCRA's
citizens' suit provision, which specifically regulates the circumstances under which an ongoing CERCLA response action would
bar a RCRA citizens' suit. 253 In the court's view, the RCRA citi-

zens' suit provision indicated a congressional intent to permit state
enforcement of a RCRA ,compliance order, even if that involved
review of a CERCLA response action.2 54 The court contrasted the
availability of this type of RCRA citizens' suit with a citizens' suit
alleging that RCRA is being violated because a party is creating an
imminent and substantial endangerment. RCRA expressly provides that such an imminent hazard citizens' suit is foreclosed when
a CERCLA response action is under way.255 In the court's view,
Congress had specifically legislated regarding the interaction of
CERCLA and RCRA when it enacted the RCRA citizens' suit
provision, and that Congress decided to permit a RCRA citizens'
suit to enforce a RCRA order, notwithstanding the existence of an
ongoing CERCLA response action.256
In Arkansas Peace Ctr. v. Arkansas Dep't of Pollution Control
and Ecology,25 7 the Eighth Circuit also relied on the RCRA citizens' suit provision to define how CERCLA interacted with
RCRA. In that case, a citizens group opposed the decision to
incinerate dioxin as part of a planned emergency removal action
under CERCLA. 258 The group's citizens' suit contended that the
incineration plan violated the applicable RCRA regulations and
posed an imminent and substantial endangerment to human
health. 259 Because the citizens group was raising an imminent hazard claim, rather than seeking enforcement of a RCRA order, the
court held that Congress had intentionally foreclosed the citizens'
Id. at 1574.
252 See id. at 1575-77 (construing 42 U.S.C. §§ 9652(d), 9614(a)).
253 See id. at 1577-78 (construing 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)).
254 See id. at 1578 (construing 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(1XA) and noting that the RCRA
citizens' suit provision does not specifically foreclose such a citizens' suit when a CERCLA
response action is present).
255 See id. at 1578 (construing 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2)(B)).
256 See id.
257 999 F.2d 1212 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1397 (1994).
258 See id. at 1215.
259 See id. at 1215, 1217.
251
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suit because of the ongoing CERCLA removal action. 260 The court
distinguished the Colorado case, pointing out that that case
involved a citizens' suit to enforce a RCRA order. 261 In sum, when
courts have applied CERCLA's review preclusion provision to
RCRA claims, RCRA itself indicates the extent to which Congress
2 62
intended to preclude review.

In the second category of challenges to CERCLA response
actions based on claims arising out of other substantive statutes,
the statutes do not indicate congressional intent, and thus do not
coordinate different, and possibly conflicting, statutes. In this context, courts may rely on their discretion. However, they must firstconclude that the broad and categorical language of section 113(h)
permits a decision that pre-enforcement review of a CERCLA
response action, even under another statute, is not foreclosed.
260 See id. at 1218.
261See id.at 1217-18. One commentator contends that § 113(h) should not foreclose
any RCRA citizens' suits and criticizes the Arkansas Peace Center decision for its reasoning and result. See Wuerth, supra note 248, at 383-85.
262 In a third case involving the interaction between CERCLA and RCRA, the court did
not rely on the RCRA citizens' suit provision to define the scope of review preclusion. In
Browning-FerrisIndus. of South Jersey, Inc. (BFI) v. Muszynski, 899 F.2d 151 (2d Cir.
1990), a RCRA consent order to which BFI and the EPA were parties required BFI to use
wells to monitor groundwater affected by leaching from a BFI landfill. Id. at 152-53. A
dispute arose between the parties over the type of pipe that should be used for monitoring.
Id. This dispute continued until the EPA issued a § 106 order under CERCLA, requiring
BFI to submit a new monitoring plan, which would provide for the installation of stainless
steel pipes - the type of pipes desired by the EPA and opposed by BFI. See id.
After receiving the § 106 order - review of which is expressly barred by § 113(h) until
the EPA itself brings an action to enforce it - BFI brought an action in district court,
challenging the new monitoring requirement under RCRA and CERCLA. See id. at 153.
BFI did not bring the action as a RCRA citizens' suit based on the RCRA consent order,
but instead sought pre-enforcement review of the § 106 order, arguing that the EPA acted
beyond its statutory authority in issuing that order and the court should review its claim to
provide an adequate and timely remedy. BFI relied on Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184
(1958), to support this argument. See BFI, 1989 WL 51916, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), affd,
899 F.2d 151 (2d Cir. 1990). Relying on the terms of § 113(h), the district court dismissed
BFI's action. See 899 F.2d at 153-54.
After stating that § 113(h) was "not dispositive" of the jurisdiction issue, the Second
Circuit came to the uncommon conclusion that the case "is an appropriate one in which to
assume jurisdiction arguendo without deciding the issue." Id. at 154, 159. The court
declined to rule on the jurisdiction issue because it was concerned that "[a] comprehensive
ruling on the jurisdictional issues would necessarily have a broad impact on future EPA
pollution remediation efforts." Id. at 154. The court stated that defining the scope of
review preclusion under § 113(h) poses a knotty problem because, even though the purposes of CERCLA are very important and are furthered by delaying review, the breadth of
preclusion under § 113(h) may allow the EPA to prevent judicial review of its actions by
relying on CERCLA authority when the EPA views review preclusion as necessary to
accomplish its remedial objectives. See id. at 160. Having assumed jurisdiction, the court
then rejected BFI's claim on the merits. Id. at 164.
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A court may, however, be unwilling as a threshold matter to construe section 113(h) narrowly. In McClellan Ecological Seepage
Situation (MESS) v. Perry,263 a citizens group brought an action

against the United States Department of Defense, owner of
McClellan Air Force Base, the site of an ongoing CERCLA
response. 264 The plaintiff group brought statutory claims under the
Clean Water Act (CWA) 265 and sought injunctive relief and civil
penalties.266

In deciding that pre-enforcement review of the statutory claims
was not available, the Ninth Circuit focused exclusively on the
"clear and unequivocal" language of section 113(h), which
"amount[ed] to a blunt withdrawal of federal jurisdiction. ' 267 In
the court's view, this "unqualified language . .. preclud[ed] 'any
challenges' to CERCLA Section 104 cleanups, not just those
brought under other provisions of CERCLA. ' '268 The court

inferred from the broad terms of section 113(h) that Congress
believed that any such review would slow cleanup, undermine
CERCLA policies, and therefore, intended to bar early review
under other statutes. 269 The court recognized that delayed review
of the non-CERCLA statutory claims raised by the plaintiff might
necessarily result in inadequate review of those claims. 270 Nevertheless, the court stated that, "[w]e must presume that Congress
has already balanced all concerns and 'concluded that the interest
47 F.3d 325 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 51 (1995).
Id. at 326-27.
Id.
266 Id.
267 Id. at 328 (quoting North Shore Gas Co. v. EPA, 930 F.2d 1239, 1244 (7th Cir. 1991)).
268 Id. (quoting Arkansas Peace Ctr. v. Arkansas Dep't of Pollution Control and Ecology, 999 F.2d 1212, 1217 (8th Cir. 1993)); accord Razore v. Tulalip Tribes of Wash., 66 F.3d
236, 239-40 (9th Cir. 1995); see Werlein v. United States, 746 F. Supp. 887, 893-94 (D.
Minn. 1990). Wuerth discusses and criticizes the Werlein decision, supra note 248, at 365367.
The MESS court's treatment of the plaintiff's RCRA claims also indicates the court's
view of the broad scope of review preclusion mandated by § 113(h). See 47 F.3d at 327.
The court viewed the text of § 113(h) as plainly foreclosing those claims. See id. at 328-29.
Accordingly, the MESS court did not follow the approach of the cases discussed infra notes
284-98 and accompanying text, and did not examine the terms of the RCRA citizens' suit
provision to determine whether Congress had expressly provided that RCRA review was
available. See 47 F.3d at 331 ("Section 113(h) withholds federal jurisdiction to review citizens' suits and actions brought under other, non-CERCLA statutes that challenge ongoing
CERCLA cleanup actions.").
269 See 47 F.3d. at 329 ("Although judicial review is an important element in the enforcement of laws such as RCRA and the Clean Water Act, Congress has determined that the
need for swift execution of CERCLA cleanup plans outweighs this concern.").
270 Id.
263

264
265
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in removing the hazard of toxic waste from Superfund sites' clearly
outweighs the risk of irreparable harm" arising out of delayed
2 71
review of non-CERCLA statutory claims.
However, it is not certain that Congress actually made the intentional decision to dispense with adequate statutory review of nonCERCLA claims when it enacted section 113(h). The legislative
record offers no direct support for the court's inference. A better
reading of section 113(h) and the legislative history shows that
Congress did not consider the complexities of the statutory interactions that would arise in these cases and, thus, did not intentionally
select its preferred means for resolving statutory inconsistencies
that might arise.
Not all courts have construed section 113(h) to apply so broadly
as to foreclose statutory review of non-CERCLA claims. In Penn
Central Corp. v. United States, 72 the Special Court established by
the Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973 (Rail Act)2 73 did not
construe section 113(h) to foreclose pre-enforcement review of all
CERCLA response actions. There, Penn Central was potentially
liable for CERCLA response costs incurred at two different sites.
Penn Central brought a declaratory judgment action in the Special
Court, requesting an adjudication of its CERCLA liability based
on several rail documents and court orders.2 74 The government
moved to dismiss the action on grounds that section 113(h) barred
the court's jurisdiction. 75
The court rejected this argument and held that it had jurisdiction
to review Penn Central's claim, based on section 209(e)(2) of the
Rail Act. 76 That provision giyes the Special Court exclusive jurisdiction to review any claim that involves interpreting a rail order
entered by that court.277 Because a court would have to interpret
such an order to determine Penn Central's liability for response
costs under CERCLA, the Special Court held that it had exclusive
jurisdiction over Penn Central's claim notwithstanding the terms of
section 113(h). 78 Moreover, the court concluded that its assumption of exclusive jurisdiction would not unduly undermine CERCLA because the EPA was already in a position to litigate the
271 Id. (quoting Boarhead Corp. v. Erickson, 923 F.2d 1011, 1023 (3d Cir. 1991)).
272 814 F. Supp. 1116 (Regional Rail Reorg. Ct. 1993).
273 45 U.S.C. §§ 701-797m, 719 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
274 See 814 F. Supp. at 1118.
275 See id. at 1118, 1121-22.
276 45 U.S.C. § 719(e)(2).
277 See 814 F. Supp. at 1119 (quoting and explaining § 209(e) of the Rail Act).
278 See id. at 1119-21.

1995-96]

Judicial Review Preclusion

317

CERCLA claims, so that the case did not truly involve preenforcement review.279
In sum, conflicts will arise between CERCLA's policy of delayed
review and the policies identified in other substantive federal statutes. The broad, categorical, and plain language of section 113(h)
may be a significant hurdle to gaining timely review of those nonCERCLA claims. The claim for immediate review under another
statute - if it is to be available at all - requires a strong showing
through the text or purposes of that other statute that Congress
intended to permit review of the non-CERCLA claim.
E. Preclusion of Administrative Procedure Act Claim Review
Priorto CERCLA Enforcement
The final situation in which a plaintiff seeks pre-enforcement
review through another federal statute involves claims under procedural statutes that do not explicitly provide for statutory review.
In such a case, the court must decide whether section 113(h) bars
the action, which is necessarily brought pursuant to the APA,28°
given that the statute giving rise to the claim does not itself provide
a right of action. Claims falling into this category typically occur
when CERCLA response actions or section 106 orders are challenged on the underlying procedural rights in the National Envi28 1 and the National Historic
ronmental Policy Act (NEPA)
282
Preservation Act (NHPA).
As more fully discussed in an earlier article,283 two courts of
appeals have decided whether claims may be asserted under the
APA to gain pre-enforcement review of a CERCLA response
action. In Schalk v. Reilly,284 the court held that CERCLA barred
federal jurisdiction over a NEPA claim asserted under the APA.285
279 See id. at 1123.
280 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06.
281 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-70d (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
282 16 U.S.C. §§ 470-70w-6 (1994). The same issue arises when a claimant relies directly
on the APA when requesting early review of a CERCIA claim. See infra notes 284-288.
283 See Healy, supra note 1, at 77-82.
284 900 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir. 1990).
285 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 704. Because NEPA itself does not include provisions granting a

statutory right of review, the plaintiffs had to assert a cause of action for nonstatutory
review under the APA. See WILLIAM MURRAY TABB & LINDA A. MALONE, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 295 (1992) ("NEPA contains no specific provision
for judicial enforcement; however, courts have interpreted its procedural requirements as
establishing a 'strict standard of compliance' judicially reviewable under the [APA].")

(quoting Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109,
1112 (D.C. Cir. 1971)).
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The APA, however, does not provide a right of review when other
federal "statutes preclude judicial review. ' 286 The Seventh Circuit
relied on Congress' broad intent "'to remove challenges to remedial action plans from the jurisdiction of the federal courts until the
remedial action has been taken, ' '287 and held that the court lacked
jurisdiction because "APA review is not available when a federal
statute specifically precludes judicial review. '288
In Boarhead Corp. v. Erickson,289 (Boarhead) the Third Circuit
considered whether a NHPA challenge of a CERCLA cleanup
could be pursued prior to enforcement or implementation. Consistent with the Schalk analysis, the Boarhead court held that the
plaintiff could pursue the NHPA claim only to the extent that the
APA established such a claim - the only source available for a
waiver of sovereign immunity by the United States. 290 The court
then concluded that there was no jurisdiction because the APA
provides that a claim may not be asserted when another statute 291
CERCLA in this context - bars review.
In both cases, to determine whether the plaintiff could assert the
procedural claim, the court considered how the relevant statutes CERCLA, the APA, NEPA or NHPA - interacted. The decision
in both cases that there was no jurisdiction follows from Congress'
decision that review of claims under NEPA and the NHPA is available only when other federal statutes do not foreclose review. This
statutory structure and the implicit legislative intent may be contrasted with the previous litigation context involving statutory
2865 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1).
287 900
288 Id.

F.2d at 1097 (quoting Alabama v. EPA, 871 F.2d 1548, 1560 (11th Cir. 1989)).
(citing Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 345 (1984)). Other
courts have also reached the conclusion that pre-enforcement review of a CERCLA
response action-cannot be gained through the APA because CERCLA itself precludes such
review. See, e.g., Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc. v. Reilly, 889 F.2d 1380, 1390-91 (5th
Cir. 1989); Dickerson v. Administrator, EPA, 834 F.2d 974, 977-78 (11th Cir. 1987). One
court reached the identical conclusion even before Congress enacted § 113(h) as part of
SARA. See J.V. Peters & Co. v. Administrator, EPA, 767 F.2d 263, 265 (6th Cir. 1985).
289 923 F.2d 1011 (3d Cir. 1991).
290 The court reached this conclusion through two steps. First, the court held that, in
enacting the NHPA, "Congress must have intended to establish a private right of action to
interested parties, such as Boarhead, in these situations." Id. at 1017. This conclusion has
no real significance because the APA establishes a private right of action for injunctive
relief in cases of illegal government action. 5 U.S.C. § 702. In any event, the court
acknowledged that the NHPA does not itself include a waiver of sovereign immunity for
actions against the United States. 923 F.2d at 1017 n.11. Therefore, the court stated: "The
government has waived sovereign immunity insofar as the APA gives Boarhead a right to
judicial review." Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 702). In short, Boarhead's claim was reviewable
only to the extent allowed by the APA.
291 See 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1).
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review. When a challenge to a CERCLA cleanup is asserted in
that context, Congress has created a statutory right and has provided the express means for gaining judicial review of government
actions alleged to impair that statutory right. When statutory
review is involved, a court must weigh the policies of both CERCLA and the other federal statute in deciding whether review is
foreclosed.
F. Preclusion of ConstitutionalClaims Review Priorto
CERCLA Enforcement
The final litigation context in which courts must decide whether
section 113(h)2 92 forecloses pre-enforcement review involves claims
that response actions 293 or section 106 orders2 94 violate the Constitution. 95 In deciding whether review of such' claims is available
prior to enforcement, courts have reached three different conclusions. The decision whether to adopt one or another of these interpretations turns on whether the court relies only on CERCLA's
text or accounts as well for nontextual policies.
Two courts, including the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, have
held that CERCLA bars pre-enforcement jurisdiction of a PRP's
due process claims regarding its inability to challenge issues related
to its CERCLA liability.296 The Sixth Circuit concluded that the
text of section 113(h) does not include any exception for constitutional challenges to its broad rule of review preclusion.297 The
court also concluded that the legislative history of section 113(h)
292 42 U.S.C. §
293
294
295

9613(h).

See 42 U.S.C. § 9604.
42 U.S.C. § 9606(a).
Cases involving these claims are discussed in greater detail in Healy, supra note 1, at

82-95.
296 Barmet Aluminum Corp. v. Reilly, 927 F.2d 289 (6th Cir. 1991); South Macomb Disposal Auth. v. EPA, 681 F. Supp. 1244 (E.D. Mich. 1988).
297 Barmet, 927 F.2d at 293 ("Notably, the statutory language of section 9613(h) does not
include any explicit provision for constitutional challenges."); accord South Macomb, 681
F. Supp. at 1249-50 ("Reading the language of § 9613(h) [foreclosing jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 13311 for its everyday meaning supports the notion that this subsection prohibits
constitutional as well as statutory challenges until the time proscribed [sic] by the statute."); Reardon v. United States, 731 F. Supp. 558, 567 (D. Mass. 1990), rev'd in relevant
part, 947 F.2d 1509 (1st Cir. 1991) (en banc) (noting that the plain language of § 113(h)
"divests all federal courts from jurisdiction subject to its express provisions. By implication, this section specifically bars any federal court from asserting federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 which would include possible constitutional challenges").
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confirmed Congress' intent not to extend jurisdiction over constitutional claims prior to enforcement by the EPA.298
A second group of cases is comprised of decisions in which
courts have decided the merits of constitutional claims prior to
both EPA enforcement actions and implementation of the
response action.299 The courts deciding those cases, however, have
failed to provide any statutory or nonstatutory reasons why review
of the constitutional claims is not barred by the broad and categorical terms of section 113(h).300
In contrast to these decisions, the First Circuit has concluded
that, notwithstanding the categorical language of section 113(h), a
court does have jurisdiction to adjudicate some constitutional challenges to CERCLA cleanups, while the court has no jurisdiction to
adjudicate other such claims. In Reardon v. United States,3° ' the
First Circuit, sitting en banc, held that section 113(h) did not bar
federal court review of the plaintiffs' claim "that [the] EPA's imposition of the [CERCLA] lien without a hearing violated the due
process clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. ' 30 2 The court reached this conclusion because the consti298Barmet, 927 F.2d at 293 (citing S. REP. No. 11, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 58 (1985));
accord South Macomb, 681 F. Supp. at 1250-51. For an explanation of why this reading of
the legislative history is flawed, see Healy, supra note 1, at 83-86.
299 See Schalk v. Reilly, 900 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir. 1990); Environmental Waste Control,
Inc. v. Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, 763 F. Supp. 1576, 1580 (N.D.
Ga. 1991). Although the Environmental Waste Control court concluded that "it lack[ed]
subject matter jurisdiction to review the Health Assessment at this time," the court proceeded to consider and reject on the merits the plaintiffs' due process claim that inadequate procedures led to publication of the health assessment. Id.; see also United States v.
M. Genzale Plating, Inc., 723 F. Supp. 877, 885 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (rejecting due process
challenges on the merits both as to the NPL listing and the preclusion of pre-enforcement
review); Neighborhood Toxic Cleanup Emergency v. Reilly, 716 F. Supp. 828, 836 (D.N.J.
1989) (declining to review the EPA's Record of Decision for illegalities, and also rejecting
on the merits the claim "that [the] EPA denied plaintiff's members due process in selecting
a remedy for the GEMS landfill").
300 For a colorable, supporting rationale for the result reached in these cases, see Healy,
supra note 1, at 87-91.
301 947 F.2d 1509 (1st Cir. 1991) (en banc).
302 Id. at 1511. The EPA imposed the CERCLA lien pursuant to 42 U.S.C.§ 9607(l). Id.
The United States had not disputed the district court's decision in Reardon that CERCLA
permitted federal court jurisdiction of the constitutional claim. Appellees' Petition for'
Rehearing with Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc at 12 n.9, Reardon v. United States, 947
F.2d 1509 (1st Cir. 1991) (No. 90-1319) (stating that, "[g]iven the narrowness of the district
court's holding, we have concluded that review of the due process issue, in the circumstances of this case, does not contravene the intent of Congress in enacting Section
113(h)"). The United States did not, however, provide additional analysis in support of its
position. Id.
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3 °3 of
tutional claim did not relate to the EPA's "administration
the statute and, accordingly, the plaintiffs were not seeking review
or remedial action selected under secof a "challeng[e] to removal
304
tion 9604 of this title.
Because the constitutional claim did not come within the plain
terms of section 113(h), the court held that there was jurisdiction
over the plaintiffs' pre-enforcement claim.30 5 However, the court
also stated that pre-enforcement review was not available for all
constitutional claims. Indeed, in the court's view, Reardons' claim
was exceptional because court review did not threaten CERCLA's
purposes:
extending jurisdiction to'the Reardons' due process claim
does not necessarily run counter to the purposes underlying
§ 9613(h). For example, resolution of the due process issue
does not require any information that is not likely to be
available until clean-up of a site is finished. Because it is a
purely legal issue, its resolution in a pre-enforcement proceeding does not have the potential to force [the] EPA to
confront inconsistent results (as would a finding, for example, that a particular spill was caused by an act of

God).

306

947 F.2d at 1514 (emphasis removed).
See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h). In Reardon, the court stated that the plaintiffs' due process
claim challenging the CERCLA lien provision:
does not fit into the literal language of § 9613(h) ....Under our reading, [the
section] divests federal courts of jurisdiction over challenges to [the] EPA's
administration of the statute - claims that [the] EPA did not "select[ ]"the
proper "removal or remedial action," in light of the standards and constraints
established by the CERCLA statutes. The Reardons' due process claim is not
a challenge to the way [the] EPA is administering the statute; it does not concern the merits of any particular removal or remedial action. Rather, it is a
challenge to the CERCLA statute itself - to a statutory s heme under which
the government is authorized to file lien notices without any hearing on the
validity of the lien.
947 F.2d at 1514. Although the court's analysis focuses on the express terms of CERCLA,
the court also discusses the legislative history of the provision and rejects the view that
SARA's legislative history demonstrates congressional intent to bar pre-enforcement
review of constitutional claims. See id. at 1515-16.
305The court stated,
[w]e do not believe that the statute expresses a clear congressional intent to
preclude the type of constitutional claim the Reardons are making - a challenge to several statutory provisions which form part of CERCLA.... We
find only that a constitutional challenge to the CERCLA statute is not covered by § 9613(h).
947 F.2d at 1515.
306 Id. The court in Ehrlich v. Reno, 1994 WL 613698, *8 (E-D. Pa. 1994), reached a
similar decision, holding that § 113(h) did not foreclose immediate review of the plaintiff's
constitutional claim. The court stated: "Ehrlich alleges that because CERCLA fails to
303
304
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Thus, Reardon implies that, section 113(h) bars pre-enforcement
review of a constitutional claim only when the claim arises out of
the EPA's administration of a particular cleanup and when a court
would have to inquire into the facts related to that cleanup in order
to adjudicate the claim.3 °7 In sum, notwithstanding the broad and
categorical language of section 113(h), courts have come to different conclusions about the extent to which it bars pre-enforcement
review of constitutional claims, with most courts holding that there
is jurisdiction over such claims.
IV.

THE EFFECTIVENESS AND FAIRNESS OF

CERCLA

REVIEW

PRECLUSION

Having surveyed how section 113(h) has been applied in the various litigation contexts in which pre-enforcement claims are
asserted, this article will now evaluate the provision's effectiveness
and fairness. In doing so, we must consider the opinions and concerns of those interested in and affected by the statute.
A.

The Effectiveness and Fairness of Foreclosing Review of
CERCLA Liability Claims

1.

The Assumptions Underlying Section 113(h)

This section will first examine whether the assumptions underlying CERCLA review preclusion have any basis in fact. There
appear to be two such critical assumptions. First, it is assumed that
PRPs would litigate the liability issue if they were given the opportunity, rather than pursue or permit the EPA to pursue response
actions. Second, it is assumed that cleanups would be slowed if
PRPs were permitted to litigate their CERCLA liability before the
cleanup begins and the government brings an enforcement action.
If these assumptions are true, section 113(h) must be viewed as
effective because courts have uniformly read it as barring preenforcement review of CERCLA liability.
require a timely cost recovery action and hearing, the statute violates constitutional due
process. His constitutional claim does not challenge [the] EPA's failure to file a CERCLA
cost recovery action, but CERCLA itself." Id.
307 In addition to relying upon the language and intent of CERCLA, the court also sup-

ported its decision to distinguish between constitutional claims by analogizing the case at
issue to McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc., 498 U.S. 479 (1991). See also Reardon, 947'
F.2d at 1517. The court viewed McNary as identifying a distinction between constitutional
claims related to the administration of a statute in a particular case (no jurisdiction) and to
the statute itself (jurisdiction). See id.
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Regarding the first assumption, PRPs have been clear that sound
business judgment dictates that they litigate and resolve the liability issue as soon as possible. 3°8 Because CERCLA liability is both
large and uncertain, there is great pressure to pursue litigation
which would fix and possibly miniimize PRP liability.3" 9
It is unremarkable that PRPs express a strong desire to litigate
and resolve the liability issue at an early date. However, two other
facts must be considered to gain a more complete understanding of
the PRPs' interest in fixing and minimizing the extent of their
CERCLA liability. First, the PRPs' desire to minimize their
cleanup liability is evident because they willingly enter into settle308 Set Ways and Means Review Hearings,supra note 26, at 482 (statement of William H.
Bode, General Counsel, Superfund Action Coalition). According to Mr. Bode,
[i]mposition of retroactive liability has resulted, not unexpectedly, in huge
transaction costs. Transaction costs are those associated with non-cleanup
activities such [as] the costs of litigation and attorney fees .... When companies face cleanup bills in the hundreds of thousands of dollars, they turn to'
lawyers for protection, in an attempt to shift these costs elsewhere.
Id.; see id. at 414 (statement of John D. Cole, Senior Vice President, Zurich Insurance
Group, on behaft of the American Insurance Association) ("[G]iven the enormity of
cleanup costs and the potential consequences of the liability system, PRPs and insurers
have a responsibility to their employees, customers, shareholders, and communities to
exercise all legal remedies and defenses which are available to them."); see also REPORT
ON SUPERFUND ADMINISTRATION, supra note 9, at 80 (arguing that the "nonstandardized
approach" to remedy selection causes a "lack of consistency [that], in turn, generates disputes over the remedy [the] EPA selects, further slowing the pace of cleanups and adding
to their costs"); Ways and Means Review Hearings, supra note 26, at 478 (statement of
Donald S. Bunin, Vice President, Sequa Corp., on behalf of the Superfund Action Coalition) ("The enormous cost of CERCLA clean-ups fosters litigation at every step of the
process: PRP against the EPA with respect to remedy selection and assignment of liability;
PRP against PRP for response and contribution costs; and PRP against insurance
company.").
309 See REPORT ON SUPERFUND ADMINISTRATION, supra note 9, at 130. The report
states:
During the course of the Subcommittee hearings, no less than 25 witnesses,
representing industry, federal and state elected officials and environmental
personnel, and research and public advocacy groups, identified cost allocation
as a major factor preventing more timely and cost-effective Superfund cleanups. Cost allocation among responsible parties is often the catalyst for litigation and costly duplicate site studies, waste characterization, and analysis often referred to as "defensive" engineering.
Id.; see also Ways and Means Review Hearings,supra note 26, at 483 (statement of William
H. Bode, General Counsel, Superfund Action Coalition). Mr. Bode states:
A company facing CERCLA liability, [c]onsidering itself blameless for the
past contamination, is inclined to litigate with [the] EPA and other parties at
virtually every stage of the Superfund remedial process: [The] EPA's right to
enter a site; the factual connection between its property and the contamination damage; the selection and implementation of remedies; and the apportionment of response costs among the PRPs.
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ments providing for PRP-lead cleanups. Three-quarters of all
cleanups are now pursued by PRPs, 310 at an expected cost savings
of twenty percent below the cost of an EPA-lead cleanups.311
Indeed, these settlements are now so important to the current
administration of CERCLA that the effectiveness of the review
preclusion provision depends to a significant degree on whether it
promotes these settlements. By foreclosing pre-enforcement litigation as an alternative to fix and minimize liability, the provision has
that beneficial effect.
A second variable affecting PRPs' interest in quickly determining the full extent of their liability is that pre-enforcement litigation
against the EPA is unlikely to define the precise extent of a PRP's
liability, because that determination will turn ultimately on how
liability is allocated among all PRPs for the site. Pre-enforcement
action against the EPA will not necessarily decide the allocation of
liability.312 If PRPs conclude that a pre-enforcement action will
not yield a final allocation of liability, then they are less likely to
seek such review.
Regarding the second critical assumption underlying section
113(h) -

that pre-enforcement litigation will slow cleanups

-

most CERCLA observers are in agreement that such litigation
causes significant delays, as litigation of any sort slows CERCLA
cleanups.313 Typically, litigation slows the cleanup of a particular
310 See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
311 See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
312 Interview with EPA Official (Feb. 22, 1995) [hereinafter Interview].
313 See REPORT ON SUPERFUND ADMINISTRATION, supra note 9, at 53 (noting that "cost
allocation disputes and litigation can delay all stages of cleanup"); id. at 130 ("Because of
the high costs of cleanup, and the uncertainties of cost allocation, responsible parties
engage in extensive litigation over the extent of their financial responsibility for cleanup.
This litigation can generate substantial transaction costs and slow the pace of cleanups.").
Numerous witnesses testified that transaction costs - expenditures that do
not contribute to the identification, characterization, or cleanup of a site represented too large a percentage of total costs at Superfund sites. These
costs are primarily litigation and other settlement expenses and are principally generated by cost allocation disputes at Superfund sites. This extensive
litigation further slows the pace of cleanups.
Id. at 119; see also Ways and Means Review Hearings,supra note 26, at 479 (statement of
Donald S. Bunin, Vice President, Sequa Corp., on behalf of the Superfund Action Coalition) ("The incentives under CERCLA to litigate at every step explain why the average
clean-up of a Superfund site now exceeds 10 years."). A representative of an insurance
company described the situation as follows:
. Today, instead of facing a few million dollars in cleanup costs, a company is
staring at liabilities in the tens, even hundreds of millions of dollars. The
stakes are higher, the impact on profitability and shareholder returns are
much higher, and the potential pain is much greater. It is no wonder, then,
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site for about one year.314 Delays result from litigation for two
basic reasons: first, it drains agency resources and second, it draws
agency legal resources into other (non-cleanup, non-settlement)
judicial proceedings.
The adverse impact of litigation on agency
resources is twofold. First, the EPA regional office program per-

sonnel primarily responsible for working directly on cleanup matters are diverted to developing a factual record to resolve liability
issues. 316 Moreover, the administrative burdens associated with

developing facts relating to liability are more imposing and time
consuming when the facts have to be investigated at an early stage
in the response action.317 Indeed, the administrative difficulties
that companies large and small are spending huge sums on lawyers and consultants to debate the most cost-effective cleanup remedies, to reduce their
individual share, to find others to share the burden, and to attempt to collect
as much insurance as they can.
And so begins the cycles of negotiation, litigation, and adversarial warfare
that have done so much to impede Superfund cleanups and waste scarce public and private sector resources on huge legal and consulting bills - transaction costs.
Id. at 423 (statement of Jan Edelstein, Special Assistant to the Chairman, American International Group, Inc.).
314 See House Liability Hearing, supra note 89, at 146 (statement of Keith 0. Fultz,
Director, Planning and Reporting, U.S. General Accounting Office) ("[The] EPA has an
estimate of something like 10, 12 months longer if it is involved in litigation.").
In considering the extent of cleanup delays caused by litigation, the findings in a Report
by the General Accounting Office (GAO) are relevant. The report states that "[a]s of
September 1, 1993, approximately 62 separate lawsuits had challenged [the] EPA's actions
at Superfund sites before those actions were complete." GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
GAO/RCED-94-256, SUPERFUND: STATUS, COST, AND TIMELINESS -OF HAZARDOUS
WASTE SITE CLEANUPS 15 (1994) [hereinafter GAO REPORT]. The GAO focused on ten
of these lawsuits, finding that three of them delayed cleanups by more than one month. Id.
at 15-16. All three of these challenges were ultimately dismissed either by the district court
or court of appeals. Id. at 16. One of the appendices to the GAO report provides greater
details about litigation-related delays that occurred at four Superfund sites. The delays
ranged from less than one month to three years. Id. at 37.
315 The GAO, in summarizing its study of the timeliness of CERCLA cleanups, found
that litigation delays principally resulted from court orders halting response actions, and
also from "diver[sion]" of EPA staff from work on the cleanup to "prepar[ation] for litigation." GAO REPORT, supra note 314, at 37-40. The GAO report also stated that, when
litigation causes delays in cleanup, it may also increase cleanup costs because the EPA may
incur contractor costs during the time that the cleanup is halted. Id. at 38. Finally, the
GAO summary indicates that litigation challenging cleanups may have off-site impacts as
well: "according to the EPA site attorney, the challenge delayed negotiations with responsible parties at two other sites: one where [the] EPA planned to use the same incineration
contractor and another site where similar contamination was present." Id. at 39.
316 See Interview, supra note 312.
317 The task of identifying PRPs for the often abandoned Superfund site is difficult and
time consuming. See REPORT ON SUPERFUND ADMINISTRATION, supra note 9, at 68. Even
PRPs have recognized the enormity of this task. See Ways and Means Review Hearings,
supra note 26, at 484 (statement of William H. Bode, General Counsel, Superfund Action
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associated with defining individual PRP liability had made the EPA
reluctant to pursue de minimis settlements with PRPs.318 However,
the EPA is now increasing the already substantial resources it commits to such settlements.319

Litigation also adversely impacts agency resources by involving
agency lawyers directly in liability litigation - lawyers engaged in
defending pre-enforcement claims against the agency are unavailable to provide support for agency actions and decisions that would
further cleanup efforts. 320 They are also unavailable to negotiate
settlements that would result in PRP-lead site cleanups.
Cleanup delays result from litigation for a second reason that is
unrelated to agency resources. Litigants typically seek injunctions

to preserve the status quo when a planned or ongoing cleanup is at

issue.32 ' Moreover, even in the absence of a court order that bars

additional action at the site, the EPA is concerned about the
appearance of contemptuous conduct and is accordingly reluctant
to continue a cleanup at a site when the ongoing response action is

itself the subject of pending litigation.322 In sum, the assumption

Coalition) ("Consider the quandary of [the] EPA, charged with the task of sorting out
Superfund liability at a particular 40-year old dump site.... It's no wonder that up to 70
percent of the funds available for cleanup have been consumed on these enormously complex administrative tasks."); id. at 426 (statement of Jan Edelstein, Special Assistant to the
Chairman, American International Group, Inc.) ("It is abundantly clear by now that the
source of most of the disputes, delays, and wasteful spending at Superfund sites is the need
to determine and allocate liability. At most multi-party sites, there is a paucity of hard
data on what was dumped, by whom, and when."); id. at 485 (statement of William H.
Bode, General Counsel, Superfund Action Coalition) ("[G]iven the enormous costs of
clean-up at stake, for sites whose environmental problems go back in some cases several
decades, the tasks of assigning strict liability to PRPs and apportioning costs among them
have proven to be prohibitively expensive in time and money.").
318 See REPORT ON SUPERFUND ADMINISTRATION, supra note 9, at 140 ("In the past,
EPA regions had been reluctant to use de minimis settlements because gathering the information necessary to arrive at this type of settlement is very labor-intensive."); House Liability Hearing, supra note 89, at 62-63 (statement of Keith 0. Fultz, U.S. General
Accounting Office) ("[T]he cost to the [EPA] regions of de minimis settlements represents
a major impediment to completing such settlements. [EPA officials] said that de minimis
settlements compete for limited enforcement resources and can distract already
overburdened regional site teams from site cleanup."); see also id. at 68 (statement of Keith
0. Fultz, U.S. General Accounting Office) ("[P]reparing a [nonbinding allocation of
responsibility (NBAR)], like preparing de minimis determinations, can divert the regional
site team from site cleanup.").
319 See Interview, supra note 312; see also House Liability Hearing,supra note 89, at 6567 (statement of Keith 0. Fultz, U.S. General Accounting Office) (describing administrative actions taken by the EPA to encourage greater use of de minimis settlements).
320 See Interview, supra note 312.
321 See id.; see also supra note 315 (discussing a consistent finding in a GAO REPORT).
322 See Interview, supra note 312. Because of the effects of litigation on the cleanup of a
site, the EPA is concerned about the alternative holding in United States v. Princeton
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that pre-enforcement review will slow cleanups has an apparent
factual basis.
Given the accuracy of section 113(h)'s two underlying assumptions - accuracy that no interested observer has ever contested the provision is plainly necessary to prevent cleanup delays from
CERCLA liability litigation. Moreover, the provision has been
quite effective in foreclosing pre-enforcement review of the CERCLA liability issue.323
2.

Pre-Enforcement Review of RCRA Corrective Actions

Tle conclusion that CERCLA needs a provision to foreclose
early review of liability issues begs the question why there is no

such need in the RCRA corrective action program. As we have
seen, immediate review of corrective action requirements is availGamma-Tech, Inc., 31 F.3d 138 (3d Cir. 1994). In that case, the court held that, once the
EPA brings a cost-recovery action against a PRP under § 107, the PRP may challenge the
response action even if the response action is ongoing and the PRP has not yet completed
any discrete portion. Id. at 147. The EPA is concerned that, if adopted by other courts,
this construction of the Act could slow down cleanups at sites subject to cost-recovery
actions or could force the EPA to change its enforcement strategy. See Interview. supra
note 312.
323 Results of the cases discussed in part II of this article demonstrate the effectiveness
of this provision. A GAO report reached the similar conclusion that, "[w]ith few exceptions, the statutory limits appear to have accomplished the Congress's goal of ensuring that
[the] EPA's cleanup activities are not hindered by legal challenges." GAO REPORT, supra
note 314, at 17. The GAO report also included the following summary of government
views about the review preclusion provision:
Department of Justice (DOJ) and [the] EPA attorneys believe that the limits
on judicial review have been very effective in discouraging or quickly eliminating challenges to [the] EPA's cleanup activities. While the courts have historically disallowed early challenges to [the] EPA's cleanup decisions, these
attorneys also maintain that the statutory limits have made it even more difficult for parties to succeed with these challenges, thereby discouraging parties
from bringing these suits. Most of the challenges we reviewed had little effect
on cleanup schedules. According to government attorneys, only three site
cleanups have been delayed by legal challenges since the. statutory bar was
enacted.
Id. at 15. The GAO report also discussed how the review preclusion provision is perceived
as deterring parties from filing a legal challenge:
The DOJ official responsible for overseeing the government's response to
legal challenges noted that the review bar is most effective when it discourages parties from filing challenges. Although it is impossible to predict how
many challenges would have occurred if the statutory bar had not existed,
DOJ and EPA attorneys believe that the bar has discouraged many parties
from challenging [the] EPA's actions. The DOJ official reported that one
anticipated challenge to [the] EPA's site access was averted simply by providing the potential claimant with an explanation of the statutory limitation on
judicial review.
Id. at 17.
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able under RCRA - a distinguishable context. 324 First, the
RCRA context differs because liability vel non is not an important
issue since RCRA's cleanup requirement is tied to the existence of
a TSD facility with a known owner or operator. Thus, investigating
and assigning liability does not drain agency resources under
RCRA as it does under CERCLA. Second, CERCLA, unlike
RCRA, has the NCP, which defines whether cleanup expenditures
are appropriate - the government cannot recover response costs
that a liable party demonstrates are inconsistent with the NCP.325
Consistency with the NCP thus provides a standard that can be
applied in CERCLA cases after a cleanup is complete to ensure
that the expenses were not inappropriate and that the scope of liability is not improper.
Notwithstanding these important differences, it is nevertheless
true that parties subject to RCRA corrective action requirements
will be concerned about the extent of their liability, which may
vary depending on the corrective action measures that are ordered.
These parties have the right to challenge the need for or adequacy
of these measures prior to their implementation. The fact that
RCRA has succeeded while allowing such pre-implementation
review undercuts to some extent the view that pre-enforcement
review of CERCLA liability issues would significantly harm the
Superfund program. On the other hand, post-completion review
under CERCLA for consistency with the NCP means that delayed
review should be adequate. Accordingly, there is no compelling
argument under the CERCLA scheme that review of liability
issues must occur before significant cleanup costs are expended in
order to guarantee the review's adequacy.
3.

Consequences of Section 113(h)

Even if one accepts that section 113(h) has been very effective in
foreclosing litigation of liability issues that would seriously slow
cleanups of Superfund sites, the provision may nevertheless damage the overall effectiveness of CERCLA and the cleanup of hazardous substances if it makes other aspects of the Superfund
statute less effective. Because courts hold that section 113(h) bars
pre-enforcement review of the liability issue, new pressures have

324
325

See supra part II.C.2.
See supra note 60.
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developed within the Superfund program in two areas relating to
allocation of Superfund liability among PRPs.326
First, one scholar has argued that, by foreclosing pre-enforcement review of response actions, the statute has encouraged PRPs
to focus their litigation resources on the NPL listing decision in the
hopes of avoiding the CERCLA liability issue if the site is never
listed on the NPL.327 This type of litigation has made NPL listing
more difficult for the EPA, which establishes the priority list for
Superfund cleanups.328 However, the EPA does not believe that
this is a significant side effect of pre-enforcement review preclusion. In the EPA's view, a PRP is likely to challenge a listing on
the NPL only if it has a major connection to the site. Therefore,
even if pre-enforcement review were available, such review would
not likely absolve a PRP in that position.329
Second, because the courts are not open for early resolution of
their CERCLA liability, the PRPs have increased pressure on the
EPA to resolve liability issues through settlements. 330 Even in the
absence of PRP pressure, the EPA has become more interested in
CERCLA settlements, especially given the congressional intent of
the 1986 CERCLA Amendments to encourage settlements, 331 and
because the limited amount of the trust fund constrains the EPA's
ability to pursue publicly-financed cleanups. 332 The EPA's
approach to settlement has focused principally on promoting PRP326 See Ways and Means Review Hearings, supra note 26, at 380 (statement of Brent J.
Gilhousen, Corp. Counsel, Monsanto Company, *on behalf of the Superfund Settlements
Project). Mr. Gilhousen notes,
[iln evaluating the seriousness of the [liability] allocation problem, the heavy
majority [of industry respondents to a questionnaire] ... answered that allocation problems are 'extremely serious. . .

.'

These answers [to the question-

naire] tend to confirm the prevailing view among PRPs that allocation issues
are a heavy weight on progress of the overall Superfund program.
Id.
327 See John S. Applegate, How to Save the National PrioritiesList from the D.C. Circuit
-

and Itself, 9 J. NAT. RESOutCES & ENVrL. L. 211, 223-26 (1993-94).
328 See id.

329 See Interview, supra note 312.
330 See Ways and Means Review Hearings,supra note 26, at 362 (statement of Bill Mulligan, Manager, Environmental Affairs, Chevron Corp., on behalf of the Am. Petroleum
Inst.) (stating that API encourages use of nonbinding allocations of responsibility
(NBARs) and de minimis settlements "to foster a more cooperative approach to settlements and create an atmosphere among PRPs and [the] EPA where resources could be
focused on actual cleanup as expeditiously as possible").
331 See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 252 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3276,. 3345 ("The purposes of the settlement procedures set forth in section
122 are to expedite settlements and to assure the effective clean-up of Superfund sites.").
332 See supra notes 10-12, 82 and accompanying text.
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lead cleanups, since PRPs view such settlements as a practical way
to control their cleanup costs. As a result of this approach, PRPs
now pursue private cleanups at more than three-quarters of all

Superfund sites, a significant benefit of section 113(h). The review

preclusion provision has facilitated the EPA's settlement efforts
because litigation is not available to PRPs as an alternative way to
determine and minimize liability.

Although the EPA's administration of CERCLA depends
greatly on PRP-lead settlements, the EPA has generally refrained
from significant use of the settlement tools provided and

encouraged by Congress in 1986 and endorsed by PRPs -

de

minimis settlements and nonbinding allocations of responsibility

(NBARs). These tools aid the actual allocation of liability among
the PRPs for a site. Before they can be used, however, three open
questions will usually have to be answered.
First, the EPA must identify the PRPs for the site, a labor intensive task. 3 Second, in some of these settlements, the EPA and
the PRPs must come to an agreement upon each PRP's share of

cleanup responsibility - a divisive issue 334 that has no generally

accepted method for apportionment. 335 Finally, allocation of PRP
liability must usually wait for a determination of the cleanup's costs
- in the absence of knowing those costs, neither party may be
willing to settle.336 Because many critical aspects of the response
333 See supra note 317 and accompanying text.
334 See Ways and Means Review Hearings,supra note 26, at 379-80 (statement of Brent J.

Gilhousen, Corp. Counsel, Monsanto, on behalf of the Superfund Settlements Project). In
the hearings, one PRP representative stated that
[slince the initial efforts to implement Superfund in the early 1980s, allocation
issues have presented many of the most significant obstructions to progress in
Superfund proceedings. Efforts to achieve settlements under which PRPs
would perform Superfund work, were often blocked by the fact that the PRPs
could not determine the basis of their respective responsibilities. In the past
three years, since May 1989 when [the] EPA enunciated its Enforcement First
policy, the government has intensified pressure on PRPs to accelerate their
internal negotiations while at the same time it has shortened the deadlines,
with the result that PRPs still are often held back by allocation uncertainties.

Id.

335 See REPORT ON SUPERFUND ADMINISTRATION, supra note 9, at 132 ("It is also not
unusual for responsible parties that contributed large quantities of less toxic waste to try to

apportion cleanup costs based upon the toxicity or hazardous characteristics of the waste,

rather than its volume alone. The competing interests often lead to protracted litigation.").

336 See Ways and Means Review Hearings,supra note 26, at 388 (statement of Brent J.
Gilhousen, Corp. Counsel, Monsanto, on behalf of the Superfund Settlements Project).
Mr. Gilhousen stated:
A true premium [in a settlement] can only be calculated after it becomes reasonably clear what base of PRPs will be liable and available to bear the costs
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action - e.g., the standards for cleanliness at the site, the cleanup
methodology - are uncertain, the cost of cleanup cannot often be
determined early enough to permit a settlement'that minimizes
transaction costs. 337 Indeed, in the view of PRPs, foreclosing preenforcement review and postponing it until after costs are incurred
exacerbates the problem of waste and inefficiency in the cleanup of
sites. 338 The EPA rejects this view because CERCLA forecloses
not paid by the settling parties. Some allowance for uncertainties in collection
from within the PRP base must be calculated into the premium charged those
who settle out early, and the amount of the allowance will have to be determined by reference to the specific circumstances relevant to each site.
Id.; see also id. (statement of Brent J. Gilhousen, Corp. Counsel, Monsanto, on behalf of
the Superfund Settlements Project) (stating also that "we remain apprehensive that the
difficulties of making a reliable estimate [of potential remedial costs] will drag down the
settlement process and cause settlements to be delayed until most of the transaction costs
have already been incurred").
337 See REPORT ON SUPERFUND ADMINISTRATION, supra note 9, at 9-10 (stating that
"the determination of 'relevant and appropriate' requirements is subject to considerable
uncertainty that generates unnecessary litigation over choice of remedy. Modification of
ARARs could speed cleanups by reducing this unneeded litigation"); id. at 82 ("As such,
generic cleanup standards and remedies do not exist, requiring cleanup levels and.methods
to be determined on a site-by-site basis. As a result, disputes arise over the issue 'how
clean is clean?' and over what remedy should be selected to achieve the required level of
cleanliness."); Ways and Means Review Hearings, supra note 26, at 361 (statement of Bill
Mulligan on behalf of the Am. Petroleum Inst.) (agreeing that "a contentious issue at
numerous sites is how much cleanup is necessary to protect human health and the environment, or 'How Clean Is Clean?' Cleanups at many sites have been delayed because of
protracted arguments among [the] EPA, PRPs, states, and the public over the levels to
which the PRP must remediate"); id. at 374-75 (statement of Brent J. Gilhousen, Corp.
Counsel, Monsanto, on behalf of the Superfund Settlements Project). Mr. Gilhousen
notes,
[w]ithout any question, the greatest problem that impairs the cost-effectiveness of the current program is that the framework for making decisions on
what remedial action should be undertaken at each site is skewed in the direction of idealistic solutions that can impose exorbitant costs, particularly when
contrasted to alternative approaches that could provide equivalent practical
protection with far greater economy.
Id.
338 See Ways and Means Review Hearings, supra note 26, at 377 (statement of Brent J.
Gilhousen, Corp. Counsel, Monsanto, on behalf of the Superfund Settlements Project).
Mr. Gilhousen argues,
[t]he present statutory and regulatory framework of Superfund provides little
incentive to emphasize efficiency in the performance of work. Section 107
provides blanket authority for the government to recover "all" costs not
inconsistent with the [NCP]. The statute also explicitly prohibits efforts by
PRPs to limit wasteful government actions by barring any form of preenforcement judicial review. There are no standards to assure that government expenditures are properly controlled or carefully monitored ....
This
makes settlement unlikely, fosters increasing litigation, and contributes to a
sense of unfairness by our government's actions.
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the recovery of unreasonable costs - that is, costs that are incon339
sistent with the NCP.
Thus, notwithstanding pressure to increase settlements and the
reforms included in the 1986 Amendments, the contentious, open
issues that must be resolved prior to a settlement allocating liability
among PRPs have made such settlements a little-used method for
defining liability and relieving the pressure to gain pre-enforcement review. 340 Indeed, the EPA does not employ such settlements
for basically the same reasons that Congress barred pre-enforcement review of the CERCLA liability issue: the EPA does not
want to spend an undue amount of time working to allocate liability up front, and would prefer to leave that issue for resolution
after the cleanup and principally among PRPs themselves in contribution actions or settlements. 34 1 In fact, the EPA's current settlement focus on PRP-lead cleanups forces the PRPs themselves to
339 See Interview, supra note 312. Because the trust fund supporting EPA-lead cleanups
is limited, reimbursement of the trust fund is important to the EPA, and it will be wary of
incurring costs that are inconsistent with the NCP.
340 See Ways and Means Review Hearings,supra note 26, at 426 (statement of Jan Edelstein, Special Assistant to the Chairman, American Int'l Group, Inc.). This part of the
hearing discusses the EPA's failure to make use of de minimis settlements, mixed funding
agreements, and NBARs, all of which Congress included in SARA in order "to accelerate
cleanup and eliminate many of the program's obvious inequities." This interested observer
concluded that
[t]here are good reasons for the failure of these supposedly cure-all remedies.
First, all are enormously resource and labor intensive and [the] EPA's
Superfund spending request has been cut year in and year out by Congress.
Second, the data required to do NBARs and de minimis settlements frequently does not exist at many sites and no amount of wishing or mandating
will cause waste disposal records to materialize from the past 30 years.
Id.
341 See REPORT ON SUPERFUND ADMINISTRATION, supra note 9, at 147. The report
specifies,
EPA regional officials have determined that Superfund personnel should concentrate on overseeing and completing the various site cleanup stages remedial investigations and feasibility studies, records of decision, and
cleanup construction - rather than devote time to negotiating de minimis
.settlements or mixed funding agreements or fashioning NBARs. EPA headquarters and regional offices appear resigned to the current practice of
responsible parties determining their own cost allocation through contribution litigation.
Id. The report also notes,
[t]he experience of Region I, where so much EPA time and effort was
expended without reaching a timely cost allocation among the responsible
parties, may have served to discourage the use of NBARs by other EPA
regions. The allocation of cleanup costs among responsible parties through
litigation relieves EPA personnel of the time-consuming duties of negotiating
NBARs.
Id. at 143. The report states,
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bear the transaction costs associated with allocating liability among
all PRPs in contribution actions.342 The EPA might have to bear
many or all of these costs if CERCLA did not foreclose early
review of response actions.343
In sum, section 113(h) has been effective in foreclosing what
would otherwise be extensive pre-enforcement litigation intended
to allocate each PRP's share of CERCLA liability. Although foreclosing this litigation may make the NPL listing decision more controversial, that effect is acceptable, particularly because section
113(h) increased settlements that result in PRP-lead cleanups.
Because the provision has been effective in foreclosing litigation of
liability issues, it speeds cleanups, reduces overall cleanup costs by
encouraging PRP-lead cleanups, and relieves the trust fund of
transaction costs related to a full allocation of liability among
PRPs.
Fairness Concerns Outside Section 113(h)
Before considering the fairness of review preclusion, it is important to reiterate that PRPs have consistently challenged the fairness of CERCLA's liability scheme. PRP concerns about the
fairness of the Superfund statute focus on its retroactive, strict,
joint and several liability scheme. 34 Because section 113(h) delays
4.

EPA Region III completed a de minimis settlement in 1992 at the Tonolli
Corp. Superfund site in Nesquehoning, Pennsylvania, that took over one and
one-half years to complete with more than 3,300 work hours expended by two
EPA attorneys, one civil investigator, the site project manager, and clerical
staff.
Id. at 140-41 (footnote omitted); see also supra note 317.
342 See PROBST ET AL., supra note 10, at 17 ("Joint and several liability enables the government to keep its transaction costs low because the subsequent reallocation of costs to
other parties, as well as the ensuing transaction costs, take place without government
involvement. The net result is that both cleanup and transaction costs fall primarily on the
private sector.").
343 The EPA need not incur these transaction costs in the RCRA corrective action program, because under that program a particular owner or operator of a TSD facility must
take corrective action at one or more solid waste management units located at its facility.
See supra notes 161-164 and accompanying text.
344Ways and Means Review Hearings, supra note 26, at 477 (statement of Donald S.
Bunin, Vice President, Sequa Corp., on behalf of the Superfund Action Coalition) ("In an
effort to 'make the polluter pay,' CERCLA imposed on this country a liability scheme
radically different from any other under law, and which repudiates 200 years of American
jurisprudence. Liability for clean-ups is based upon ...status... rather than culpability.");
see REPORT ON SUPERFUND ADMINISTRATION, supra note 9, at 133 ("One of the major

criticisms of the current Superfund liability system focused on its equity and fairness.");
Ways and Means Review Hearings,supra note 26, at 24 ("The most familiar equity questions have dealt with the definition of the set of PRPs and the allocation of costs among
them. This category includes such questions as ... how volume and toxicity should be
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resolution of liability issues for potentially long periods of time,
PRPs criticize the provision itself as unfair. 5 These concerns
about the fairness of the liability scheme should be considered in
light of both its congressional purpose - that those responsible for
the problems of hazardous waste disposal, rather than taxpayers,
should bear the costs of cleanup 346 _ and the reality that
adversely affected parties are likely to view
any liability scheme for
34 7
unfair.
as
cleanups
substance
hazardous
The only way to entirely eliminate PRP concerns about the
unfai'ness of CERCLA liability would be to eliminate CERCLA's
retroactive, strict, joint and several liability provisions.
Such a
weighed in allocating cost shares to industrial and municipal waste in landfills containing
both .... ); id. at 322 (statement of Katherine N. Probst, Fellow, Ctr. for Risk Management, Resources for the Future) (agreeing that "there has been much discussion of
whether the liability standards in Superfund should be changed, owing in large part to the
perceived inequities associated with these standards. Some believe that the major source
of unfairness in the law is the imposition of joint and several liability"); id. at 399 (statement of the Hazardous Waste Cleanup Project) ("It has been acknowledged by Congress,
[the] EPA, and the courts that the Superfund liability scheme is unfair. That unfairness is
rooted in the retroactive, strict, and joint and several features of Superfund liability.").
345 See REPORT ON SUPERFUND ADMINISTRATION, supra note 9, at 269 (additional views

of Rep. Bill Zeliff). Representative Zeliff proposed amending CERCLA's provisions
regarding judicial review of liability. He developed the proposals based on his work with
the New Hampshire Superfund Task Force, "which represented a wide scope of interested
parties from all over the State." Id. at 265. His first proposal was to "[almend CERCLA
to provide a meaningful opportunity for judicial review of remedy selection and liability,
and this opportunity should be available, whenever possible, before PRPs must make payments." Id. at 269.
346 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
347 See House Liability Hearing,supra note 89, at 114 (statement of Katherine Probst)
("There probably is no 'fair' Superfund financing scheme - either in terms of liability, or
in terms of the taxes to finance the trust fund. Each of the liability schemes introduces a
new element of unfairness.").
348 See Ways and Means Review Hearings,supra note 26, at 485 (statement of William H.
Bode, Gen. Counsel, Superfund Action Coalition). Mr. Bode argues,
[p]ast societal mistakes should be paid for out of a common fund without
worrying about which companies contributed and to what degree, except in
those few cases where an intentional 'black-hat' polluter was the culprit. ...
[T]rying to pinpoint liability for mistakes happening decades ago is a waste of
resources that could be spent on cleanup.
Id. PRPs continue their long-standing desire to reform the CERCLA liability scheme.
Indeed, "[i]n 1986, Congress was concerned enough about th[e] unfairness [of the liability
scheme] that it gave [the] EPA a new set of tools to use in order to mitigate the harshness
of the liability standard. These tools included mixed funding, de minimis settlements, and
non-binding allocations of responsibility ('NBARs')." Id. at 348 (statement of the Chemical Manufacturers Association). Because Congress believes that the current liability system has been useful in generating non-public sources of money to pay for cleanups,
Congress appears unlikely to abandon the CERCLA liability scheme. See REPORT ON
SUPERFUND ADMINISTRATION, supra note 9, at 126 ("Unquestionably, the current system
is generating private party involvement in the Superfund cleanup process. The parties
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change would likely result in new and different claims of unfairness. 349 In the absence of such a fundamental change in the liability scheme, affected parties have alternative ideas about the
equitable administration of CERCLA, even given section 113(h)'s
review preclusion.
As we have seen, the PRPs' intense desire to allocate liability
arises in large part from the fact that the extent of liability is so
uncertain. ° The EPA's increased use of presumptive remedies
should reduce such uncertainty 351 and allow easier, more certain,
and earlier calculation of cleanup costs, 352 making settlements

responsible for generating and disposing of the hazardous waste found at Superfund sites
are paying for more than 60% of current site cleanup. Changing the liability system could
have adverse effects."). In fact, concerns that Superfund cleanups would be slowed make it
unlikely that the Act will be amended more modestly to require an early administrative
allocation of a fair share of liability for each PRP. See id. at 167-68. According to the
report, amending the CERCLA liability scheme to require a front-end determination by
an ALU of a party's "fair share" of liability
would require that the Superfund absorb very large costs for orphan shares, as
well as require [the] EPA or the state to expend extensive resources to identify all responsible parties. A tax increase would be needed to cover these
additional costs. The elimination of joint and several liability would reduce
incentives for responsible parties to assist in the expensive and difficult task of
identifying other responsible parties.
Id.
As an alternative to reforming the liability system, PRPs have also argued to amend
CERCLA to limit the costs for which a PRP may be held liable. See Ways and Means
Review Hearings, supra note 26, at 377 (statement of Brent J. Gilhousen, Corp. Counsel,
Monsanto, on behalf of the Superfund Settlements Project) ("Section 107(a) should be
amended to limit [the] EPA's right of cost recovery to 'reasonable' costs. Although this
standard would lack precise definition, it would provide a yardstick of common prudence
against which government expenditures would be tested.").
349See PROBST ET AL., supra note 10, at 26-27, 112-13.
350 See supra notes 51, 53-56, 348 and accompanying text.
351 See Ways and Means Review Hearings, supra note 26, at 234 (statement of Don R.
Clay, Assistant Adm'r, Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency) (noting that the EPA plans to make greater use of presumptive remedies,
which "will streamline removal actions, site studies, and remedial actions, thereby improving consistency, reducing costs, and increasifig the speed with which hazardous waste sites
are cleaned up").
352 Greater predictability regarding cleanup costs should reduce litigation and transaction costs related to liability. See id. at 81 (statement of Jan Paul Acton, Assistant Director, Natural Resources and Commerce Div., Congressional Budget Office) (noting that
while discussing cleanup negotiations, PRPs commented that "being forced to sign up for a
share of a cost of unknown magnitude too early causes PRPs to put up a lot of resistance.
That is often true at the stage of the remedial investigations and feasibility study.").
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more likely. 353 These efforts now involve major investments of
agency resources. 4
PRPs have also vigorously contended that fairer use of the Unilateral Administrative Order (UAO) authorized by section 106
would make CERCLA more equitable. PRPs protest that the
EPA's increasing reliance on UAOs intensifies CERCLA's unfairness by permitting the EPA to order a cleanup by one or a few
(typically deep pocket) PRPs 5 PRPs contend that this use of
UAOs unfairly burdens UAO recipients,356 and undermines any
chance for cooperation and settlement among PRPs. 7 Therefore,
353 See REPORT ON SUPERFUND ADMINISTRATION, supra note 9, at 80 ("The lack of

certainty about what cleanup remedy [the] EPA will choose discourages responsible parties
from taking the lead in cleaning up hazardous waste, fosters disputes over remedy selection, and creates inconsistencies in the stringency and cost of the cleanup."); see also id. at

110 ("The ARARs requirement does lend uncertainty and inconsistency to the remedy
selection process, making responsible party litigation over the remedy and delays in the
cleanup process likely. Further, the uncertainty over which standards and remedies will be
applied is a disincentive for responsible parties to initiate cleanups.").
If the EPA identified presumptive cleanups after public notice and comment, such
response actions might also reassure PRPs that the actions are not unnecessarily costly.
See Ways and Means Review Hearings, supra note 26, at 352 (statement of Bernard J.

Reilly, Corp. Counsel, Du Pont Co.) ("[T]he liability scheme is wrong because it places the
remedy selection decision in the hands of regulators with absolutely no incentive to control
costs, since the law allows recovery of every penny from the parties. This is an unhealthy
dynamic.").
354 See Interview, supra note 312.
355 Ways and Means Review Hearings,supra note 26, at 349 (statement of the Chemical

Mfrs. Ass'n). One trade association stated that
Unfortunately, the reality of "enforcement first" has been that [the] EPA has
relied almost exclusively on Section 106 unilateral orders, and the threat of
treble damages for non-compliance, to coerce cleanups....
This increased use of unilateral orders has produced a number of dramatic
results that surely were never intended by Congress. [The] EPA routinely
issues these orders to only a small handful of PRPs at each site and leaves it to
them to seek cost recovery from other PRPs.
Id.

356 See id. at 352 (statement of Bernard J. Reilly, Corp. Counsel, Du Pont Co.) ("Adding
to the inequities that result from paying for the share of owners, operators and other
defunct parties, [the] EPA selectively enforces against a subset of the viable parties."); id.
at 370 (statement of Stanley Blossom, Director, Envtl. Affairs, Oryx Eng'g Co., on behalf
of the Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs.) ("Regardless of how small a contributor is, it is not equitable
for [the] EPA to select only a percentage of waste contributors and require them to fund
the entire cleanup effort. [The] EPA must develop a system that deals with 1hese small
entities to allow them participation based on waste contribution.").
357 See id. at 376 (statement of Brent J. Gilhousen, Corp. Counsel, Monsanto, on behalf
of the Superfund Settlements Project). Mr. Gilhousen stated:
No action is more divisive among the PRPs or counterproductive to overall

progress than [the] EPA's frequent practice of issuing a . . . [UAO] under

§ 106 to only a handful of identified PRPs, omitting the names of other companies that are clearly liable, financially viable, and - in some cases - even
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PRPs strongly urge that the EPA name all identifiable PRPs for the

site in a UAO. 358 For similar reasons, a House Member has suggested that CERCLA be amended to allow pre-enforcement
review of section 106(a) orders.359 If such review were available,
section 106(a) orders would be far less useful to the EPA.3 6 °
Finally, other administrative steps could expedite the settlement

and allocation of CERCLA liability, thereby easing fairness concerns. PRPs, for example, have urged the EPA to share immedi-

ately information about the identity of all known waste generators
(known as waste-in lists) for disposal sites, allowing PRPs to coordinate and settle liability issues among themselves.36 ' PRPs have

recalcitrant. This style of enforcement action divides the PRP group, tremendously complicating the challenge of developing a cooperative agreement
among the PRPs to contribute funds and labor to undertake a remedial
responsibility.
Id. Mr. Gilhousen also noted:
Another major concern of PRPs in addressing allocation issues is the unfortunate divisiveness that results from government enforcement actions. The
worst offender in this regard is the issuance of a ...[UAO] naming a limited
subset of PRPs as liable under the order. This creates a division among the
PRPs and can instantly demolish months of tedious negotiations to achieve
understandings on allocations.
Id. at 384 (statement of Brent J. Gilhousen, Corp. Counsel, Monsanto. on behalf of the
Superfund Settlements Project).
358 See id. at 362 (statement of Bill Mulligan on behalf of the Am. Petroleum Inst.). Mr.
Mulligan states:
API also encourages [the] EPA to name all identifiable PRPs in implementing
the Section 106(a) unilateral enforcement order provision. [The] EPA's practice of naming only a few "deep pocket" PRPs in an order and expecting
those few to go after other PRPs through third party actions creates serious
and presumably unintended obstacles to cleanup. This mode of implementation initiates legal maneuvering on the part of named PRPs resulting in prolonged court battles as opposed to a cooperative settlement.
Id.
359 See REPORT ON SUPERFUND ADMINISTRATION, supra note 9,at 269 (containing recommendation of Rep. Bill Zeliff that Congress "[a]mend CERCLA to make available to
private parties a pre-enforcement hearing to determine if a Section 106 Administrative
Order is arbitrary and capricious or otherwise unlawfully issued, or to determine if the
private parties are liable under Section 106").
360 See Interview, supra note 312.
361 See Ways and Means Review Hearings,supra note 26, at 375-76 (statement of Brent J.
Gilhousen, Corp. Counsel, Monsanto, on behalf of the Superfund Settlements Project).
Mr. Gilhousen notes:
The government should be mandated to share with PRPs basic data revealing
who sent wastes to a site and data that is neither deemed confidential nor
enforcement-sensitive (narrowly construed) on an automatic basis. Congress
can achieve this result by amending CERCLA §§ 106(a), 107(a), and 113 to
provide that [the] EPA cannot bring cost recovery actions or issue § 106
orders for remedial actions until it has provided all Waste-in data to all parties
that have requested such information. Uniform compliance with this proce-
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also asked the EPA to facilitate CERCLA liability settlements earlier in the remedial process by using clauses that permit them to
change the settlement amount if final cleanup costs differ from projected costs (known as cost re-opener clauses).3 6 2 Finally, PRPs
have urged the EPA to administer CERCLA in a way that treats
all PRPs the same, instead of offering more favorable treatment to
PRPs that are municipalities or have fewer resources to fund a
cleanup.363 Although EPA officials view pleas for the "same treatment" skeptically,364 the agency itself has taken steps to administer
the program more equitably. The EPA has committed itself to
fairer use of the CERCLA lien 365 and has made major efforts to
release liability information to PRPs, develop presumptive remedies, and provide guidance to streamline response selection
further.366
In sum, the review preclusion provision tends to intensify concerns about the Superfund liability scheme by delaying liability
dure would accelerate PRP organization at every site and avoid unnecessary
delays and costs.
Id.; see also id. at 381 (statement of Brent J. Gilhousen, Corp. Counsel, Monsanto, on
behalf of the Superfund Settlements Project) ("By all accounts, the single most important
ingredient in achieving PRP organization is the development of an acceptable waste-in list.
This has been a longstanding issue in the history of dialogue between [the] EPA and
PRPs."); id. at -426 (statement of Jan Edelstein, Special Assistant to the Chairman, Am.
Int'l Group, Inc.) ("Absent reliable and complete data, fairly determining and allocating
liability is difficult, if not impossible.").
362 See id. at 394 (statement of Brent J. Gilhousen, Corp. Counsel, Monsanto, on behalf
of the Superfund Settlements Project) ("In order for de minimis settlements to achieve
wide usage, they must be implemented early in the process before the RI/FS is advanced,
or the transaction cost savings will be already lost. That means that the Cost Overrun Reopeners must become routine.").
363 See id. at 376 (statement of Brent J. Gilhousen, Corp. Counsel, Monsanto, on behalf
of the Superfund Settlements Project) ("By requiring the government to deal with all PRPs
with even-handed uniformity, unfairness in the program would be reduced and a message
would be sent to every PRP that would provide a direct incentive for its constructive participation in performance of responsibilities under the program.").
364 In the EPA's view, it administers CERCLA appropriately by accounting for a PRP's
ability to pay and its status as a municipality when considering whether a settlement is
reasonable. See Interview, supra note 312.
365 Administration of Superfund by the Environmental Protection Agency: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 103d Cong.,
1st Sess. 41 (1993) (statement of Robert M. Sussman, Deputy Adm'r, U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency). According to Mr. Sussman:
We will take several actions to provide greater fairness for owners at
Superfund sites. [The] EPA will issue guidance on filing federal liens against
property at Superfund sites. The guidance will provide the site owner the
opportunity to submit information to or meet with EPA officials prior to [the]
EPA placing a Federal lien on the owner's property.
Id.
366 See Interview, supra note 312.
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determinations - delay that may have adverse economic effects on
PRPs.3 67 However, PRPs have not directed criticism at the review
preclusion provision independent of its effect on delaying liability
decisions. It is difficult to assuage PRPs' underlying concerns
about the fairness of CERCLA liability, although the EPA has the
ability to respond to them partially by modifying its administration
of the program. In any event, section 113(h) has successfully foreclosed litigation of the liability issue, a benefit too important to
lose through a repeal of section 113(h), at least as long as the current liability scheme is retained.
B.

The Effectiveness and Fairness of Foreclosing Review of
Nonliability-Based CERCLA Claims

Most nonliability-based CERCLA challenges claim that a proposed remedial action will irreparably injure human health or the
environment. Regardless of whether these claims relate to a chosen remedy's desirability or a site's cleanliness standards, such
claims will necessarily slow cleanups if brought prior to enforcement or cleanup completion. In the absence of a provision that
forecloses immediate judicial review, the number of health-based
CERCLA claims would be quite large because the RI/ES process is
so controversial. 368 However, since courts have almost uniformly
interpreted section 113(h) to bar litigation of these claims prior to
completion of at least a discrete phase of the cleanup, this provision, has been effective in promoting prompt cleanups.369
However, if CERCLA's prompt cleanup goal is understood
more generally as a public health protection goal, then the provision loses some of its effectiveness when the provision forecloses
review of legitimate claims by affected parties that implementation
of the proposed remedial plan will itself harm public health. It is
impossible to review adequately such a claim after completing a
challenged phase of the cleanup and the feared harm has already
367 See Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc. v. Reilly, 889 F.2d 1380, 1390 n.18 (5th Cir.
1989).
368 See REPORT ON SUPERFUND ADMINISTRATION, supra note 9, at 9-10 ("The determination of 'relevant and appropriate' requirements is subject to considerable uncertainty
that generates unnecessary litigation over choice of remedy."); see also id. at 80 (stating
that the "nonstandardized approach" to remedy selection causes a "lack of consistency
[that], in turn, generates disputes over the remedy [the] EPA selects, further slowing the
pace of cleanups and adding to their costs"); id. ("The lack of certainty about what cleanup
remedy [the] EPA will choose . . . fosters disputes over remedy selection, and creates
inconsistencies in the stringency and cost of the cleanup.").
369 But see United States v. Princeton Gamma-Tech, Inc., 31 F.3d 138 (3d Cir. 1994).
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occurred. Of course, public health concerns themselves compete
with continuing health risks posed while a cleanup is delayed by
litigation. In general, courts have not chosen to further public
health protection by construing the provision to permit pre-completion review of such health-based claims.
In contrast to its effectiveness in barring pre-completion review
of health-based CERCLA claims, the provision has been less effective in barring early review of sporadic citizens' suits asserting
370
CERCLA claims that are related neither to liability nor health.
The willingness of courts to entertain these other CERCLA claims
reflects a view that review in these rare cases will not significantly
impact the speed of cleanups.
The nonliability-based CERCLA claims that give rise to the
greatest concerns about the unfairness of review preclusion are
health-based claims. This article has discussed how those claims
should be divided into two broad categories for purposes of analysis.371 First, many claims assert that implementation of the
response action will itself harm public health or the environment,
mandating alternative cleanup measures. Second, other claims.
assert that completed cleanups will not sufficiently protect human
health. The cleanup may fail either because the cleanliness standards are too lax or because the cleaning methods are simply insufficient to reach the desired level of cleanliness.
The first category of claims gives rise to the greatest concerns
about the unfairness of review preclusion. For this category of
claims, delayed review is necessarily inadequate because the
health-based concerns arise out of the actual cleanup measures.372
However, delayed review of the second category of claims does
not give rise to the same concerns about unfairness. Even if review
of those claims takes place after the completion of the cleanup,
that review should still be adequate. A court is able to order
implementation of new, more protective cleanup standards or additional efforts to ensure compliance with the cleanup standards that
See supra note 220.
See supra part III.A.
See Interview with William Shutkin, Co-Director, Alternatives for Community &
Environment, Inc. (Feb. 15, 1995) [hereinafter Shutkin Interview]. It may have been as a
result of this perception of unfairness that the deliberations of the New Hampshire
Superfund Task Force, "which represented a wide scope of interested parties from all over
the State," led to the recommendation of Rep. Bill Zeliff that CERCLA be amended "to
provide a meaningful opportunity for judicial review of remedy selection and liability."
REPORT ON SUPERFUND ADMINISTRATION, supra note 9, at 265 (additional views of Rep.
Bill Zeliff), 269.
370
371
372
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properly apply to the site. An order to engage in further cleanup
almost fully redresses the concerns raised by the second category
of claims. To be sure, redress is not completely adequate because
postponing review delays a proper cleanup of the site. However,
such a delay is not unfair - a delay in cleanup would also have
resulted from pre-completion review of those same claims. Indeed,
there is a marginal public health benefit to litigating such a claim
after the site has been cleaned up to a significant (and presumptively reasonable) degree. In sum, review preclusion of the second
category of claims does not raise a significant concern about
unfairness.
Nonetheless, the inadequacy of post-completion review of the
first category of claims does give rise to very serious concerns
about unfairness - delayed review in that case may result in harms
to public health. For this reason, section 113(h) should permit precompletion review when a plaintiff contends that the implementation of the proposed remedy will harm public health or the environment.373 This narrow interpretation of the review preclusion
provision has received a mixed, but generally hostile, reaction in
the courts.374
Because PRPs would raise such claims and thereby slow CERCLA cleanups, the EPA has great concerns about permitting early
review of health-based claims.375 In the EPA's view, slowing cleanups endangers human health and the environment because hazardous substances would continue to be released into the environment
during the review. This concern is certainly legitimate. Indeed, it
is the core concern that led to the enactment of CERCLA.
To assess the significance of the EPA's concern about public
health risks, three facts should be considered. First, given the
structure of EPA response actions, the EPA or the state will in
almost all cases have previously conducted a removal action to stabilize the site (and the risks associated with it), before engaging in
373 See Healy, supra note 1, at 43-51. This argument relies in part on the procedural
requirements of the statute and the statute's purpose to protect human health and the
environment. See id.
374 Compare, e.g., Hanford Downwinders Coalition, Inc. v. Dowdle, 841 F. Supp. 1050,
1062 (E.D. Wash. 1993) ("Unfortunately, the position does not find support in the plain
language of the statute or in the many cases that have interpreted the statute."), affd, 71
F.3d 1469 (9th Cir. 1995), with United States v. Princeton Gamma-Tech., Inc., 31 F.3d 138
(3d Cir. 1994) (permitting immediate review of health-based CERCLA claims under the
CERCLA citizens' suit provision).
375 PRPs might bring such actions if they could claim that cheaper cleanup measures
would pose no risk or a reduced risk to public health, or if they believed they could delay
the time at which they incur significant response costs.
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work on the RI/FS and developing the plans for the remedial
action. Thus, when the health-based claims arise out of a planned
remedial action, an earlier removal action will most likely have
greatly reduced the threat to human health and the environment.
Second, even if pre-completion review of the health impacts of a
proposed remedial action were permitted, the EPA would retain its
authority under section 106 to order or to bring an action in district
court ordering abatement of any "imminent and substantial endangerment to the public health" caused by the release or threat of a
release of hazardous substances. 376 Thus, if delaying cleanup poses
a substantial endangerment, the EPA could order or seek relief
needed to abate that threat. Third, the availability of immediate
review in RCRA corrective actions suggests that the risks that such
review poses to human health are outweighed by the value of early
review. As discussed, the release of hazardous waste or constituents into the environment triggers the corrective action requirement.377 The public health hazards associated with those releases
should be, on the whole, equivalent to the public health risks
resulting from the hazardous substance releases that result in CERCLA remedial actions, especially after a removal action is completed and the CERCLA site has been stabilized. In sum, allowing
immediate review of claims that implementation of a CERCLA
cleanup will harm-public health and the environment should not
itself result in an undue risk to public health and the environment.
Constraints on pre-completion review of the health-based claim
could also minimize the risks that pre-completion review poses to
public health and the environment. First, there should continue to
be a strong bar against pre-completion review of removal actions.
The EPA could thus continue to rely upon removal actions to stabilize sites and reduce the risks of hazardous substance releases,
without the delays associated with litigation. Because CERCLA
imposes significant limits on the duration and expense of removal
actions, this more limited bar against pre-completion review should
not be viewed as unfair.378 Constraints on removal actions ensure
that their implementation is unlikely to pose significant risks to
human health, particularly when balanced against the risks arising.
from an unstable site.
Second, constraints on pre-completion review of the healthbased claims associated with remedial action implementation pre376
377
378

See 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a).
See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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vent undue delay and the risks to human health associated with
such delay. RCRA corrective action review provides examples of
key constraints in a context where undue delay may also present
public health concerns. One such constraint is initial review by the
expert Environmental Appeals Board "(EAB) within the EPA.
Such review should provide consistency and expertise in decisionmaking, particularly because the EAB has significant experience
with considering petitions for the review of corrective action
requirements included in RCRA permits. 379 The EAB, when it initially reviewed a CERCLA health-based claim, would ensure that
the petition involved a health claim that could not be reviewed
adequately following the cleanup. Review by the EAB would also
provide an administrative record and decision, subject -to subsequent court review. The other key constraint would be time limits
on requests for review and responsive briefing before the EAB.
Persons seeking review of corrective action conditions within a permit must file a petition within thirty days after the permit is
issued.380 The EAB then typically provides the Regional Office
forty-five days to file a response along with an administrative record.381 In almost all cases, briefing is complete at that point.382
Regardless of whether pre-completion review becomes available
for health-based claims related to implementation of remedial
actions, more sensitive administration of the RI/FS and selection of
the remedy can mitigate the unfairness that results from applying
section 113(h)'s review preclusion to these claims. If the EPA
designs and selects remedial actions in an open manner - providing for a full airing of the concerns of affected parties - the local
community is more likely to support the action finally selected,
decreasing the likelihood of a court challenge.383 The EPA has
379 For a similar recommendation that the EAB play a role in the CERCLA settlement
review context because of its expertise, see David L. Markell, "Reinventing Government":
A Conceptual Framework for Evaluating the Proposed Superfund Reform Act of 1994's
Approach to Intergovernmental Relations, 24 ENVTL. L. 1055, 1080-81 (1994). At present,
the EAB's sole CERCLA function is to review § 106(b) petitions for reimbursement from
the trust fund.

See

ENVIRONMENTAL

PROTECTION

AGENCY,

THE ENVIRONMENTAL

APPEALS BOARD PRACTICE MANUAL 21-23 (1994).

380
381
382
383

40 C.F.R. § 124.19(a) (1995).
See ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 379, at 6.
See id. at 6-7.
See Shutkin Interview, supra note 372; see also REPORT ON SUPERFUND ADMINIS-

TRATION, supra note 9, at 65. The Subcommittee reports that:
When [the] EPA proceeds with a Superfund cleanup without providing adequate information to the local community or without taking into consideration the community's objections to the cleanup, delays can occur as
community resistance to the cleanup remedy grows. Witnesses representing
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made a significant effort to ensure better and earlier community
involvement in selecting a remedial action.384
One activist contends that an open process of formulating the
response action is helpful in breaking down the basic mistrust that
exists between the EPA and communities affected by CERCLA
cleanups, and may yield agreement between the EPA and these
communities regarding the most appropriate cleanup. 385 In this
regard, CERCLA's technological assistance grants to community
groups 386 help to inform the community and to instill mutual confidence. 387 This activist hypothesized that, if the process leading to
remedy selection were improved, the desire for litigation would
wane and the availability of immediate review would slow cleanups
only marginally. 38 8 He cited the New Bedford Harbor cleanup as
an example of the impact of an improved CERCLA process.38 9
There, openness, informal consultation, and mediation between the
EPA and the affected community avoided the need for litigation
and its dilatory effects.39°
C. The Effectiveness and Fairnessof Foreclosing Review of
CERCLA Liability in Bankruptcy Proceedings
This article has summarized how section 113(h) has achieved
limited success in foreclosing review of CERCLA liability claims
prior to government enforcement when a debtor seeks to discharge
a CERCLA claim in a bankruptcy proceeding.39 ' Section 113(h)
becomes progressively less effective depending on the test that the
[the] EPA, state and local governments, and local residents virtually all agreed
that Superfund sites experience fewer delays when the local community is
involved during the early stages of cleanup.
Id. See generally id. at 74 ("Community acceptance of a cleanup remedy is essential for a
timely completion of a Superfund cleanup. Local communities should be involved with site
progress before [the] EPA develops the Record of Decision and selects the cleanup
remedy.").
384 See Interview, supra note 312.
385 See Shutkin Interview, supra note 372.
386 These grants are available pursuant to § 117(e) of CERCLA. See supra note 46 (discussing public involvement in remediation plans).
387 See Shutkin Interview, supra note 372.
388 See id.
389 See id.

390 See Stearns, supra note 248, at 79-82 (telling the story of the remedy selection for
New Bedford Harbor). It may be important that the community used the threat of a citi-

zens' suit to encourage the use of mediation with the community in defining the proper
remediation plan. See id.
391 See supra part III.C.
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court applies. Under the Chateaugay approach,3 92 the EPA must
file any CERCLA claims related to the cleanup costs of any release
that occurred prior to the bankruptcy petition's filing for which the
debtor is a responsible party. This requirement applies regardless
of the cleanup's stage or whether a cleanup has been initiated at
all. Thus, once the EPA learns that a debtor has filed a bankruptcy
petition, the agency must first devote its administrative resources
to identifying any CERCLA liability for that debtor and then to
estimating the likely cleanup costs for which that debtor is responsible. Each of these tasks is labor intensive. The task of identifying
PRPs is quite time consuming, particularly for old and abandoned
sites.393 The EPA estimates the amount of the claim against the
debtor in the next step - this turns on several difficult to define
variables. 39 4 Given the EPA's limited resources, completing these
tasks likely reduces the EPA's ability to pursue cleanups at other
sites.395
Two alternative approaches to identifying when a claim may be
discharged in bankruptcy396 intrude less on the EPA's administrative flexibility. Before a CERCLA claim will be discharged, the
claim either must be within the EPA's fair contemplation or the

EPA must have expended response costs. In both of these circum392 See supra notes 228-34 and accompanying text.
393 See Ways and Means Review Hearings,supra note 26, at 484 ("Consider the quandary
of [the] EPA, charged with the task of sorting out Superfund liability at a particular 40-year
old dump site.... It's no wonder that up to 70 percent of the funds available for clean-up
have been consumed on these enormously complex administrative tasks.").
394 See REPORT ON SUPERFUND ADMINISTRATION, supra note 9, at 170-71 (discussing
the desirability of early de minimis settlements with PRPs, the report states that "after the
initial indemnification of responsible parties, [the] EPA seldom has reliable waste contribution data, site characterization data, or cleanup cost estimates" to permit the estimates
needed for such settlements); see also Ways and Means Review Hearings,supra note 26, at
237 (statement of Don R. Clay, Assistant Adm'r, Office of Solid Waste and Emergency
Response, U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency) (noting that bankruptcy cases "are often
resource-intensive, but in some instances can yield significant cost recovery").
395 For example, the EPA has recognized that if it expends the administrative resources
needed to complete a settlement (which requires the sort of administrative tasks needed to
estimate claims in bankruptcy), the agency will be less successful in cleaning up hazardous
substances. See REPORT ON SUPERFUND ADMINISTRATION, supra note 9, at 141 ("Despite
the success in securing responsible party cleanup funds, the extensive work hours taken [in
Region III] to secure the settlement caused some delays at other Superfund sites in the
region, another disincentive to the use of de minimis settlements."); see also Ways and
Means Review Hearings, supra note 26, at 415 (statement of John D. Cole, Senior Vice
President, Zurich Ins. Group, on behalf of the Am. Ins. Ass'n) ("[A] bankruptcy filing
stays all claims against the bankrupt party, thus possibly delaying the cleanup of any
Superfund sites with which the bankrupt party is involved."); Schuh, supra note 224, at 207.
396 National Gypsum and Union Scrap present these approaches, discussed supra notes
235-46 and accompanying text.
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stances, the EPA will at least have identified the debtor as a
responsible party at a release site so that the EPA will be left with
the sole7 (but difficult) task of estimating the amount of the
claim.

39

By allowing the discharge of so many CERCLA claims, the

result in Chateaugay may increase the number of bankruptcy petitions.3 98 One commentator has also argued that Chateaugay will

make the settlement of CERCLA claims more difficult. 399 On the
other hand, other commentary has decried the result in Chateaugay
because the court defined the scope of discharged claims too
narrowly. °°

Although commentators do not agree about the proper circumstances under which CERCLA liability ought to be discharged in
bankruptcy,40 ' they concur that CERCLA is very difficult to recon397 One commentator has argued that the approach adopted in Union Scrap is "directly
inconsistent" with the bankruptcy code in defining when a CERCLA claim may be discharged. See Schuh, supra note 224, at 213. Another commentator has argued that the
benefit to the EPA of the fair contemplation test may be illusory:
If [the] EPA has identified a site and begun some preliminary efforts to establish a plan for a cleanup, it could easily be deemed to have "contemplated"
the problem; yet it may not have identified all the parties that are potentially
liable at the site or the extent of the cost of cleanup.
Topol, supra note 223, at 207.
398 See Ways and Means Review Hearings,supra note 26, at 415 (statement of John D.
Cole, Senior Vice President, Zurich Ins. Group, on behalf of the Am. Ins. Ass'n) ("The
high costs of Superfund cleanup, and the potentially disproportionate impact of the liability system, can force an otherwise healthy company into bankruptcy. A recent ruling by
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals that Superfund claims are dischargeable in bankruptcy could increase the number of firms which file for bankruptcy as a result of their
Superfund liabilities.").
399 See Kevin J.Saville, Note, Discharging CERCLA Liability in Bankruptcy: When
Does a Claim Arise?, 76 MINN. L. REV. 327, 352 (1991) ("If the debtor can escape both
known and unknown liability by entering into bankruptcy, it has no incentive to settle with
the EPA.").
400 See Kenneth E. Aaron, The Chateaugay Appeal: Crash at the Intersection of Bankruptcy and Environmental Law, 6 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 535, 536-37 (1991) (criticizing the
Second Circuit for improperly narrowing the definition of "claim" adopted by the district
court). Notwithstanding the Second Circuit's affirmance of the district court, Aaron argues
that the Second Circuit established a threshold requirement of a nexus between the debtor
(LTV) and the creditor (the EPA). See id. Aaron argues that, as long as there is a prepetition release or threat of a release, the EPA's awareness of a PRP and of the PRP's prepetition conduct should be irrelevant to whether a dischargeable claim exists.
401 For various proposals for determining when a CERCLA claim may be discharged,
see, e.g., Bevis, supra note 227, at 198-99 (summarizing the balancing test approach proposed by Katherine Simpson Allen); id. at 199-200 (explaining agreement with the foreseeability test proposed by Saville); Saville, supra note 399, at 354 ("[C]ourts should discharge
only the CERCLA liability which is or was foreseeable at the conclusion of the debtor's
bankruptcy case." (emphasis in original)); Schuh, supra note 224, at 215 ("[C]ourts should
hold that CERCLA liability under the Bankruptcy Code only arises after hazardous waste
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cile with the Bankruptcy Code,

°2

and that, notwithstanding its cat-

egorical terms, section 113(h) should not bar litigation of the

liability issue (and a discharge in bankruptcy) until the government
brings an enforcement action.4 °3 In sum, section 113(h) has not
been effective in barring the discharge in bankruptcy of CERCLA
liability claims prior to cleanup or an EPA enforcement action.

To evaluate the fairness of the application of section 113(h) in
the bankruptcy context, one must consider first the statutory values

that conflict when the two statutory schemes interact. A provision
that delays the estimation and discharge of claims that affect reorganization and solvency undermines the fresh start value that animates the Bankruptcy Code. 404 Thus, PRPs who rely on
bankruptcy protections to settle debts and claims and re-start operations will find a statutory scheme that retains CERCLA liabilities
unfair. Such PRPs would favor Chateaugay's broad rule for discharging CERCLA liability, while they would view the other, narrower rules of discharge as unfair.
Solvent responsible parties, subject to joint and several liability

for cleanup costs along with debtors, voice a countervailing claim
of unfairness. These responsible parties are increasingly concerned
about the fairness of CERCLA liability if debtors may readily discharge CERCLA claims through bankruptcy, thus placing greater
portion of the cleanup costs on solvent parties. 5 PRPs in this
is detected and the party is actually notified that the EPA has identified [it] as a PRP.").
Another commentator has argued that the issue of when a CERCLA claim is subject to
discharge is not of central importance and would become decidedly less important if Congress amended the Bankruptcy Code to prioritize environmental claims. See Topol, supra
note 223, at 232.
402 E.g., John C. Ryland, Note, When Policies Collide: The Conflict Between the Bankruptcy Code and CERCLA, 24 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 739, 771 (1994) ("[T]he dischargeability issue presents a very complicated and difficult problem to resolve."); cf.
Bevis, supra note,227, at 202 ("[Jludicial intervention has failed miserably to develop a
logical, rational, and consistent resolution to the conflict [between CERCLA and the

Code.]").
403 Cf. Ryland, supra note 402, at 771- ("While almost all courts agree that CERCLA
liability can be discharged in bankruptcy, there is vast disagreement as to when such liability becomes dischargeable."). But see Nancy H. Kratzke, Dischargeability Issues and
Superfund Claims: The Conflict Between Environmental and Bankruptcy Policies, 17
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 381, 415-16 (1992) (arguing that cleanup costs should not be discharged in bankruptcy because CERCLA cleanups serve important public policies when

financed by those responsible for the contamination).
44

See supra note 225 and accompanying text.

405 See Ways and Means Review Hearings,supra note 26, at 415 (statement of John D.
Cole, Senior Vice President, Zurich Ins. Group, on behalf of the Am. Ins. Ass'n) ("Bankruptcy increases the proportionate share of other responsible parties, regardless of their
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position would view narrow rules of discharge as fair, and would
oppose the broad, Chateaugay rule.
Indeed, fairness concerns motivated (at least in part) the district
court in National Gypsum to adopt its rule of bankruptcy discharge.40 6 That court concluded that claims subject to discharge
(and a filing obligation) are those within the fair contemplation of
the parties. Such a rule appears to be fairest to all parties involved.
D.

The Effectiveness and Fairness of Foreclosing Review of
Claims Under Other Substantive Statutes

When considering the effectiveness of review preclusion of
claims raised under other substantive statutes, one must consider
more than only the pace and effectiveness of CERCLA cleanups.
In deciding whether review is foreclosed, a court should undertake
a case and statute-specific analysis of the extent to which immediate review threatens the policies of both CERCLA and the other
federal statute. To the extent that these potentially competing policies are properly weighed in deciding whether section 113(h) forecloses review under the other statute, the vindication of rights
established under other federal statutes will more than offset any
negative effect on the efficiency of CERCLA cleanups. Congress
has seen fit to protect those competing rights by providing for a
right of review in court.
The following example illustrates how effectiveness must be
assessed in the context of litigation involving CERCLA and other
statutes. Although no case has addressed this potential conflict,
suppose that a plaintiff brings a claim asserting that a CERCLA
response action is inconsistent with the Endangered Species Act of
1973 (ESA)40 7 and that later review will not adequately protect the
ESA interests.4 °8 In that setting, a court should have the ability to
weigh whether the statutes can be harmonized and whether the
policies of the ESA mandate that review be conducted before the
response action threatens the existence of an endangered species.
If the court concludes that the ESA claim should proceed, it will
have effectively prioritized ESA interests over a swift CERCLA
actual involvement at a site."). This concern relates, of course, to bankruptcy's fresh start
policy, rather than to CERCLA's liability policy.
406See supra notes 235-43 and accompanying text.
40716 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988 & Supp. 1993).
408

Cf.Stearns, supra note 248, at 83-84 (arguing for jurisdiction under CERCLA to

review a CERCLA remedial plan that would result in obvious and irremediable harms to
the environment).
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response. However, given the broad and categorical terms of section 113(h), a court is more likely to forego the balancing of statutory values and foreclose review reflexively. That outcome does
although it
not undermine the effectiveness of CERCLA cleanups,
40 9
may not protect other statutory values effectively.
Notwithstanding the categorical terms of section 113(h), if courts
carefully consider the interrelation of statutory schemes and policies of the other federal statute with CERCLA, they will not
degrade the overall and effective protection of statutory rights.
The ultimate conclusion courts reach about whether section 113(h)
forecloses jurisdiction may properly differ based on the competing
statutory policies underlying the substantive law that supports the
plaintiff's claim. The results will likely vary because each case will
present a statutory conflict implicating CERCLA or other statutory values to different degrees - the impact that early review
would have on furthering or undermining those values may change
as well.
However, one EPA official has expressed serious reservations
about permitting pre-cleanup review of health and welfare-based
challenges to response actions. The principal concern is that PRPs
will transform claims relating to cleanup costs (and therefore the
scope of their CERCLA liability) into health or environmentalbased claims. 411 Providing this opportunity for early litigation
would, in the official's view, result in a significant amount of precleanup litigation. 411 Furthermore, a jurisdictional approach that
involves balancing statutory policies would not be workable and
would be inferior to a clear and categorical rule barring jurisdiction.412 For this latter reason, the EPA official believes that the
current text of section 113(h), which is clear and categorical, bars
courts from balancing competing statutory policies.41 3
Fairness concerns arise in the present litigation context when a
court forecloses review pursuant to section 113(h) and makes
meaningful review of a claim under another statute impossible.
These concerns are not compelling because courts seem willing to
decide the merits of the asserted statutory claims when it is neces409 One commentator argues that, by broadly foreclosing review of RCRA citizens' suits
seeking review of cleanups at federal facilities, this approach has "largely thwarted . ..
important oversight." Wuerth, supra note 248, at 385.
410 See Interview, supra note 312.
411 See id.
412 See id.
413 See id.
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sary to ensure meaningful review. Indeed, courts have shown a
willingness to decide statutory claims on the merits even after they
have concluded that review of the statutory claim is unavailable or
the availability of review is uncertain. Thus, in Arkansas Peace
Center,4 14 the Eighth Circuit decided a citizen group's RCRA claim
on the merits after concluding that section 113(h) foreclosed dis-'
trict court review of the RCRA claim. 15 Similarly, the court in
BFI assumed the existence of jurisdiction to resolve the RCRA
claim asserted by the plaintiff.4 16 In sum, courts in this litigation
context are concerned about equity and the adequacy of delayed
review of the statutory claim. If a plaintiff can convince the court
that foreclosing review will deprive the claimant of meaningful
review, then the claimant is likely to gain immediate review of the
statutory claim.
E. The Effectiveness and Fairness of Foreclosing Review of
Claims for Nonstatutory Review Brought Under the APA
The categorical language of section 113(h) has been effective in
foreclosing review sought through the APA. A contrary interpretation requiring the EPA to comply with the procedural dictates of
NEPA or the NHPA before proceeding with a response action
would make the EPA's decisionmaking more cumbersome and its
actions slower.
Although section 113(h) has effectively foreclosed review under
these procedural statutes, such preclusion might be criticized as
unfair because it denigrates the procedural values protected by federal statutes such as NEPA and the NHPA. The concern about
fairness does not seem strong for several reasons. First, CERCLA
and the NCP mandate procedures for the RI/ES process that are
intended to protect the affected parties' procedural rights and
ensure adequate consideration of environmental impacts.417 Sec414 999 F.2d 1212 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1397 (1994); see supra, notes
257-61 and accompanying text.
415 Arkansas Peace Ctr., 999 F.2d at 1218.
416 Browning Ferris Indus. of South Jersey, Inc. (BFI) v. Muszynski, 899 F.2d 151, 152

(2d Cir. 1990); see supra, note 262.

417 See supra note 46 (describing the CERCLA procedures for remedial plan selection
and implementation). For discussion on how CERCLA procedures provide affected states
with additional procedural protection, see supra note 49 and accompanying text. The NCP
provides that, when designing a remedial action, the EPA should consider impacts on the
habitat of endangered and threatened species. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(e)(2)(i)(G) (1995).
Also, one of the nine critical criteria for evaluating alternatives when selecting a remedial
action relates to the "[o]verall protection of human health and the environment." Id.
§ 300.430(e)(9)(iii)(A).
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ond, with regard to the historic preservation values protected by
the NHPA, the EPA indicated that it would consider historic preservation values when designing the remedy. 418 Finally, the
Boarhead court recognized that one of the traditional safety valves
that make pre-enforcement review available in special circumstances could allow a court to exercise pre-enforcement jurisdiction
to protect preservation values in a case where delayed review
would be inadequate to protect those values.419 In sum, section
113(h) pre-enforcement review foreclosure does not raise significant concerns about fairness under the APA.
F.

The Effectiveness and Fairness of Foreclosing Review of
Constitutional Claims

Section 113(h) has been least effective in foreclosing preenforcement review of constitutional claims, with the majority of
courts permitting pre-enforcement review in this context. Given
that courts generally permit pre-enforcement review of constitutional claims in other administrative law contexts, 4 20 the provision's
lack of effectiveness in this context is understandable.
Permitting review of constitutional claims has a limited impact
on the pace of CERCLA cleanups. First, there are relatively few
such claims, particularly when compared to liability claims. Second, the EPA need not expend significant administrative resources
to litigate these claims because they do not typically turn on resolving the CERCLA liability issue or the issue of the adequacy of the
proposed cleanup. Indeed, the court in Reardon fashioned its rule
permitting pre-enforcement review to minimize the burden on the
EPA. 42 1 Third, and finally, when a PRP or an affected group brings
a constitutional claim, the EPA has completed the difficult preliminary work of PRP identification and, possibly, remedy selection at
the site. This means that the EPA will have already dedicated
some of its resources to pursuing a cleanup at the site. Allowing
litigation of these claims thus does not pose the same threat to
418
419

See Boarhead Corp. v. Erickson, 923 F.2d 1011, 1022 n.17 (3d Cir. 1991).

See id. (noting that because the EPA accounts for historic preservation concerns in
the RI/FS process, the court did not have to "reach the troubling question" of whether
review would be available to protect those values in the absence of such administrative
consideration).
420 See supra notes 130, 137 and accompanying text.
421 An EPA official argued that the Reardon court properly interpreted § 113(h) by permitting a court to review not the response action, but the constitutionality of the statute.
See Interview, supra note 312; see also supra notes 301-07 and accompanying text (discussing Reardon).
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cleanups as that posed by litigating discharge of CERCLA claims
in bankruptcy. To protect those latter claims when the broad
Chateaugay rule of discharge is applied, the EPA will often have
the onerous tasks both of identifying PRPs and estimating their
share of liability.422
The courts that permit pre-enforcement review of constitutional
claims are principally motivated by concerns about fairness and the
preservation of basic constitutional rights. The cases, decided in
this context reflect the concerns that have motivated courts to
develop well-recognized exceptions, serving as safety valves to a
general rule foreclosing pre-enforcement review of agency
actions.423
V.

CONCLUSION

Having reviewed how courts apply section 113(h), as well as its
effectiveness and fairness, it is valuable to state some general conclusions about (1) the utility of the provision as currently enacted
and (2) the desirability of amending.the provision.
A. Evaluation of Section 113(h) as Enacted
1. In General
CERCLA's review provision expressly limits the availability of
pre-enforcement review. It speaks directly to. the availability of
judicial review and is therefore preferable to the provisions of
many other statutes. Because CERCLA includes this provision,
courts need not infer limits on pre-enforcement review.
2. Review of CERCLA Liability Claims
The CERCLA review preclusion provision has been very effective in meeting its intended purpose - foreclosing the litigation of
CERCLA liability issues prior to a government enforcement
action. Commentators have generally recognized this effectiveness
as important to the EPA's ability to pursue timely response actions.
However, PRPs view the provision as unfair because it delays the
liability determination while the PRP's potential exposure is very
high. This derives from the inherent unfairness of strict, joint, and
several liability on responsible parties. However, the availability of
adequate, delayed review of the liability issue (including review of
422 See supra notes 393-95 and accompanying text.
423 See supra notes 148-55 and accompanying text (discussing the safety valves to review
preclusion).
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the appropriateness of cleanup costs) undercuts the unfairness
claims. The EPA may seek to minimize further the perceived
unfairness of the provision by improved administration of the program and the use of procedures that moderate the impact of joint
and several liability.
3.

Review of Other CERCLA Claims

Section 113(h) has also been applied to foreclose review of other
health-based CERCLA claims that are unrelated to liability. The
use of section 113(h) in this context prevents the slowing of cleanups, but creates problems by foreclosing adequate review if the
underlying claim asserts that cleanup implementation will itself
cause irreparable injury to human health and the environment,
thus undermining the core reason for Superfund cleanups. Moreover, when the underlying claim relates to the adverse impacts on
human health and the environment expected from implementation
of a proposed remedial action, immediate review of the claim
appears to be appropriate under Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner:4 24 The issue is fit for judicial review and potentially great and
irreparable hardship will result if review is withheld. 25
For these reasons, courts should interpret section 113(h) to permit immediate review of such health and environmental-based
claims. In undertaking this review, courts should ensure that the
process leading to the selection of the remedial plan has been adequate. Such process-based review is, of course, best accomplished
before agency action is taken.426
4. Review of CERCLA Liability Claims in Bankruptcy
Proceedings
Cases in which courts must decide whether CERCLA claims are
discharged in bankruptcy present the greatest controversy involving review preclusion effects. Results in this litigation context are
least consistent with and quite likely to harm CERCLA values
because such litigation diverts agency personnel from cleanups.
These cases involve CERCLA liability; Congress decided with sec424
425
426

See 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
See id. at 140-41.
See ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE

OF THE UNITED STATES, RECOMMENDATION 827, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF RULES IN ENFORCEMENT PROCEEDINGS 17 (1982) ("When objections on procedural grounds are raised early, errors may be remedied promptly and-the
rule-making process recommenced with a minimum of disruption to the interests of those
affected by the rule.").
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tion 113(h) that litigation of this issue should not slow CERCLA
cleanups. Courts must account for Congress' decision in this
regard when they resolve the issue of when CERCLA claims arise
and are subject to discharge in bankruptcy. Courts must, of course,
also consider the fresh start policy of the Bankruptcy Code when
deciding this issue, but that latter policy must not predominate and
thereby undercut the EPA's effective administration of the
Superfund program.
5. Review of Other Statutory and ConstitutionalClaims
Courts are also faced with difficult issues when they must decide
whether section 113(h) forecloses pre-CERCLA-enforcement
review of claims based on other statutes or the Constitution. As in
the bankruptcy context, courts should decide whether to permit
such review based on a sensitive balancing of the conflicting statutory (or constitutional) values, including consideration of the adequacy of delayed review of the claims being asserted.
B. Amendment of Section 113(h)
1. In General
Section 113(h) is drafted in broad and categorical terms so that it
has the potential to foreclose pre-enforcement review of much
more than CERCLA liability issues. Courts have applied the provision unevenly in various nonliability contexts. Given that courts
have not applied consistently the uniform terms of section 113(h),
this provision should be amended to permit on its face a greater
range of judicial responses in different litigation contexts. Even
though Congress is to be commended for including a provision that
expressly governs the availability of pre-enforcement review, the
current terms of section 113(h) are too categorical and'expansive
to tolerate the flexible construction that courts have adopted in different litigation contexts.
2.

Specific Recommendations

a. CERCLA Liability Claims
An amended section 113(h) should maintain a strong rule of
review preclusion when PRPs bring actions against the EPA to
adjudicate any CERCLA liability issues prior to a cost-recovery or
other enforcement action. Preclusion of review in these cases
ensures the timeliness and effectiveness of CERCLA cleanups.
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CERCLA Health-based Claims

CERCLA should be amended to permit pre-completion review
of a claim that implementation of a portion (or the entirety) of a
remedial action will itself result in irremediable injury to public
health or the environment. 27 This review should take place initially at the administrative level before the EPA Environmental
Appeals Board (EAB), using the same limits on timing that apply
to EAB review of RCRA permits. The EAB decision should then
be subject to judicial review as a final agency action.
c.

CERCLA Liability Claims in Bankruptcy Proceedings
Congress should amend section 113(h) to define expressly when
CERCLA liability claims may be discharged in bankruptcy. Courts
have differed greatly in their interpretations of the current text.
Congress itself ought to balance the fresh-start policy of bankruptcy (which favors a broad discharge) and the prompt cleanup
pol icy of CERCLA (which favors a narrow discharge). The "fair
contemplation" standard adopted by the National Gypsum court is
a fair balance of the two competing policies.
d. Other Statutory and Constitutional Claims
In order to ensure adequate review and consideration of legal
values that arise independently of CERCLA, an amended statute
should provide for district court jurisdiction when a claim is made
that a response action will itself irreparably damage other statutory
values or violate the Constitution, and when those harmed interests outweigh the interest in foreclosing CERCLA review prior to
implementation or enforcement. Courts applying a review-preclusion provision amended in this way will have to engage in careful
decisionmaking that accounts for the statutory and constitutional
values that are at issue. Because Congress will likely conclude that
it is impossible to identify prospectively a legislative rule that will
accommodate competing policies, an amended statute will likely
have to rely upon a court's weighing of the competing values at
issue in a particular case.

427 However, such pre-completion review should not be available when the health-based
claim relates to the potential effects of implementing a removal action. Cf. Wuerth, supra
note 248, at 370-71 (arguing that § 113(h) should bar review of removal actions, but not
remedial actions, at federal facilities).

